Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

371. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, June 1, 1962.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum which Mr. Goodwin took with him to the meeting between the President and Ambassador Thurston on Saturday, May 26.² I understand that the memorandum was discussed at the meeting and that the President gave his general approval to it.

We would appreciate receiving a memorandum confirming the President’s approval of the position set forth in the memorandum or some other indication of the President’s decision respecting it.³

E.S. Little⁴

Attachment

Our present policy is aimed at the identification and support of a viable alternative to Duvalier and the ultimate dislodgement of the Duvalier regime in favor of such alternative. Our present target date for the completion of this operation is next May, at which time Duvalier’s first “elected” term of office expires. (We have never recognized the second “election” at which he extended his term.)

Among the reasons we feel it necessary to dislodge Duvalier are the following:

1. Some of the key people around Duvalier are ultranationalist, anti-U.S. and have communist backgrounds. There is every indication that their influence is increasing. We also believe that they are quietly, and under the very severe limitations of Duvalier’s ingrained suspicions of everyone, trying to increase their authority within the government, militia, etc.; hoping to take over when Duvalier goes. The longer that he hangs on the more likely they may be to succeed.

2. There is some indication of increasing communist activity in the country. There is no doubt that the longer this repressive regime continues the greater the potential communist strength.

3. Our support of Duvalier inevitably strengthens the hands of those elements of the opposition which are anti-US in orientation.

4. We are convinced that it is hopeless to try to work with Duvalier. He is indifferent to the social and economic welfare of his people, intoxicated with brutality and repressions, unaware or indifferent to the possibility of ultimate communist rule, and hostile to our guidance or advice. All efforts to work with him have met resistance and there seems to be no realistic hope that things will get better in the future.

5. A US role in dislodging Duvalier would, of course, help us with other democratic forces in the Caribbean area and be another significant step in upsetting the old “friendly to dictators” picture which still prevails although lessened by the DR events.

Under no circumstances would we try to dislodge Duvalier without a fairly clear idea who would replace him.

Thus we must use the next year to identify the alternative.

1. The CIA, FBI and INR have completed a dossier of promising Haitian exiles and visible resistance figures⁵ from which we are trying to select those most likely to be capable of heading a successor government.

2. We are trying to substantially increase our intelligence on Haiti. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Hard as it is to believe, we know far less about Haiti under Duvalier than we knew about the Dominican Republic under Trujillo.

3. Identification of an alternative is the primary mission of our Embassy.

While this is going on we will be publicly cool toward Duvalier and conduct normal personal and private contacts. We are most anxious not to do anything which will precipitate his departure before we are ready. On the other hand a cool public posture, with occasional mild acts of hostility, are essential if we are to encourage the tentative emergence of an opposition and make them willing to be in touch with us.

If we are ready next May it is probable that we will be able to get rid of Duvalier. We are studying plans for this now. The most promising approach would be the withdrawal of recognition at the time when his term expires. This would have a juridical base and we could probably get some other countries (e.g., Venezuela and Colombia) to go along with us. This complete severing of relations on the part of the US and others would make his fall almost inevitable.

I want to stress that this is now a probing operation. We do not intend to move decisively unless and until we feel that we have reasonable control over the future course of events.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Haiti, 1/61-6/62. Secret.
2. The meeting took place at the White House from 11:02 to 11:20 a.m. Schlesinger also attended. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) No other record of this meeting has been found.
3. Not found.
4. Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.
5. Reference, at least in part, is to a compilation listing nearly 200 potential oppositionists to Duvalier. The list was attached to a memorandum from Hilsman to Martin, May 7, in which Hilsman noted that Duvalier’s repression of dissident elements was so effective that there were no organized opposition groups inside Haiti. Oppositionists were all exiles. Hilsman listed 18 “technicans” who appeared to meet minimum standards of administrative ability, leadership, friendship to the United States or lack of animosity, and absence of Communist sympathies. (Department of State, Central Files, 738.11/5-762)