Office of the Historian

363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela1

Washington, December 13, 1963, 8:15 p.m.

516. Embtel 725.2 We can assure you decision recognize Honduran and Dominican regimes at this time only after exhaustive consideration all foreign and domestic aspects.3 In cases both countries our principal objective in withholding recognition has been return at earliest possible date constitutionally elected government. We have also sought (a) give pause incipient plotters in other parts hemisphere, (b) minimize violence and opportunities for extreme leftists expand their strength and (c) secure fullest possible respect for civil liberties and non-communist party activity pending new elections. While our non-recognition has yielded some success, we convinced that prospects for further influencing situation by non-recognition both countries in direction our objectives are virtually nil and continued non-recognition likely nullify gains thus far achieved.

We airpouching for your information detailed memoranda setting forth basis on which decision reached.4 Meantime following are factors [Page 748] in addition those cited Depcirtel 10655 favoring proposed US recognition which you may draw upon in further discussions with Betancourt and Oduber and/or Orlich to clarify our position:

Dominican Republic

1.
Our ability influence DR developments along course we favor during short and mid-term future will tend decrease if we continue withhold recognition since high world sugar prices and lack general Dominican popular reaction against coup support conclusion de facto regime does not need US recognition to survive.
2.
Regime’s personnel are not strong and lack popular support and thus would be easy targets for extreme leftist violence and/or military coup should serious difficulties arise. US recognition and support will significantly increase regime’s ability withstand extremists’ attacks and maintain commitments on free elections.
3.
Withholding recognition can be expected strengthen regime’s resistance our suggestions for measures to improve its national and international acceptance making eventual accommodation more difficult and increasing risk seriously damaging basically friendly relations between US and DR.
4.
Recognition will significantly enhance prospects for promoting replacement of less desirable elements now in government with more acceptable men since non-recognition is factor which has created cohesive political front against such changes. Triumviate believes US support will enable it take firm stand against party hacks and incompetents in cabinet and enlist able non-party civilians to replace them to improve regime’s capabilities for effective government beneficial to Dominicans and for adherence election schedule.
5.
Extreme leftists have started small scale guerrilla action against regime supported by suspected arms from Cuba. Recognition will enable us help Dominicans stop possible Cuban arms shipments and strengthen regime’s position suppress guerrilla and other extremist-provoked disorders which were being used as pretext by rightist civilian and military elements to suppress free political activity or to seize government and cancel election schedule. Situation this latter respect was deteriorating rapidly.
6.
Number of hemisphere governments favor early recognition and have held off this long only in deference our initiatives.

[Here follows discussion of the recognition of the new Honduran Government and instructions to the Embassies in Caracas and San Jose.]

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Moskowitz; cleared by Cottrell, ARA/EST, ARA/CMA, ARA/OAP, and S/S, and approved by E.M. Martin. Also sent to San Jose as telegram 226.↩
  2. Dated December 13. (Ibid.)↩
  3. The United States recognized the new Dominican Government on December 14.↩
  4. Not found.↩
  5. Dated December 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US)↩