Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

344. Department of State Policy Directive¹

D/ARA-5

Washington, May 15, 1962.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PLAN OF ACTION FOR PERIOD FROM PRESENT TO FEBRUARY 1963

A. Reference:

National Security Action Memorandum No. 153 of May 15, 1962, Subject: Policy Statement on Dominican Republic.

B. Objectives:

1. The maintenance of the Council of State in effective power until it is replaced by an elected government;

2. Control of the threat from the far left (Castro/Communist) and the far right (Trujillistas);

3. Resolution of the current Dominican economic and financial difficulties;

4. Sound preparation of the Dominican people for participation in the electoral process.

C. Plan of Action:

1. Immediate (within 2-4 weeks)

(a) Go beyond the present statement of the U.S. position in the event of the overthrow of the Council to make clear to all concerned, especially key military figures and Amiami and Imbert, that the United States Government would find it extremely difficult to recognize and to provide assistance to any government installed as the result of a coup against the Council.

(b) Advise the Council to proceed carefully on the “purge” of Trujillista elements in the armed forces, to assess closely the risks involved before moving, and to establish if possible a definite cut-off point for a “purge” so as to avoid unnecessary apprehension and consequent reaction among the military.

(c) Continue to press the Council to act on: agrarian reform (if the new law is sound), holding elections as scheduled, and the establishment of a specific administrative entity to receive claims against the Trujillo properties.

(d) Urge the Dominican Government to request the immediate return of an OAS electoral mission whose first task would be to assist in preparations for the August and December elections, and whose subsequent task would be to observe the elections.

• —Be prepared to consider very carefully a delay in the elections, if the OAS mission so recommends.
• —Be prepared to seek a delay in the elections if it becomes apparent that the results would be contrary to our interests, and attempt to influence the OAS mission in that direction.
• —Encourage the political parties to hold their conventions and begin normal political work in preparation for the elections.
• —Urge that the Dominican electoral law be so drafted as to avoid the creation of a multi-party system with consequent political fragmentation.

(e) Urge the Council to use the administrative entity set up to receive claims as a means of relieving pressure against it and of avoiding any further claims settlements until an elected government has established a sound procedure for financing payments against claims.

• —Advise the Council to announce, simultaneously with the creation of the claims tribunal, that a percentage (perhaps 25 percent) of the net profits, if any, from all the Trujillo properties will be placed in escrow to be used for payments of claims when an elected government has taken the action mentioned above.
• —Urge the Council to cease the sale of any Trujillo properties except those which are generally recognized as uneconomic.

(f) Complete immediately the consultations with Congress on the use of AIDFY 1963 contingency funds as the equivalent of the $22 million in sugar fees so as to enable Ambassador Martin soon after his return to the Dominican Republic (May 3) to advise President Bonnelly confidentially of the United States Government decision.

—Make no public announcement of the decision before the Dominican reaction is received. (The announcement, which must be carefully worded, should be released simultaneously by Ambassador Martin and AID headquarters.)

(g) [1 line of source text not declassified] improve intelligence collection on the activities of the far left and the political attitudes and activities of the military as their highest priority task. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

—Have the Service Attaches and senior MAAG personnel increase their efforts to gather intelligence on the political activities and attitudes of the Dominican military as their highest priority task.

(h) Assign competent, Spanish-speaking AID experts in riot control procedures to Santo Domingo immediately.

(i) Arrange for a public relations adviser to the Council (preferably, he should be a qualified Latin American under contract to the Council: failing that, an American under contract to the Council; and only as a last resort, an American paid from AID funds).

(j) Take immediate steps to reduce Embassy Santo Domingo’s visa backlog to the point where it is no longer a political liability.

2. Continuing (present to February 1963)

(a) Promote an agreement between the Council on one side and the UCN and PRD on the other on a minimum program of action by the Council which the parties would at least not oppose. (Such a consensus might encompass initially the principle of agrarian reform, specific economic and social projects under the Alliance for Progress—perhaps with special reference to the $22 million—and the OAS role in the preparations for elections.)

(b) Maintain pressure on the Council to continue to move forward, suggesting new tasks as the Council demonstrates its ability to perform.

—Publicize in the Dominican Republic through U.S. information channels positive accomplishments by the Council.

(c) Begin immediately to develop an anti-guerrilla capability in the Dominican armed forces.

—Bring about a reduction in the size and cost of the Dominican armed forces consistent with the provision of suitable internal security, coastal surveillance and anti-guerrilla capabilities.

(d) Maintain pressure on the Council for prompt action to reduce the budget deficit by sound tax measures and by the elimination of unnecessary expenditures.

(e) Urge the Council to rationalize the present control structure for the Trujillo properties. (An appropriate breakdown would appear to be an agency for the sugar properties, another for non-sugar agricultural lands, another for industrial enterprises, and a fourth for commercial and service enterprises.)

• —Arrange for a request from the Dominican Government to the IDB or AID to finance a thorough inventory and analysis, by a first-class U.S. management group, of all the Trujillo properties. (The group would be expected to determine the present condition of each of the properties and its future earning prospects. This report would furnish the factual basis for sound decisions by an elected government concerning the final disposition of the properties.)
• —Help the Dominican Government in obtaining technical assist-ance to operate the properties efficiently, and provide such assistance through AID, if private consultants are not available or desired.
• —Discourage U.S. interests from seeking to invest in the Trujillo properties until an elected government has made basic decisions on disposition.
• —Discourage U.S. management of (as distinct from technical assist-ance to) politically sensitive properties such as the sugar holdings, until an elected government has made basic decisions on disposition.
• —Keep constantly before the Government the necessity that the properties should be so operated as to maximize the economic and social benefits they can provide the Dominican people whose patrimony they are.
• —If, as is likely, the new constitution contains provisions concerning the handling of claims against the Trujillo properties, urge that these provisions be kept general in order to assure the new, elected government maximum flexibility. (Subject to conditions existing at the time of the drafting of the constitution, provision might be made in the constitution for the creation of a claims tribunal or commission which would begin operations under the new government and to which the administrative entity previously set up would turn over the claims it had received.)

(f) Be prepared to meet, and, if necessary, stimulate a Dominican request for a well-qualified adviser for the constitution-drafting process. (The adviser should be a Latin American jurist of suitable experience and acceptable political background. If no appropriate Latin American can be found, any American chosen would have to have extensive background in Latin American constitutional law.)

(g) Be prepared to provide very substantially increased economic assistance to the Dominican Government if, as a result of changes in U.S. sugar legislation, Dominican sugar ceases to earn the U.S. premium price.

—If such changes are not made, impress upon the Dominican Government the necessity for planning its economic and financial policies so as to take into account the temporary nature of the preferential U.S. market.

(h) Country team collaborating with Washington agencies develop promptly an outline of social and economic objectives and specific programs to reach them.

—Allocate responsibility for implementing programs to various agencies cooperating in the Alliance for Progress (AID, IDB, OAS, etc.) and set up mechanism to insure follow through.

(i) Expand, coordinate and improve the technical assistance and training programs of the Alliance organizations in the economic and financial agencies of the Dominican Government, as the priority element of a public administration program.

(j) Continue to press the IMF to raise the Dominican quota in the Fund so as to make available $13.5 million to bolster the Dominican reserve and foreign exchange positions.

(k) Provide AID financing for a privately prepared and presented “political literacy” course to teach, through radio and television, the basic principles and procedures of democratic government.

(l) Continue, with all available means, to control and reduce Castro/Communist influence in the student and labor movements.

(m) Assign without delay one or two political officers to Santiago to cover the important area of political activity centered on that city.

(n) Assure that all U.S. personnel assigned to the Dominican Republic be of the highest quality obtainable.

Action By:

Immediate

Department

(d)—paras 2 and 3

(f),(g)—para 1

(i),(j)

AID

(f),(h),(i)

[2 lines of source text not declassified]

Embassy Santo Domingo Country Team

(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(i),(j)

DOD

(g)—para 2

Continuing

Department

(e)—paras 3 and 4

(f),(g),(h),(j),(m),(n)

AID

(e)—paras 2,3,4,5

(g),(h),(i),(j),(k),(l),(n)

USIA

(b)—para 2

(k),(l),(n)

Embassy Santo Domingo Country Team

All paragraphs

DOD

(c),(n)

[2 lines of source text not declassified]

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department and Agencies Series, Department of State Policy Directive, 1961–1963. Secret; Limit Distribution. President Kennedy approved this plan of action at a White House meeting on May 1. It was orginally attached to NSAM 153, May 15. (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316)