Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State¹

Mexico City, October 19, 1961, 10 p.m.

Secun 26. For President, Secretary, Ball and Hamilton from Bowles. Although I am reporting separately on over-all results of regional meetings our Chiefs of Mission in Lima and San Jose, I would like to add some special comments on the dilemma we face in regard to the Alliance for Progress.

1) The Act of Bogota, Declaration of Punta del Este, and our own recent aid legislation called for no less than an economic and social revolution throughout Latin America.

2) The prestige and integrity of the Kennedy Administration are deeply committed to an all out effort to make this program successful. Indeed many Latin Americans already refer to the program not as the “Alliance for Progress” but as the “Kennedy Plan”.

3) Opposition in Latin America to the determined effort which is required will be more formidable than has been generally assumed in Washington. The governments of most Latin American countries have not yet grasped what this program calls for in the way of economic and social change, nor do the economically privileged groups understand the sacrifices which will be required of them.

The obstacles to change vary from country to country but they are all deep-seated and each will be extremely difficult to remove. Some governments, for instance, feel it is impossible even to consider really basic land reform programs. Whatever they propose to do in this direction is likely to be no more than a gesture. Others are persuaded that a progressive tax system is antagonistic to their tradition, interest and in any event is no one’s business but their own. Some others, noticeably Venezuela, which have taken important first steps in land reform and tax reform, will vigorously oppose any proposal to adjust the purchasing power of their currency to that of other trading nations, much less to take measures necessary to stop the flight of their capital overseas. When government officials in these countries are asked why the US should be asked to replace with our dollars those dollars and pounds sterling which their own well-to-do people have been transferring to banks in Switzerland, they show little comprehension.

4) As we press reluctant governments for economic, fiscal and social reforms and reorient our defense policy in Latin America toward greater emphasis on internal security measures and less on old-fashioned prestige building military establishments, we will face strong criticism. Diminished political cooperation from many US oriented governments whose leaders do not in fact accept the need for rapid evolutionary change is inevitable. Many of our Missions are likely to become less effective in government-to-government dealings and support from some Latin American representatives in the United Nations will become less assured.

5) If we carry through with our commitment to this democratic revolution as I believe we must, we will be subjected in country after country to powerful attacks by the local oligarchy which will equate every reform we propose with radicalism. At the other extreme will be the Communists and Castroites who will attempt to equate our reform efforts with some new form of Yankee imperialism. In between will be the bulk of the people, in many cases with able and dedicated leaders, who will support our efforts but who lack funds, organization, and access to radio and news media.

6) With a few exceptions, our Chiefs of Mission and their associates are keenly aware of the implications of this situation. Due in large measure to the straight talk which characterized our meetings, they are convinced of need for a firm and consistent US position and determined to carry their share of the burden in spite of difficulties which they know will be created for them personally. Many of those present with long Latin American experience have been arguing for years in favor of the very approach to which we are now committed. Everyone agrees there will be need occasionally for compromise and expediency. But it is felt that these must be kept to a minimum.

7) Nearly all Ambassadors, however, expressed concern that their efforts to induce even at a reasonable pace social and economic reforms as quid pro quo for US loans, grants and technical assistance may not be backed up from Washington. In other words, they fear that the predictably strong reaction from entrenched conservative Latin American interests will cause us to back away when chips are down, in order to avoid the displeasure of politically friendly governments now in office.

8) The challenge that confronts us is a formidable one. I am more than ever convinced that we have an opportunity in Latin America which conceivably may prove to be a turning point in the whole global situation. If we have the courage and insight to stick to our stated objectives, an increasing number of liberal, strongly anti-Communist Latin American leaders with growing public support will begin to line up beside us. If we exert a great effort now to build fruitful relationships with the rising new political generation, we may even, after a few years of extremely frustrating and explosive change, be able to stand on a much more solid political structure in this hemisphere which will be of inestimable value in dealing with the rest of the world.

9) Assuming that we are in fact determined to carry out the democratic role in which we have presented ourselves, there are several important requirements.

(A) The choice of the regional aid administrator for Latin America under Fowler Hamilton is, in my opinion, one of the most important appointments we will make in a long time.

(B) Closer coordination between all the lending and aid agencies must be assured. Efforts will be made to play the aid against the inter-American Bank, the inter-American Bank against the EXIM Bank, etc. It is essential that these agencies reach agreement on terms of operations, interpretations of the Act of Bogota, the Declaration of Punta del Este, as well as the legislation under which they are operating.

(C) In order to assure this essential coordination and to provide the utmost support for each Ambassador in his negotiations with his host government, we should place a high priority on the development of detailed standards which reflect the Act of Bogota, the Declaration of Punta del Este, and our own legislation. Every effort should be made to secure agreement on these standards, not only in aid but in the inter-American Bank, and other aid groups dealing with Latin America.

(D) Increased attention should be given to the military in all Latin American countries. If they can be persuaded that their support for economic and social reform is essential to the establishment of democratic, anti-Communist, secure societies, they can go far to assure the success of this program. If they fail to see the issues and side with the land-owning oligarchies, the result will be either an end to reform, civil war, or both. Haydn Williams has been a great strength in outlining this situation to the Mission Chiefs. He is confident that we can count on Pentagon understanding and assistance.

(E) There has been much too little emphasis in this area on the food for peace program. This can be a major element in the Alliance, particularly in the rural areas where sixty to seventy percent of the people live. The potentiality of this program in Latin America has scarcely been tapped.

(F) As opposition to economic and social reforms called for by the Act of Bogota develops from Latin American sources, we may expect to see similar criticism develop among conservative groups in the US. I believe that we can deal effectively with this sort of criticism by stressing the fact that we Americans have always believed that every farmer has a right to his own land, that a progressive income tax system which we advocate for Latin America has been well established for half a century in our own country. Why should we heavily taxed Americans be asked to contribute to help nations and governments which are unwilling to help themselves?

(G) Every effort should be made to assist our Ambassadors to meet the difficult pressures which they will surely encounter. Wide publicity for the detailed standards which we must develop in cooperation with the other agencies will be helpful in this respect. They will permit our Ambassadors to stress that we are acting solely on the basis of agreements in the Act of Bogota, the Declaration of Punta del Este which each Latin American Government signed, as well as on the instructions from the US Congress with regard to carrying out these objectives.

Even with such precise standards to which they can point we may and probably will see some Ambassadors declared persona non grata if they do their jobs well. These meetings convinced me that our Ambassadors in Latin America face the toughest assignments during the next few years to be found anywhere in the world. We must be certain they do not personally suffer in their careers for carrying out hard assignments just too well.

A personal letter from the President to each Ambassador in Latin America expressing his understanding of the difficulties they will be called upon to face and assuring them of his support would be most helpful. Such a letter from the President would also be an ideal vehicle for the concise, authoritative statement of our long and short range political objectives under the Alliance which, I believe, is urgently needed. I shall draft such a letter upon my return for your consideration.

Murat Williams’ experience in El Salvador made a deep impression on all Mission Chiefs. The new government there is making an earnest if mild effort to carry out the objectives of the Declaration of Punta del Este. As a result it is under extreme pressure from the oligarchy in El Salvador which is centered around fourteen major land-owning families, plus some US citizens with major business interests. This group has started rumors that Williams has been forced to resign, that he has exceeded his instructions, that he has been rebuked by Washington, etc. Williams bluntly stated that although he is willing personally to meet whatever pressures may be involved, he would like my assurance that he would not someday receive a telegram from Washington suggesting that he was taking his job too seriously. I assured him this would not occur and after telephone consultation with Ed Gudeman in Washington asked Jay Cerf, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to return briefly to Salvador with Williams to demonstrate that the latter has the administration’s full support and to attempt to persuade the American businessmen to adopt a more realistic position.

I am convinced that the Alliance for Progress is one of the most important political and economic opportunities since the Marshall Plan. But it is far more complex, however, than any we have tackled before and a great deal of courage and insight will be required to carry it out. If we effectively meet this challenge we will succeed in bringing about peaceful economic and social revolution in Latin America of enormous world-wide consequence. Most Latin Americans whom I have met do not think we have the guts to do it. I have assured him that we have.

Mann

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, January 1961-May 1962. Confidential; Priority.