Attachment
THE DOMINICAN SITUATION
I. Problem
To take action which will relieve the present tension in the
Dominican Republic and will at the same time promote the basic
United States objectives of (a) preventing Castro-Communism from
developing or taking control, and (b) establishing a friendly and
stable government as democratic as possible.
II. Discussion
Tension in the Dominican Republic is increasing. Elements of the
military fear for their future and are reacting with violence to
political activities, some of them provocative, by the newly
emerging political
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opposition. Some of the military elements have also threatened to
“turn to the left” and are reportedly favoring Castro-Communists.
Ramfis appears to be weakening in his initial declared intention to
control the armed forces and give Balaguer effective support. Military elements may
overthrow Balaguer at any
time.
If the Trujillo and military elements achieve or
continue seriously to threaten a coup, the currently non-Communist
opposition can be expected to reject moderate leaders and tactics,
undertake widespread strikes and covert revolutionary activities,
and seek alliance with Castro-Communists. They may also gain support
from some of the military.
Should such a coup occur, the new regime could probably impose
temporary order but would almost certainly lead to an explosion that
would give the Castro-Communists ideal conditions for gaining
strength and assuming power. Such a regime also could expect intense
Venezuelan hostility and OAS
disapproval and would be most difficult for the United States to
support.
To reduce this threat, we must seek means of easing the transition
for the military and other Trujillo-associated
elements from the Trujillo system to a freer
society. These means must be compatible, however, with our support
of the Balaguer program and
the moderate opposition, which represents our best hope for reaching
our objectives.
These means must take into account the economic power of the
Trujillos, which is a critical aspect of the problem. For example,
under existing United States legislation, the Trujillos would stand
to gain $28 million from the sale to the United States of their
sugar under a windfall quota, which would automatically be assigned
to the Dominican Republic upon resumption of diplomatic
relations.
III. Recommended Courses of
Action
A. Immediate
We should:
- 1.
- Publicly and privately make clear that we support
President Balaguer
and his program of democratization, and where possible
identify our programs as expressions of that support and of
our interest in the Dominican people.
- 2.
- Inform Ramfis Trujillo at the earliest opportunity that we
(a) would view with serious concern the overthrow of
Balaguer by force
or intimidation; (b) urge that security and military forces
seek common cause with the moderate opposition and avoid
abuses against it; and (c) recommend that the military and
security forces recognize that they would be certain victims
of a Castro-Communist take-over and that they avoid
supporting Castro-Communist elements.
- 3.
- Take steps toward establishing a small United States
military mission at field-grade level, commencing with the
assignment of military liaison officers to the
Consulate.
- 4.
- Inform the moderate opposition that we (a) consider it a
key factor in the future of the Dominican Republic; (b) urge
it to pursue its objectives peacefully and seek a
constructive relationship with the military; and (c) urge it
to exclude rigorously and oppose Castro-Communists.
- 5.
- Informally assist the Balaguer Government in contracting for, or
through the OAS, a police
mission to improve the attitudes and methods (especially in
intelligence techniques and crowd control) of the security
forces.
- 6.
- Once President Balaguer has made a request, urge and assist
voluntary relief agencies to make the necessary survey
leading to a PL 480 food distribution program for needy
Dominicans.
- 7.
- Move in the OAS to remove
sanctions on petroleum, trucks, and spare parts.
- 8.
- In order to induce the Trujillos to relinquish power and,
in some cases, leave the country in a constructive manner,
with their self-respect and some small part of their
holdings within the Dominican Republic, obtain their consent
in principle to the establishment of a foundation which
would take over the bulk of their holdings (including all
sugar properties) within the Dominican Republic and
administer them for the benefit of the Dominican people.
Once consent is obtained, have a qualified U.S. lawyer and
an economist work out the details.
- 9.
- Persuade Balaguer
to agree to a statement, and Ramfis to support it, (a)
expressing the intention to continue the democratization
program; (b) offering the moderate opposition representation
in the government; (c) eliminating the PD assessment on
salaries; and (d) announcing the Trujillos’ agreement to a
foundation.
- 10.
- Seek Venezuelan support for or acquiescence in our plans,
emphasizing the divestment of the Trujillos of their
properties.
B. Subsequent
Following on the above actions, we should:
- 11.
- Move for the return of the OAS Sub-Committee to receive the declaration
outlined in paragraph 9.
- 12.
- Move in the COAS for the
rescission of Resolution 1 of the VI MFM, i.e., for the
restoration of diplomatic relations.
