303. Telegram From the Consulate General in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
994. Businessmen and administrators who have been collaborators in Trujillo regime were asked in last few days by chosen representatives of dissidents what Trujillo’s reaction would be if convinced Kennedy administration would definitely not follow conciliatory policy toward his regime. They replied Trujillo would in their opinion do practically nothing against USG or Americans because he fully realizes he still has basic sugar quota and US market for other important exports to safeguard. These collaborators believe Trujillo will attempt smooth things over with USG once convinced his blustering tactics no avail. He may criticize but will soft pedal. In discussion on Cuban windfall sugar Ramfis reported have said recently “what is all the excitement about? Loss of the windfall is not so important. It was something we never had before”. Further reasoning behind observations of collaborators is Trujillo has failed in strenuous and costly efforts change US policy toward him, break solidarity OAS, and exchange missions with additional countries western Europe, UAS and iron curtain nations. He now knows he has no place to turn and in play to salvage his power and preserve his wealth will play down attacks on US and turn conciliatory. (Noteworthy he has not yet attacked Kennedy administration on its position re purchases Dominican sugar though Rusk letter to Rayburn was publicized February 21.)2
Responsible dissident businessmen who are in contact with mentioned collaborators are developing consensus foregoing may be accurate prognostication.
Close adviser of Trujillo recently remarked to friend of former in veiled way Trujillo more preoccupied by another development than over sugar problem. Best informed dissidents are guessing this greater problem connected with reported disloyalties at home (Consulate telegrams 987 and 991)3 and fear of activities anti-Trujillo Dominican exiles abroad. Dissidents reason if anything worries Trujillo more than his sugar sales this concern probably results from knowledge of some physical threat to his regime.
[Page 620]Comment: Source of foregoing is of utmost reliability and group for whom he speaks is comprised of pro-US moderate dissidents. If views expressed are correct, my interpretation is Trujillo tried by sound and fury (threats expel all Americans, terminate Consular relations, tie up with iron curtain, etc.) prevent USG from taking steps adverse his interests. He may now realize his strategy has failed and may try save his regime by only course left—namely convince US and OAS to tolerate him. I have been interested in several comments by contacts during past week that Ramfis is one who is restraining Generalissimo from taking drastic action against Americans. Last night [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who I consider be practically agent of Trujillo and son (though perhaps less so than formerly) told me Ramfis is one who could give further good advice and US should talk with him. These developments may [sic] than Trujillo family hopes save skins by persuading US businessmen and USG that reconciliation can be worked out through Ramfis. My advice is Ramfis is most unstable, ruthless, US-hating, untrustworthy and cynical occupant of whole Trujillo nest and we should avoid him like bubonic plague. This opinion borne out by such important source as President Balaguer who remarked to high ranking friend of mine who made some complimentary remarks about Ramfis “Ramfis is the worst of the lot” (this information given me in utmost confidence).
I wish emphasize Trujillo is short-term proposition in Dominican Republic, that future US interests here lie in building goodwill among moderate elements of dissidents, and that if USG gives slightest indication of softening toward Trujillo US security and business interests in Dominican Republic will suffer consequences for years to come. In own interest I believe US should do all possible within non-interventionist commitments to hasten turnover of GODR to elements which will respect guiding principles of OAS.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/2-2461. Confidential; Priority.↩
- In a February 17 letter to Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn, Secretary Rusk asked that Congress consider amending the U.S. Sugar Act to empower the President to deny the Trujillo government any of the sugar quota previously allotted to Cuba.↩
- Dated February 23 and February 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/2-2361 and 739.00/2-2461, respectively)↩