Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

290. Airgram From the Consulate General in Georgetown to the Department of State¹

A-250

Georgetown, March 14, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Time and Jagan: The Consulate General’s Appraisal

REF

• A-249, March 14, 1963²

[Here follows a table of contents.]

General

It seems to be generally agreed by the Department, HMG and the Consulate General that Proportional Representation (PR) as an electoral system for British Guiana (BG) represents the most practical electoral device for replacing Premier Cheddi Jagan and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) with a more democratic and reliable government. It is generally conceded that PR should be put to a referendum. The most advantageous timing for a referendum and electionin the very near future, or after a delay which may extend for as much as one yearis not so readily apparent.

Based on an appraisal of the local scene, the Consulate General believes that, unless definite action is taken, time favors Jagan. The longer the delay the more difficult it will be to dislodge Jagan and Jagan’s brand of “socialism” from Government; extended delay presents the possibility of Cubalike situation. Since it is definitely not in the best U.S. interests to have either British Guiana or an independent Guyana ruled by Jagan’s PPP, the U.S. Government should strive for an HMG decision for an immediate referendum on PR, either by itself or as a combined referendum-election.

Recent Memorandums of Conversation and other reports reaching this Consulate General indicate that HMG states it believes that the PPP government is ragged and running down hill “and may be forced from office, either by popular uprising or a Legislative Assembly vote of no confidence.” In the Consulate General’s opinion, this is unrealistic and perhaps reflects wishful thinking. Sufficient British troops are present to prevent any recurrence of the February 16, 1962 disorders, even if Government were to allow conditions which would permit passions to rise as in February 1962. In view of the Guianese temperament, the possibility of a flash riot seems remote. As for a no confidence “vote, it must be stressed that while the form of the BG Legislative Assembly is that of UK parliamentary democracy, its substance is not. On all but the most trivial of issues Legislative Assembly voting is on straight party lines. The PPP legislators are zealots, political hacks, or opportunists—or combinations thereof—in varying degrees. Although Balram Singh Rai defected on ideological grounds (or so he now stoutly claims), he was a comparative newcomer (circa 1956) to the PPP, and has a rich wife. No other PPP legislator, except possibly Fenton Ramsahoye, appears to question the advantages of defecting. It could be that Ramsahoye, an opportunist, and possibly one or two backbenchers could be induced to defect for private gain of one type or another. However, such gain would have to be greater than the patronage and other awards which the ruling PPP can now offer. With the situation currently favoring the PPP there is no practical reason why potential defectors would bolt on their own initiative. Thus, the PPP cannot be expected to fall on a no confidence” vote. If the Government is dissolved, it will be because Jagan believes it can effect some political advantage. Dissolution will be as a result of the ruling clique’s decision.

Comments on HMG Position as Seen from the Consulate General

The UK will have no major political interest in an independent Guyana, although comparatively small—by British standards—commercial investment will remain. HMG wants to shed BG quickly, consistent with as graceful a departure as possible. The private views of one Colonial Officer seem to stress more the awkwardness of an Order in Council for PR than its utilization to remove Jagan.

It appears that for most of the last decade it has been the British approach to present the Guianese situation as one which, while neither tranquil nor in the best free world interest, is not as serious as might be supposed.

In 1953 HMG believed that the various actions and declarations of the PPP government demanded suspension of the Constitution and the internment of some PPP leaders, including both Jagans. A subsequent White Paper stated that this was necessary since the PPP was attempting to establish a communist state. In the late 1950’s it became HMG policy to consider Cheddi Jagan and the majority of the PPP hierarchy as neither communist nor particularly bloc oriented. Rather, they were considered misguided and politically immature. There was no firm evidence to indicate a change of PPP philosophy, although the Party became somewhat less blatant in its support of communism and communist causes. This may have been due to the leaders’ honest, albeit unstated, change of heart. However, given that the Party has maintained and even increased its bloc contacts, the evidence would indicate that the PPP hierarchy realized that, even though the largest political grouping, it would be impossible to head any pre-independence government without British tacit approval. Hence, the softening of the public line. The UF has given wide circulation to what is purported to be Cheddi Jagan’s Secret Address to the 1956 Party Conference. “The text states that until 1953 the Party committed deviations to the left” which had to be corrected due to the need for a flexible and well considered policy “(allegedly a quote from Stalin). Whether the speech was Jagan’s or an excellent fraud has never been ascertained. However, PPP policy certainly corrected the deviationism to the left” in its public approach (excluding its continued strong support for Castro), although, as noted, there was no decrease in communist ties. At the risk of oversimplification, there appear to be four possible explanations for the British approach during the last decade.

1) Selfdeception, based in part on the subconscious recognition that HMG had failed to instill basic democratic principles in some of BG’s major political figures, or to create a viable economy.

2) An effort to delude the U.S., temporarily,” until such time as HMG had evolved a solution which would allow withdrawal with some degree of dignity, and without U.S. Government pressure or criticism.

3) A combination of 1 and 2, based upon HMG’s inability to recognize the need for actions which might be embarrassing internationally.

4) They are instinctively correct.

The current HMG position seems to be one of outlining the administrative or parliamentary problems involved in proposing PR, on the assumption that Jagan will somehow, sometime soon, disappear due to his own incompetence. This approach appears to avoid the unpleasant reality that few Governments fall through stupidity. Jagan might not possess nimbleness of intellect” but his is sincere to his own ends. Janet Jagan and some of the men surrounding her can probably provide the intelligence needed to keep Cheddi propped up.

U.S. Interest in a Solution for British Guiana

Granting that spheres of influence exist, an independent Guyana will be within the U.S. sphere. It is not in the national interest to have a communist government on the mainland of South America. An independent Guyana with Jagan and the PPP in office represents such a threat and as such should be removed.

Politically, Jagan remains firm under the status quo and may well be improving his position. The Civil Service, the Ministries, government corporations and the public information media are all being used to PPP advantage. By what could be described as administrative subversion,” PPP actions are eroding the principle of a democratically oriented government with an apolitical Civil Service. Economically, BG’s position is worsening but Jagan may well be able to avoid any serious government financial crisis. The longer the delay in firm action which will remove Jagan, the greater must be the eventual U.S. efforts required to correct the damage. If undue delay results, at best it will be most difficult to unscramble and reassemble the Guianese egg; and at worst a communist state will be established.

The Need for Strong Efforts Now to Attempt Forcing HMG Action on PR

Failure to act quickly provides Jagan a chance to assume the initiative. For example, if the present situation continues he might demand new elections under first-past-the-post. With the existing electoral districting, he would probably win a majority of seats. This would permit him to present a fresh mandate” for independence, without PR.

Lack of action probably provides the PPP with a morale boost and simultaneously tends to dishearten further the opposition.

The presence of a British army battalion makes the possibility of renewed mass urban disorders most unlikely. Also, having learned its lesson in January-February 1962, the government can take preventive action to avoid creation of the tension-filled situation which preceded February 16, 1962.

A British Labour Government could be expected to be more inclined to grant independence under the existing government than would a Conservative one. Therefore, U.S. actions should be taken while the UK Government of the moment could be expected to be more receptive to the PR concept.

Two Areas of U.S. Action

1. At appropriate levels, efforts should be intensified to create a greater British awareness that, although it may be temporarily unpleasant and awkward, a PR decision should be quickly implemented. A new PR election would probably force Jagan from office, lead to some revitalization of internal economic activity, speed the date of independence and allow time to correct and eradicate communist influences. If, conceivably Jagan wins a PR referendum, it would force recognition that he would probably head an independent Guyana, at which time other measures could be considered.

2. The U.S. should be able to develop better information on political parties in BG. The Consulate General has fairly reliable sources within the PNC, fewer and less good contacts in the UF, and virtually none in the PPP. Information provided by the British—for whatever reasons—is inadequate and unsatisfactory. This gap in basic data should be filled.

The Current Scene

A. Political Factors

In British Guiana, as elsewhere, domestic politics requires fulltime devotion and is not a field to be cultivated only before an election. The PPP (or at least the Janet-Benn-Bhagwan core) recognizes and exploits this far more effectively than do the opposition. In so doing, the PPP has the tremendous advantage of being the party in power.

After an initial period of inactivity following the failure at London, the PPP has resumed fullscale politicking. Party leaders, including the Premier (but apparently not Janet), are constantly in the country and often in the urban centers. The PPP approach continues to be that immediate independence—without PR—means economic advancement, that colonialism and big business “are the causes of BG’s lack of progress and that growth under socialism” can only be accomplished by the PPP. When the question of communism is raised, the Party equivocates although after several months of silence on Cuba, it is returning to somewhat cautious praise for Castro. Strong organizational efforts continue among youth and women through the PPP, the PYO and the PWO.

The PPP continues to infiltrate all levels of the bureaucracy. In the main, the Civil Service, while probably opposed to Jagan as individual voters, is still apolitical. However, as the older civil servants retire or resign, they are being replaced by either Party supporters or bureaucratic nondescripts. In some cases, PPP watchdogs are placed in government enterprises as rewards to the faithful and as implied threats to the others. New government units, such as the Central Planning Division, are staffed with handpicked native or expatriate personnel, who—whatever their other qualifications—are selected for their compassionate views toward the PPP. Plans for a National Army continue and it is believed by many locally, including the Consulate General, that PPP/PYO cadres, including those now in Cuba, will play a significant role. While great emphasis has been placed on the Army’s multiracial character, it will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain the political philosophy of future troops. The same may be the case for the BG Volunteer Force (militia). Several months ago, an expatriate police officer remarked that a considerable number of East Indians had suddenly come forth expressing a desire to join the Volunteer Force with the identical reason: to serve my Queen and Country.” The officer assumed that they had been ordered to join by the Party.

In the meantime the PPP appears to be accepting some salary and fee kickbacks from government coffers to help support the party. All ministers of government are obliged to contribute BWI$100 from their monthly salaries of BWI$800. Mooneer Khan, Chairman of the Rice Marketing Board, is understood to be taking kickbacks on the sale of rice bags, although who gets the money is unknown. The PPP also receives whatever profits (or other funds) are forthcoming from Guiana Import-Export and the New Guiana Corporation. While the PPP may or may not be receiving funds directly from the bloc, it is most certainly in a better financial position than either the PNC or the UF.

The PPP Government is effectively using the public information media to strengthen the Party hold on BG. By law Government is entitled to free radio time for informational purposes and much of this is being effectively utilized for Party interests. Despite some sniping, Jagan’s weekly press conference is little more than a propaganda forum which is rebroadcast twice over the weekend. It is accepted practice that the tape is edited before release. Other Government Information Services press releases and programs exhort Government’s deeds, with particular references to PPP ministers or the accomplishments of socialist (never communist) countries.

Although the broadcasting company is privately owned, it is under strict corporate injunction not to antagonize the government. This is carried to such an extreme that local news reports do not mention Legislative Assembly debates which are critical of Government. Scripts (including USIS material) for such programs as Viewpoint “are vetted to ensure that they will not embarrass” Government.

On the press side, the PPP weekly The Mirror (printed on Cuban-confiscated U.S. presses given to the PPP) is becoming consistently more newsworthy since it has private access to ministerial decisions. It is rumored to become at least a biweekly shortly. The other papers are ineffective as sources of antigovernment news. The Evening Post, and its Sunday edition, Argosy, exist on a shoestring. Circulation is down, bills are up. Content is mainly boilerplate and the small amount of local reporting is devoid of intelligent, or even particularly factual, presentation. The Chronicle is so rabid in its attacks on the PPP government that at times it almost assumes an anti-East Indian bias in some of its stories. It has no special reputation for accuracy. Worse, it is ineffective. The expatriate-owned Guiana Graphic, like the radio stations, follows such an a-political course in working with the government of the moment that at times it appears to be pro-government.

Probably to ensure that it becomes even less of a threat, Government has announced that a Press Council will be established. When queried, Jagan said initially the Council will not have punitive powers, although these might be subsequently necessary.

Through Government the PPP is also effectively creating the groundwork for greater control over education. To cite two examples: creation of a University of Guyana and withdrawal from UWI; release of the longstanding Board of Governors of a major government high school after it had refused to allow the PPP to use the school for a political meeting. A new board is to be named.

All these activities are indicative of the degree to which the PPP is spreading tentacles into Guianese life. All will become increasingly more difficult to eradicate the longer the Party is in office.

The situation might be ameliorated if the political opposition showed signs of increasing its effectiveness but if anything the reverse seems to be the case.

PNC organizational activities appear to be almost nonexistent. Most of the PNC effort seems to be directed toward its signature campaign for a PR referendum. However, the fact that the campaign continues well past the original closing date in January indicates that it is not going well, despite recent UF support. A certain amount of time is spent by Burnham and others exhorting the faithful in Georgetown and (once) in New Amsterdam but there seems to be little PNC activity in the rural areas, sections which will become particularly important if PR becomes a reality. Far too often the PNC attacks Jagan for courting the rural areas at the expense of the urban. While this may serve as a sop to the PNC urban supporters, it only tends to alienate further the rural voter.

While the PPP obviously courts and actively recruits youth with Freedom House lectures, strong influence at ITABO, scholarship offers and the prize of a college degree through the University of Guyana, as far as can be determined the PNC is doing little if any proselytizing among this group. With some 6,000 school leavers a year searching for opportunities, the PNC either through ignorance or indolence is overlooking a significant segment of the potential electorate.

The United Force is probably losing much of whatever appeal it may once have had for the nonwhite, non-Amerindian voter. After 2 years, Peter D’Aguiar has failed to develop any political intelligence and the UF is merely his political reflection. Instead of attacking Government on the selected well-documented evidence which abounds, the UF tactic is to swing against the PPP with wild charges, while making the most preposterous of claims as to what it would accomplish in office (i.e., $500,000,000.00 of new foreign investment). As noted, the Chronicle has become little more than a daily political rag, and one which unfortunately often is almost anti-East Indian in tone as it attacks Government. Equally bad is the Chronicle’s habit of printing foreign source information about BG which it knows to be misleading, if not patently false. To cite one example: the Chronicle printed U.S. columnist Victor Riesel’s story on BG starting with a lead sentence to the effect that the U.S. and UK had forgotten abandoned” Atkinson Field, but the Russians had not. A quote of Janet’s supporting the Berlin Wall, later verified, was buried in the story but was generally discounted locally.

UF supporters may be losing heart. Ann Jardim, the only UF leader with any sense of political realities, has been ailing, is discouraged, and considering leaving the colony. The UK Entry Certificate Officer (i.e. visa man) commented privately that many of the middle and upper classes (from which the UF draws the bulk of its support) have taken out departure insurance in the form of UK entry certificates. Thus, in its initial electoral bid in August 1961 the UF, as presently oriented, probably gained as large a percentage of the electorate as possible. Its total voting strength could well decline as time passes. The only group which will remain firm is the numerically small Amerindian, who can still be controlled by Melville, with an assist from the Church.

A PNC-UF working arrangement might be possible with a combined electoral majority under PRif only to keep Jagan out. However, a PPP-PNC coalition is possible if Burnham believes the chances for a PR referendum are fading.

Balram Singh Rai has been inactive politically for the last few months and there has been more speculation recently in the U.S. and UK than in BG on his political future. Whatever electoral potential Rai may hold or be expected to gain, either by himself or in conjunction with other center-left personalities or the UF, is yet to be tested. However, the longer the status quo, the farther from public awareness Rai will be. The Consulate General would hazard that there are two basic criteria for Rai’s motivation; a specific electoral target and, possibly, financial support. Public moral support might also help.

Thus, on balance, the PPP is strong and working to solidify its political position. As the party in power, it recognizes all the advantages this carries. While it cannot yet fully implement its policies, it can create the understructure needed to do so on short notice. While its ability to conduct foreign affairs is proscribed, it has started to sever its traditional West Indies ties, and to commence initial (economic”) ties with the bloc. Against this background the political opposition, which lacks motivation, seems to be becoming somewhat less effective.

B. Economic Factors

Jagan’s government potentially is weaker on the economic side than on the political. There are two issues, the general status of the internal economy and the particular weakness of the government’s financial position.

The internal trade sector remains bad. Imports do not appear to have risen and inventories remain down. However, these factors affect the urban areas, particularly Georgetown, far more than the rural. Even if conditions do not improve there will be little adverse effect on Jagan’s electoral popularity. While some urbanites may work more actively against Jagan, others show signs of surrendering and leaving BG. In any case, it is well known that Jagan’s urban voting strength has been negligible. These factors tend to cancel each other—excluding the very remote possibility of a sudden, truly spontaneous riot in the comparatively brief time before British troops could be mobilized.

The export market is good. Bauxite workers are the highest paid in the colony, have reasonable job security by local standards and continue to support the PNC. The sugar workers support Jagan politically, although the anti-PPPMPCA represents them on trade union matters. Currently, MPCA is negotiating a new contract and another once for all” bonus. While a strike may develop, the ultimate result will be some sort of bonus and possible increased daily wages and fringe benefits. Any dissatisfaction at the settlement will probably be generated by the Guiana Agricultural Workers Union (formerly BG Sugar Workers), the PPP union which is attempting to depose MPCA. GAWU will claim, regardless of what MPCA gets, that they could have done better had they possessed bargaining rights.

Rice could be Jagan’s major weakness over a long period. While crop expectations for 1963 are excellent and the price to farmers has improved, at present the 26,000 ton Trinidad market may have been lost. Also, Cuba will absorb only some 15,000 tons in 1963, instead of an expected 36,000. There could be a considerable surplus. Also, through mismanagement and entanglement in bloc arrangements, the Rice Marketing Board may be in serious trouble. The Consulate General’s A-242 of February 21, 1963³ explores this in some detail, and notes the possible effects of Jagan’s electoral popularity.

Government’s financial position presents the greatest potential weakness for Jagan, although not necessarily a fatal one. The 1963 Recurrent Budget predicted a major increase in imports over 1962 and a BWI$4.5 million revenue increase through new taxes and the increased tax rates. If Government is overly optimistic about these levels, a financial crises is possible. While it could incur some deficit spending and draw down its General Revenue Balance (reserves which were only $3.4 million at the end of 1962), there still could be insufficient funds to pay the Civil Service. Any work stoppage could be considered the grave emergency” needed by the UK to suspend the Constitution.

While the potential for a financial crisis is present, there are three possibilities which could forestall it:

1) When a similar situation arose in 1962, the UK rescued the Government with a vitally needed short-term loan. The British might well do so again to avoid the charges that one of their colonies faced financial difficulties resulting from colonialist rule (and the lack of independence).

In late 1962 the Governor, Sir Ralph Grey, stated privately that the UK was unwilling to allow Jagan to wreck the country financially, even if this demanded saving the PPP government. It would be most interesting to know what the UK would do if BG again faced the problem.

2) If a crisis threatened, the Government could request the large expatriate firms to pay immediately all or part of their 1963 taxes (due in 1964). The expatriate firms, who must attempt to work with the government of the day, would not refuse such a request. This device, utilized in other countries, might provide the Opposition with some political ammunition, but the danger is far less serious for Government than a financial breakdown.

3) A quick local loan might be floated. Ordinarily such a loan in BG at this time would be badly undersubscribed. However, if the bloc decided to risk a comparatively small sum for future gains, it could channel funds either through Guiana Import-Export or the New Guiana Corporation, who could then subscribe all or part of the loan.

The Threat of Jagan Out of Office

The argument has been entered, particularly by HMG, that Jagan out of office is more dangerous than Jagan in power, particularly while BG is a colony. This is not valid. Admittedly, Jagan would attack the existing government, the colonialist-imperialist” group, the West and big business. He would also preach his various themes on the need for bloc ties. However, in power, as he is now, he can, and does, follow this approach with a minimum of restraint while entrenching the PPP and laying the framework for even closer bloc connections. The point that Jagan out of office might resort to violence should not deter efforts to remove him; appropriate common criminal action can always be initiated—provided his removal precedes heavy concentrations of the PPP in civil and (proposed) military organizations.

U.S. Long Term Objectives

The immediate objective is the replacement of the PPP in office. A long term objective should be to impress upon the average Guianese the desirability of a democratic government oriented to free world philosophy and objectives, as well as to the dangers of bloc ensnarement.

The need for this immediate objective is outlined in this paper. Parts of the longer term goal, once this is accomplished, can be considered through USAID and USIS programs. In addition, the Consulate General will shortly present an outline of several projects which, after PPP removal, may be effective in discrediting Jagan with some of his supporters.

Conclusion

Continuation of the status quo permits Jagan to consolidate his gains in establishing PPP domination over all facets of BG life. To the degree which the U.S. Government and HMG fail to move to counteract this trend, they are providing implicit support for his rule. Such support is dangerous.

EK Melby American Consul General

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BR GU. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London. Drafted by Rosenthal.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 741D.00/2-2163)