Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

280. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy¹

Washington, July 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• British Guiana

We have reassessed the probable orientation of an independent British Guiana under Cheddi Jagan’s leadership and I attach for your consideration a paper describing the program we propose to follow (Enclosure 1).²

A Special National Intelligence Estimate dated April 11, 1962,³ concluded We believe … that Jagan is a Communist, though the degree of Moscow’s control is not yet clear. A Jagan government in the post independence period would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in international affairs, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction. “[5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We have also been given by the FBI a report of the American Communist Party’s intention to seek for Jagan economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc (Enclosure 3). Attached is a study we have prepared of contacts by the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) with communists, communist fronts and the communist bloc since September, 1961 (Enclosure 4). During cross examination before the Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the February riots Jagan admitted on June 22, 1962 that he was a communist. This admission came after much muddled explanation by Jagan as to what the term communism” meant and was qualified by his definition that communism was a system based on from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs”. Further questioning on Jagan’s political beliefs was cut short on June 26 by the British Chairman of the Commission with the ruling that it was useless to pursue the subject since it had already been established beyond peradventure” that Dr. Jagan was a communist.

In the light of all the evidence which has now accumulated, I believe we are obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Cheddi Jagan will establish a Marxist” regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet Bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse effects in the foreign relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions within this country.

It is also my view that a policy of trying to work with Jagan, as urged by the British, will not pay off. Jagan is already too far committed emotionally and suspicious of our intentions.

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

I propose that we transfer the locale of the discussions with the U.K. on British Guiana to Washington and that I call in the British Ambassador and speak to him along the lines indicated in the attached paper. My thought in transferring the locale to Washington is to enable us to deal through a sympathetic British Ambassador with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister rather than sending messages to our Embassy in London which in practice usually discusses British Guiana with the not so sympathetic Colonial Office. It is further helpful to us to talk in Washington because we have available here people with the most uptodate U.S. information on British Guiana and we would be able to provide nuances of our current thinking to the British Ambassador.

Recommendations

I recommend that you approve specifically the following:

[4 paragraphs (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

5. That you approve my talking with the British Ambassador along the lines of Section I of the attached paper and that we try to maintain Washington as the venue for any further discussions on British Guiana in the immediate future. This would constitute a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan’s letter to you of May 30⁴ (Enclosure 6).

Dean Rusk⁵

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Top Secret.
2. None of the attachments is printed.
3. Document 274.
4. See Document 276.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.