Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

240. Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development¹

Washington,September 30, 1963.

PROPOSED SHORT TERM POLICY—BRAZIL

The following assumptions, objectives, and lines of action are intended to provide guidelines for the conduct of U.S. relations and programs vis-à-vis Brazil up to the closing months of 1964 when the campaign for the Presidential succession will be getting into full swing, looking toward elections in October, 1965. These elections, apart from other developments on the national scene, should compel a fresh look. General assumptions are set forth at some length in the belief that a very extensive change can occur on very short notice in a country situation as viable and uncertain as that in Brazil; and if this happens, guidelines will need to be reexamined. In any event, a further comprehensive review should be made early in 1964 to consider the need for possible revisions in these guidelines.

Assumptions:

1. Goulart will continue his shifting game of political agitation, accommodation and manipulation with the objectives of (a) blunting the attack and winning at least the passive accommodation of the opposition (mainly of the center and right); and (b) maintaining his control over supporting elements in labor, the military, and other sectors (mainly of the left) while destroying or weakening those who would threaten or contest this control.

2. The demonstrated disinterest and incapacity of Goulart outside of the realm of tactical political manipulation, and the absence since last June of forceful leadership among Goulart’s principal associates, makes it unlikely that he or his government will mount, much less follow through on, any substantial program of constructive economic and social betterment, especially where it involves significant measures of unpopular discipline, self-restraint or self-denial which would subject Goulart to serious political criticism.

3. While leftists and ultranationalists of various shades have for decades played significant parts in Brazilian politics and government, such individuals will continue to enjoy particular favor under the Goulart regime. Goulart will not be disposed to sacrifice the political support derived from his long-standing ties with extreme-leftist (including Communist) and ultranationalist elements, and he will continue to give them position and opportunity from which they can carry on their anti-U.S., and in some cases Moscow, Peking, or Havana Communist-line, advocacy in Brazil.

4. There is of course a possibility that the extreme left, or some elements thereof, may be tempted to break with Goulart because his manipulations to stay in power will also involve accommodations to the center and right, because he does not consistently collaborate in their own efforts to achieve and consolidate power, or because he is not achieving, at least formally, alleged social betterments. Goulart’s capacity for accommodation and manipulation, plus extreme leftist reluctance to give up significant benefits, plus the fact that both would lose substantial strength in separating from each other, makes this an unlikely prospect.

5. Goulart himself will probably not be prepared to abandon his accommodations with more moderate political elements, and will probably seek to curb his extremist following on occasions when their excesses provoke strong reaction in the military and other quarters. Goulart’s abandonment of this line in favor of unequivocal alignment with his extremist following is unlikely unless he comes to believe that they are so strong that this step offers the best opportunity for his political survival, or that other forces are so unequivocally opposed to him that he has no alternative base of support.

6. Ultranationalism (whose strong manifestations in Brazil can be traced back to the 30’s and earlier, and which has periodically erupted since then) will continue to find strong support in many sectors in Brazil from left to right and will continue to present problems for American diplomacy and for U.S. private enterprise in Brazil, which is currently the main target of nationalists as were British interests in earlier years.

7. Goulart will continue to reassign and promote military officers within what he judges to be the limits of political feasibility in order to strengthen his supporters and to weaken those forces which might mount a political opposition to him within the armed services. While promotions and assignments have undoubtedly weakened anti-Goulart elements and in varying degrees strengthened pro-Goulart forces, opportunists, nationalists and leftists (including extremists in the latter two categories) in the Brazilian armed services, there continues to exist in the armed services a strong advocacy of law and order, and a substantial preference for orderly democratic processes which will react against extremist excesses either by the left or the right. This has been at least temporarily strengthened by the recent Sergeants’ revolt. This means that while the already limited military capability to overthrow Goulart on purely political grounds has been further weakened, the capability for resistance to any clear-cut move against constitutionalism or against the military hierarchy as a body will probably continue and be capable of expressing itself not only against Goulart but also against any unconstitutional move against Goulart either from left or right.

8. There is still a significant reservoir in the armed services of actual and potential good-will toward the U.S.

9. The military appear to be the only force capable of maintaining and restoring public order—and, if necessary, orderly government—should the political and economic deterioration produced by the policies of the present regime “get out of hand.”

10. While Goulart and the extreme leftists among his supporters have not demonstrated the capacity to pursue truly constructive courses of action (and Goulart himself probably lacks the desire to do so), they will continue to identify themselves in their public relations with progressive and “popular” change (e.g., “basic reforms”) while labelling the opposition as negative, reactionary, status quo, etc.

11. Goulart—to the extent that circumstances and his political manipulations might permit him to do so at minimum political risk—will seek to restrict and might even attempt to stifle democratic opposition forces and processes. He would probably like to achieve a dictatorship on the models of Vargas or Peron, closing the Congress and intervening all the State governments.

12. Goulart’s own ineptitude and political manipulations, coupled with increasing inflation and other economic deterioration, may create sufficient political and social tensions as to bring about his “removal” or “withdrawal” from the Office of President, probably at military “urging,” without his having taken obviously unconstitutional steps.

13. While Goulart will probably attempt to liquidate or weaken political forces which directly and seriously attack or threaten him, he will very likely stop short of such action against other democratically-oriented forces which do not offer this direct, personal threat. He will be motivated by fear of alienating too broad a spectrum of opinion and power, and also by the desire to retain some forces which can move against excesses by his own extremist supporters or be used as a counterweight against such supporters when they get out of hand.

14. Goulart may from time to time condone or even encourage in labor and other sectors, democratic elements opposed to the extreme leftist and ultranationalist elements who ordinarily support Goulart and enjoy his direct and indirect support—this to discourage the latter from “getting out of hand.”

15. Key areas of activity in which one can have maximum impact on developments in Brazil, political and otherwise, include (a) government, including the State Governors and the Congress, (b) the military, (c) labor, (d) students, (e) the Catholic church, particularly church-sponsored community services and activities, (f) business and industry, and (g) the press, radio, and other media influencing general public opinion.

16. In the OAS and the UN, and in its foreign relations generally, Brazil will continue to pursue its “independent” foreign policy line, over-reacting at times against U.S. and OAS “intrusions” into national sovereignty, seeking to realize its pretensions to world power status by providing leadership among the new and the underdeveloped nations as a kind of new “third force” in relation to the major powers and the developed nations. It will also continue to maneuver for the leadership of the Latin American nations through exclusively Latin American organs or arrangements from which the U.S. is excluded.

17. As part of the foregoing general policy, Brazil will continue to expand its relations with Communist nations, will overreact against identity with the free world “bloc” but will at the same time stress its dedication to christian democracy and continue to work with the U.S. on a wide range of specific international issues in the UN, the OAS, and elsewhere.

18. Barring clear indications of serious likelihood of a political takeover by elements subservient to and supported by a foreign government, it would be against U.S. policy to intervene directly or indirectly in support of any move to overthrow the Goulart regime. In the event of a threatened foreign-government-affiliated political takeover, consideration of courses of action would be directed more broadly but directly to the threatened takeover, rather than against Goulart (although some action against the latter might result).

19. While there are continuing efforts among them for reconciliation and coordination, there are many schisms and disagreements among the extreme left, the ultranationalists, and the Communists which can produce conflict within as well as among these various groups, and which can alienate from them the more moderate nationalists and leftists.

20. While the Goulart Government will continue to tolerate and nourish elements opposed to the U.S. and its objectives, Goulart’s own friendship or antagonism toward the U.S. can temper or stimulate the behavior of such elements or the degree of official tolerance or accept-ance of U.S. operations in Brazil.

Objectives:

1. Promote and strengthen in all sectors of Brazilian life democratically oriented forces which can restrain undemocratic or anti-democratic excesses by Goulart or his extreme leftist or ultranationalist supporters (and also, to the limited extent it threatens, by the extreme right as well), and facilitate the most favorable possible succession in the event that a crisis of regime leads to Goulart’s removal, and in any case in the elections of 1965.

2. Promote the formulation and vigorous advocacy of constructive reform programs by the democratically oriented forces in Brazil so that they can compete more effectively against the rabble-rousing demo-goguery of Goulart and his extremist supporters.

3. Maintain and build in Brazil a favorable image of the United States through all possible channels to counteract nationalist and ultranationalist attacks.

4. Weaken or soften by seduction as well as by opposition the opportunistic, ultranationalist or extreme leftist forces in Brazil in their affiliation with or support of antidemocratic or undemocratic agitations or causes.

5. Discourage counter-productive maneuvers by forces opposed to Goulart of a type which can be exploited by Goulart and his extremist supporters either to pursue their own demagogic political aggrandizement or to weaken the forces capable of restraining their undemocratic or antidemocratic excesses.

6. Avoid insofar as possible measures or policies by U.S. Government or U.S. business interests which can be exploited by anti-U.S. elements either to stir up nationalist antagonisms against the U.S. or to jeopardize the legitimate interests of the U.S. or its citizens by stimulating nationalistic hostility to them.

7. Maintain a friendly, helpful, posture toward Brazil and its government in order to maximize our ability, limited as it sometimes may be, to carry forward our own programs and to protest more effectively against undemocratic elements and actions, especially as they are unfriendly to the U.S., U.S. business or U.S. nationals.

8. Build a more extensive consultation on U.S. and Brazilian foreign policy objectives, particularly as between the U.S. Embassy and the Brazilian Foreign Office, with a view to promoting a more receptive psychological climate in Brazil toward cooperation with the U.S.

9. Promote division and conflict within and between extreme leftist and ultranationalist groups and attempt to alienate other leftists and the more moderate nationalists from them.

10. Promote the formation of an effective coalition of politically effective forces which will present a viable alternative to the demagoguery of the extreme left and to the reactionary proposals of the far right.

11. Strengthen the basically democratic and pro-United States orientation of the military.

12. Weaken the influence of the Communist and other extremist anti-U.S. elements in both labor and student organizations.

[Here follows a section entitled “Lines of Action.”]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BRAZ-US. Secret. A covering memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 1, explains that the paper was prepared jointly by Ambassador Gordon, ARA, and AID/LA for consideration at an October 3 meeting of the Latin American Policy Committee. No record of this meeting was found. ARA suggested that the paper be circulated to the members of the NSC Standing Group for their October 1 meeting. The Standing Group declined to discuss the paper at the meeting. Another covering memorandum, also dated October 1, from Stephen Wailes of S/S-S to Read indicates that the paper was circulated to Harriman.