Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, March 19, 1962, 3 p.m.

1661. This telegram is in nature of a contingency paper and in consequence I do not wish it to be taken as a cry of alarm. Other telegrams going out from Embassy this morning will analyze results of elections, submit biographic data on Framini and company, and summarize Embassy opinion on psychological, political, and economic impact from yesterday’s balloting.²

Purpose of this telegram is to point out various contingencies which may arise from an unsatisfactory situation.

1. Ironic paradox is that national elections which by every index were clean and honestly run will lead to one of three alternatives, none palatable to Argentina nor ultimately to US:

A) Election results are allowed to stand “as is” with Peronists thus gaining control of seven to nine provinces, including vitally important Buenos Aires province, as Well as materially increasing their representation in Chamber of Deputies. Such control could easily prepare a way for election two years hence of a Peronist president.

B) To prevent foregoing alternative, Frondizi (as Morales told me last night—Embtel 1656)³ might intervene against Framini in Buenos Aires province and other Peronist Governors in remaining six provinces. This, although constitutionally “legal” since Argentina still remains in state of siege, would of itself negate democratic process as carried out by elections.

C) Military, incensed at what they regard as a gigantic miscalculation by Frondizi, may use their power not merely to insist that he have recourse to intervention as outlined above, but might as Well ask themselves “why not go the whole hog?” “Why not throw out Frondizi?”

2. Our own attitude toward these three alternatives initially should be one of “no comment” although here and there we could make noises about hope that constitutional procedures will be followed in one of Latin America’s most politically advanced countries.

3. If, however, military do oust Frondizi they will certainly not stop short of getting rid of Frigerio at same time and will place Peronists, at least for time being, beyond the pale. Their coup d’etat will undoubtedly have window dressing to make it seem an anti-Communist, anti-Castro measure. It is perhaps early to discern whom they would entrust with power as an eventual provisional president, but it seems clear that Aramburu would most likely fill requirements of that position. If he is appointed I believe we should give him prompt recognition with stress on fact that it was he who intervened against Peron and succeeded in bringing nation to restoration of a constitutional regime. General Fraga, Secretary of War, might be another possibility.

Foregoing is responsive to last sentence Deptel 1668⁴ although drafted before receipt that telegram.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-1962. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to POLADCINCARIB.
2. National elections were held in the federal capital and 16 provinces. Fourteen provinces elected governors along with provincial and local officials. Fifteen provinces and the federal capital elected members of the National Chamber of Deputies. Eighty-seven of the 192 seats in the National Assembly were at stake. The Peronists ran first in 11 provinces, winning 9 governorships and were second in the federal capital. Voting for seats in the National Chamber resulted in the following distribution (including hold-over members): Union Civica Radical Instransigente (UCRI), Frondizi’s party, 74; Union Civica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP), 56; Peronists, 47; and 14 seats were distributed among minor parties. Documentation on the election is ibid., 735.00.
3. Dated March 18. (Ibid., 735.00/3-1862)
4. The last sentence of telegram 1668 to Buenos Aires, March 19, reads: “Your evaluation election results including probable effect on position and policies GOA and US-Argentine relations eagerly awaited particularly in view Congressional interest.” (Ibid.)