Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

164. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy¹

Washington, April 1, 1963.

SUBJECT

• My Memorandum of March 12, 1963 Regarding Next Steps in OAS on Cuban Problem²

I enclose a copy of the referenced memorandum which was transmitted to the White House March 12.

With respect to the COAS report on subversive activities referred to in paragraph 1, the Committee has now completed preliminary approval of its program of recommendations, and although these have not yet been submitted to the full Council, they will be available for use at the April 3 meeting in Managua.

Paragraph 2 of the March 12 memorandum recommends that we seek further action in the OAS on economic measures against the Castro regime. I am informed that no action has yet been taken on this recommendation. In the light of our overall Cuban policy, this problem remains important and the recommendation is not affected by the San Jose meeting. Indeed, the recommendation that further economic measures be taken against the Castro regime would be quite consistent with the general attitude of the other Presidents as expressed in that meeting. I renew my recommendation, therefore, that you authorize the Department of State to seek action by the COAS along the lines of paragraph 2 of my memorandum of March 12.³

Dean Rusk⁴

Enclosure⁵

Memorandum by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell)

SUBJECT

• Next Steps in OAS on Cuban Problem

1. Subversive Activities (Movement of Persons, Propaganda and Funds).

The COAS Committee charged with maintaining vigilance against subversive activities has been working for the last several weeks on a practical program of recommendations to the governments for the control of travel, propaganda and funds, basing its work in part on the recent SCCS report which had been prepared at its request. (The United States member is also drawing upon material prepared by Subcommittee chaired by Major General Victor Krulak, USMC.)⁶

We are accelerating this work so that, if possible, the Committee’s report may be sent to all members of the Council by March 15. Then the consideration of this hemisphere-wide problem by the seven Presidents at San Jose may be within the hemisphere-wide framework of the OAS.

2. Further Economic Measures against the Castro Regime.

The following three considerations militate against strong immediate OAS punitive measures against Castro:

a. Dissipation through time and circumstance of the crisis-stimulated willingness to take strong action;

b. United States concern lest the impending partial withdrawal of Soviet troops be prejudiced; and

c. The importance attached to preserving unanimity in the OAS.

Nevertheless, it is important that some forward movement be made in the OAS toward our ultimate objective (other than the above defensive action against that part of the problem represented by subversive activities).

Recommendations:

1. I therefore recommend that, prefaced by consultations with members of the COAS Committee and others, we seek to have the COAS adopt by the last week in March a resolution which would:

a. Extend the arms embargo imposed by Resolution VIII of Punta del Este to include “all items of trade except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies”

b. Recommend that Member States prohibit the use of their vessels to carry to Cuba any embargoed items;

c. Recommend that Member States deny overflight and landing rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuban runs; and

d. Call upon the rest of the free world to take similar measures.

Such a resolution is consistent with United States objectives and practice, should be welcomed domestically, would have slight economic, but appreciable psychological advantages, stands a good chance of obtaining unanimous or near unanimous support, and seems unlikely to affect Soviet willingness (if any) to remove its troops.

2. After the recovery of the United States prisoners, and after observing further withdrawals of Soviet troops, we can consider additional measures for adoption by the OAS.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 COAS-IA. Secret. Drafted by Allen.
2. Copies of the March 12 memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy and its enclosure, an undated memorandum by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, are attached to the source text. A March 30 note from David Rowe of the Executive Secretariat to Rusk’s Special Assistant Emory C. Swank, attached to the source text, states that the White House had lost the March 12 memorandum and had requested a copy with an update of its recommendation concerning OAS action.
3. An April 5 memorandum from Dungan to Rusk, attached to the source text, states that the President concurred in Rusk’s recommendations and left the question of timing of implementation to the Department.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
5. Originally enclosed with Rusk’s March 12 memorandum to Kennedy, cited in footnote 2. Both were enclosed with Rusk’s April 1 memorandum to Kennedy.
6. Reference is to the Counter-Subversion Subcommittee of the Interagency Cuban Coordinating Committee.