153. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State1
Secto 21. Informal MFM. Following based on uncleared memcon:2
Secy met Sept 25 informally with FonMins Bolivia, CR, DomRep, Guat, Nic and Panama for discussion Cuban problem in preparation informal MFM next week. He briefly reviewed situation, pointing out while recent Sov shipments supplied at Castro’s urging have neither increased power of Cuba as offensive military threat nor increased Castro’s ability control own people, do represent increased Sov involvement. [Page 325] Secy repeated unequivocal assurances US will under no circumstances permit any raids or attacks of any kind by Cuba on LA countries and stated so far Castro acting cautiously in this area. Recent Sov bluster still gives no indication Soviets contemplating actions of type President warned against in press statement.
Secy made clear US not prepared accept Cuban situation as permanent. Although military action remains eventual possibility, we must think of ways solve problem without recourse to arms. Objective should be actions which increasingly isolate Cuba so as make abundantly clear to Soviets Cuba is unprofitable enterprise for them, either in itself or as basis Communist penetration other ARs.
Such steps, which worthy discussion informal MFM, would include review of minimal trade relationships with and shipping to Cuba (this matter we also discussing with our NATO allies); measures to control flow of small arms, propaganda, money, agents from Cuba and movement of groups of Latin nationals to Cuba for training in subversion; measures of increased surveillance Carib area; and measures control Commies in each country.
In making clear our determination isolate Cuba, we naturally hope for complete hemisphere solidarity, at least on general approach. In addition we prepared move on more intensive steps tightened surveillance and controls with those ARs willing do so, particularly Caribbean nations whose special right take extra measures was recognized at Punta del Este (para 3 res 11).
In ensuing discussion (Bolivia and El Salvador silent) Central Americans expressed agreement Secy’s approach; showed real interest in moving forward in Carib concert, but did not suggest any radical or belligerent action. They showed general concern (to which Secy agreed) that one serious impact in their countries of recent Cuban buildup has been to increase confidence and insolence local Commie groups who intensifying their subversive nibbling tactics. Guatemalan suggested all should urge those ARs still maintaining relations with Cuba to break them. Considerable emphasis placed by Latins on importance of intensive combined efforts educate peoples OARs on actual conditions Cuban people to counteract heavy Castro propaganda.
Separate meeting of Central American and Caribbean FonMins (excluding Mexico) held 3 pm September 26 with Martin3 for more concrete exploration possible steps. Secy met 5 pm same day with FonMins South American Reps present for similar initial review of situation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2662. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to all posts in Latin America except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLADCINCLANT, and POLADCINCARIB. Received at 1:19 a.m. on September 27.↩
- A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2152.↩
- The meeting was summarized in Secto 41 from New York, dated September 28. (Ibid.)↩