Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

146. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 4, 1962, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cuban Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Brazilian Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Lincoln Gordon
• Mr. J. W. Wilson, Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs

In the course of a conversation on other matters, the Cuban situation was discussed.

In response to the Secretary’s inquiry as to his opinion on the Cuban situation, the Foreign Minister replied that there is a rapid daily deterioration. Castro is in a fight with the Communists, who have increased the strength of their apparatus, and is in danger of being discarded by them. He has appealed to the esprit de corps of the barbudos. The food situation is bad. He cited as significant the recent action of the Cuban Government in exporting to the USSR appliances, etc. taken from private homes in order to pay for food imports.

The Foreign Minister said Brazil is in a good position to follow and influence the situation. (The Secretary interjected that this may soon be a “unique” position.) For this reason he is interested in what the U.S. views are of this evolution in Cuba—of getting Fidel away from the Communists. The Foreign Minister said there can be no thought of retreating from the Cuban revolution, of return to the Cardonas and the like, the status quo ante. It would be easier to create the conditions for a new form of democratic revolution. In response to a question by Ambassador Gordon, the Foreign Minister indicated that this might be something on the model of Yugoslavia. He asserted that it is clear that Khrushchev despises Fidel.

The Secretary said that, while their conversation was speculation, of course, he wanted to make sure it was understood clearly that from the U.S. viewpoint two things are not negotiable: (1) the direct Cuban ties with Moscow, such as arms and the Communist apparatus; and (2) Cuban subversive actions elsewhere in the hemisphere. If the situation inside Cuba should involve a clear break with Moscow and the concentration of Cuban activities in Cuba, then the possibility would be opened for a change of the policies of other countries. We have known of some top level defections and discontent (among those still in Cuba) over the embracing of the Communist apparatus.

The Secretary emphasized that, as President Kennedy has stated publicly, it is not the expropriations nor the internal changes in Cuba which are our concern; it is the ties with Moscow and the subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere. If Castro had support free from the Communist apparatus and cut the ties to Moscow, this would create a new situation.

The Foreign Minister then inquired whether the Secretary thought the idea of trying to wean Castro away from the Communists had some merit. The Secretary responded by pointing to the fact that we have never asked Brazil to break relations with Cuba, an omission which is not due to accident.

In recapitulating the Secretary’s two points of U.S. policy on Cuba, the Foreign Minister said it was his understanding that these were tied to formal Communist participation in the Cuban regime and that, if these were removed, other points would be negotiable. He stated parenthetically that Castro is not weak internally. The Secretary said evidence of cutting the ties with Moscow would be, for example, reconciliation with Castro’s early supporters who have left him on the Communist issue and the dropping of the language of Communism. When the Foreign Minister inquired if the U.S. made a distinction between diplomatic relations and ties with the U.S.S.R., the Secretary said that a change such as breaking ties would probably bring on a break in relations.

The Secretary mentioned the problem of asylees in the Ecuadoran Embassy and wondered if the Cubans would let some of them out of Cuba for Brazil. The Foreign Minister said the Brazilian Embassy was taking them in liberally and commented on the numbers in various Embassies. Some had been let out of the country in the past, he said.

In concluding the discussion of Cuba, the Secretary said he wished to make two more points. (1) There will be no military invasion of Cuba except in the event of fighting with the Soviet Union over something elsewhere, such as Berlin. (2) We do not take seriously the threats of Khrushchev to support Cuba. Khrushchev will not sacrifice the Soviet Union for Cuba.

With regard to an appointment to continue their discussion upon the Foreign Minister’s return from Mexico, the Secretary said he was free all Thursday afternoon, April 12. He proposed that, should the weather be good, they take a cruise on the Potomac in the President’s boat, having lunch on board and talking during the afternoon.

The Foreign Minister said he intended to summon the Brazilian Ambassador in Habana to Mexico City during his visit there. When the Secretary cautioned on the need for holding closely knowledge of their discussion, the Foreign Minister assured him of the Ambassador’s discretion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-462. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S on April 12. The conversation was held in the Secretary’s office.