Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

132. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, January 9, 1962, 9:16 p.m.

1230. Department’s current analysis positions OAS governments re possible action 8th MFM indicates:

Group of governments constituting most if not all thirteen which clearly supported Rio Treaty convocation appear favor obligatory rupture diplomatic and economic relations perhaps with 30 to 60 day waiting period demonstrate Cuban noncompliance. Certain these governments such as Guatemala and Peru would support measures having appearance even stronger action including some type air-sea surveillance Caribbean area or denial Cuba’s right participate OAS. On other hand Argentina, as reflected in consultations possible actions resulting Kennedy-Frondizi December 24 meeting, emerging as leader in group which opposes or unreceptive obligatory rupture diplomatic and economic relations, but willing support or favorably consider non-mandatory action, including insistence Cuba clearly define its position within OAS system or suffer at least moral consequences. Argentina also desires inclusion exhortation drastic emphasis on and acceleration Alliance for Progress program. This group would probably also support continuing COAS responsibility maintain vigilance and recommend means strengthening capacity defense against Cuban-communist intervention. Although positions all governments not clear, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador might follow Argentine lead. Uruguay uncertain, Mexico will probably oppose on “juridical” grounds.

Principal immediate questions are:

(1) Whether necessary majority fourteen votes obtainable for obligatory measures; and

(2) Whether, even if such bare majority obtainable, it is not preferable seek agreement additional governments on action not involving obligatory measures but clearly achieving moral isolation Castro regime and agreement on strengthening defense against its penetration.

In these circumstances our position should be described as follows:

(1) US favors MFM action which will accomplish most conclusive possible definition OAS position against Castro regime’s making itself accomplice Sino-Soviet bloc.

(2) Resolution or resolutions containing principal points draft forwarded CA-735,² and that developed on basis Depcirtel 1200³ including obligatory diplomatic and economic break (after waiting period), would accomplish this purpose particularly if substantial majority for it achieved.

(3) We continue prepared consult on ways in which basic objective effective OAS isolation Cuba can be achieved, but we consider it extremely important that countries favoring obligatory measures be urged consult with countries not favoring such measures and vice versa since most imminent danger from Marxism-Leninism-Castroism is to Latin countries and USG judgment cannot substitute for their judgment in deciding on MFM actions in relation their individual country situations and danger from Cuba.

FYI. While maintaining obligatory measures as “basic position” we do not wish preclude outcome which would clearly accomplish isolation Castro without forcing reluctant countries into obligatory break at this time. End FYI.

Please discuss US position with FonMin (except Brazil, Argentina and Colombia) and report his views. Mention that US does not have a specific proposal but has drafted tentative articles to be of assistance in recording consensus when substantial majority views are known.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-962. Confidential. Drafted by Woodward and Jamison; cleared by Belcher, Whitman, Bowden (SOV), Bracken, and Charles K. Johnson; and approved by Rusk.
2. See footnote 3, Document 127.
3. See footnote 3, Document 129.