124. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Conference Between President Kennedy and Venezuelan President Betancourt—Cuban Problem—OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Ambassador Chester Bowles
- Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Charge d’Affaires ad interim
- Mr. Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the Agency for International Development
- Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs
- Mr. Harold Linder, President of Export-Import Bank of Washington
- Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS staff interpreter
- President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela
- Dr. Marcos Falcón Briceno, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
- Dr. Andres German Otero, Minister of Finance of Venezuela
- General Antonio Briceno Linares, Minister of Defense of Venezuela
- Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States
- Dr. Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Governor of the Federal District of Venezuela
- Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Chief, Office of Coordination and Planning, Venezuelan Government
The meeting convened at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, 1961, at Los Nunez, President Betancourt’s residence in Caracas, Venezuela. Several unrelated matters were discussed at this conference, including the subject covered in this memorandum.2
Cuban Problem—OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting
President Kennedy brought into the conversation the OAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (MFM) scheduled on January 10 to deal with the Cuban problem. He said the Panamanian Government had offered Panama City as site for the Meeting but had indicated that circumstances made it necessary to hold the meeting in February. President Kennedy asked President Betancourt whether a delay would be advisable or whether the meeting should be held as scheduled in the Pan American Union headquarters in Washington.
[Page 272]President Betancourt replied that he had discussed this point with Foreign Minister Falcón Briceno and Ambassador Mayobre and had concluded that the important point was not the site but whether the necessary two-thirds votes could be obtained to vote sanctions against the Castro regime. He said the Governments of Colombia and Venezuela were working a “pincers” movement against Ecuador. He had written a letter to the Ecuadorean President and might send an emissary to converse with President Arosemena about changing his country’s policy in favor of voting sanctions. He is also considering a possible trip to Venezuela by the Ecuadorean President.
President Betancourt added that when President Frondizi of Argentina stopped briefly in Venezuela he was of the opinion that Argentina planned to vote favorably for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, but actually had abstained.
President Betancourt also said that as a result of a trip of President López Mateos of Mexico to Caracas, personal contact was established between the two Presidents. The Government of Venezuela was considering the possibility of sending a special envoy to Mexico in order to try to convince that country to modify its stand vis-à-vis Cuba. Of course, there were internal political factors and a traditional attitude on the part of the Mexican Foreign Ministry that would make such a change extremely difficult to achieve.
When President Kennedy asked again whether the timing of the MFM was vital President Betancourt responded that time was not as important as having the necessary 14 votes.
President Kennedy expressed the view, which was corroborated by Assistant Secretary Woodward, that it would be difficult to obtain a resolution imposing sanctions on Cuba but thought that one would pass asking the Castro regime to sever its ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and return to the inter-American family. He felt that the strongest possible resolution should be passed.
President Betancourt agreed with this. He added that Venezuela would vote for sanctions or for any other resolution such as the one that had just been indicated by the President. President Betancourt observed that the resolution against the Dominican Republic, voted at San Jose, did not go very far but it was of great moral assistance in paving the way for downfall of the Trujillo regime.
President Kennedy asked for Mr. Woodward’s comments on the MFM meeting and the latter stated that it was not likely Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and possibly Bolivia and Ecuador would vote for strong sanctions. Mr. Woodward thought that we should support the Colombian resolution strongly and attempt to pin down Castro to break with the Sino-Soviet bloc or face sanctions.
[Page 273]At this point President Betancourt observed that any unilateral action against Cuba would destroy the inter-American system and President Kennedy assured him the United States did not intend to take unilateral action against the Castro government.
President Kennedy added that the United States hoped to get as strong a resolution against Cuba as it was possible to get; but even if one calling only for a break with the Sino-Soviets were obtained, it is certain Castro would refuse to do so and thus place Cuba in a most difficult position. He said if we lower our aim from the outset the final result might well be a watered-down resolution that would not be very effective. Perhaps we would not be able to agree on sanctions at this meeting but we could lay the groundwork for them in the future. Castro will obviously reject the OAS request and his refusal could be the basis for another Meeting of Foreign Ministers later on. Because it will take some time to line up the necessary votes and the Christmas holidays are near, President Kennedy expressed the view that the February meeting was most logical.
Mr. Woodward added that President Kennedy would have an opportunity on December 17 to obtain President Lleras Camargo’s judgment on the timing of the meeting and the type of resolution which could be obtained. President Kennedy said Mr. Woodward would stay an extra day in Bogota to go over the proposed resolutions which are to be pre-sented at the MFM meeting. He thought the revised drafts would be ready for consideration in 10 days.
President Betancourt stated that Venezuela would support strong action against Cuba but cautioned that it might be necessary to go by easy stages, as was done with the Dominican Republic. He expressed the conviction that Castro’s days were numbered and he based this on his residence in that country for two years. Castro has insulted everyone and brought about rupture of relations with most of the OAS members. He said that the resistance movement in Cuba must be strongly supported and Venezuela is so doing within its resources. President Betancourt indicated that the situation in Cuba is different from that in the Soviet Union because the Cuban people had known freedom and the Russians never have. He hoped that the Cuban people will eventually be able to get rid of Communism. Any unilateral action on the part of the United States would be extremely harmful.
President Kennedy replied that the police system in Cuba was very powerful and that it would make it difficult for the Cubans to revolt. On the other hand, the United States would not act unilaterally but only on a hemisphere-wide basis. In view of Castro’s recent speeches and of the economic and social structure he was trying to impose on Cuba it would seem that it would be difficult for the Latin American governments to oppose a resolution that urged Castro to return to the inter-American [Page 274] family of nations. Castro has shown himself to be a Communist rather than a great American revolutionary leader. President Kennedy thought it would not be likely that Castro would return to the inter-American family and therefore action against his regime would be easier once he had refused to break his ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
President Betancourt expressed his total agreement with the President’s views.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1661. Secret. Drafted by Stewart, Van Reigersberg, and Moskowitz. Approved in the White House on February 6. President Kennedy traveled to Venezuela December 16 and 17.↩
- see Document 334. Other memoranda of conversation are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2016.↩