Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

330. Summary Record of the 3d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, April 30, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

CUBA

Under Secretary Harriman reported on his talks with Gromyko and Khrushchev on the subject of Cuba. (He read extracts from a long summary, copies of which he later left with the President and Mr. Bundy, copy attached.)¹ Mr. Harriman did not think that Khrushchev was in trouble personally but his policies are being criticized by the hard line Communists. The Soviets are using Castro as an exhibit of the success of their Cuban policy. They are also seeking to handle him in such a way that he will not turn toward the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev does not think that Soviet troops in Cuba are really important, but Harriman believes the Russians will go to great lengths to ensure that Castro remains in control of Cuba. After Cuban troops are trained, the Russian troops can be expected to leave, but Soviet economic aid will be continued at a level necessary to ensure a going economy in Cuba.

The attached copy of Mr. Bundy’s summary covers the assignments which have been made as a result of the discussion of Cuba.² Points not covered in that summary follow:

There was a discussion of whether the U.S. could destroy Castro’s halo by an information program aimed at Cuba and Latin America. Under Secretary Ball said Castro was becoming a symbol and an effort should be made to undermine this symbol. Mr. Harriman pointed out that we could make fUN of Castro. This is an effective way of attacking Communists who, in his opinion, can take almost anything except ridicule.

Secretary McNamara noted that he had initiated a study of how to reduce to a minimum the reaction time of U.S. forces in the event a decision was taken to use force against Cuba. He has under study a plan which would mean that within ninety to one hundred days we would have a capability of destroying all the SAM sites in Cuba with twenty-six missiles.

The Attorney General commented that the President was hopeful that we could take actions now in the OAS which would permit us in the future to act effectively in the event the Russians or the Cubans started shipping large amounts of arms to other Latin American states. The purpose would be to prepare now a basis for drastic U.S. action to halt any attempt to introduce a Soviet military presence in another Latin American country.

It was agreed that pressure against the Soviet presence in Cuba will be kept low-key for the next month in order to give Khrushchev an option of carrying out quietly the prompt withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

The preparation of a study covering the possible defection of Castro was deferred for the present. All that can be done in this connection now is to keep open the line of communication to Castro which was opened by Mr. Donovan during the negotiations about the U.S. prisoners. Director McCone’s interest in this matter prompted the postponement of the discussion of this possible course of action until the Director’s return.

There was recognition of the importance of relating what we are now doing to what we are planning to do in Cuba. Secretary McNamara expressed his view that small-scale sabotage over a long period of time would produce no real change in the situation and therefore was not an acceptable course of action.

Bromley Smith³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/30/63. Top Secret.
1. See Document 326.
2. See Document 333.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.