Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

314. Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone⁰

Washington, April 15, 1963.

As I analyze it, the situation in Cuba is about as follows:

1. Undeniably there has been a withdrawal. A figure of 4,000 can be supported by visual observation, analyses of shipping, refugee and clandestine reports.

2. There is no evidence of withdrawal of equipment. In fact, there is evidence of the recent introduction of some equipment of an undisclosed nature during the last several months.

3. Some reports, including statements by Castro and other high Cuban officials, would lead to the conclusion that a continuing, gradual Soviet withdrawal is to be expected and will be completed in about a year. At this time all Soviet equipment including SAM sites will have been turned over to the Cubans. This is contradicted by evidences of Soviet intention to stay in Cuba, the most persuasive being substantial permanent construction of facilities to house Soviet personnel.

4. At the present time the Soviets are manning the SAM sites, coastal defense missiles, KOMAR ships, MIG-21 aircraft and maintaining their 4 military encampments of about battalion size. The appearance of Cuban tents adjacent to each of the 4 camps could mean one of two things:

a. A Cuban training program, or

b. Utilization of Cubans for support activities such as camp maintenance, mess hall duty, etc.

Under the latter assumption, it could be that personnel withdrawn have been support personnel, and that the combat personnel remain intact. Soviet Cuban relationships remain strained but not as seriously strained as they were last Fall. A situation has evolved which both sides seem willing to live with. Castro is asserting and declaring his independ-ence of the Soviets. He considers that he is not a satellite but he is obviously beholden to the Soviets for economic aid and military assist-ance.

5. We have no hard intelligence which would indicate a change in Castro’s basic attitude toward other Latin American governments.

6. Castro’s talks with Donovan have been mild in nature, conciliatory and reasonably frank. Of greater significance is Dr. Vallejo’s private statements to Donovan that Castro realizes he must find a rapprochement with the United States if he is to succeed in building a viable Cuba. Apparently Castro does not know how to go about this, therefore the subject has not been discussed with Donovan.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret.