Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

302. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, March 28, 1963.

Dear Mr. President: I am concerned that hit and rUN raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday’s exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.¹

• First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.
• Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current Customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.
• Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.
• Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.
• Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Confidential. Drafted by Robert Follestad, Officer in Charge of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, and cleared by Martin, Cottrell, and U. Alexis Johnson.
1. In a March 28 memorandum Chase alerted Bundy to the recommedations proposed in this letter. Chase also informed Bundy of his conversations at the Department of Justice on March 27. According to Chase, the discussions “indicated that the FBI is not doing a stellar intelligence job; they seem to know remarkably little about the activist groups. However, I have been told that FBI has been shaken up by this episode and that solid FBI contributions will be forthcoming today.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement.