Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:24 p.m.

1933. Eyes only for Ambassador. With reference Khrushchev’s statements to Trevelyan on US commitments with respect to Cuba reported Embtel 2241,¹ President desires that you take advantage of suitable opportunity to point out to Khrushchev that the President’s position has been entirely consistent on this matter and that the President is concerned that Khrushchev should feel there has been any change. The President clearly set forth our policy in his November 20 press conference, which stated inter alia “as for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. As I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.’”

As the President said in his message of November 21, he regretted that Chairman Khrushchev had not been able to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, “and that, in consequence, we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday (referring to his November 20 press conference), there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course.”

As the President has subsequently been very careful not to depart from the position taken in his press conference of November 20, he finds it difficult to understand how Chairman Khrushchev could believe that he is now in any way departing from his previous policy, with which Khrushchev had expressed understanding, as noted in the President’s letter of December 14.

In your discretion and in manner you consider most appropriate, you should reiterate to Khrushchev that, in view of history this affair and in absence other means of verification contemplated in original undertaking embodied in President’s letter of October 27 and Chairman Khrushchev’s letter of October 28,² we must continue to rely upon our own means of information and any interference with our ability to obtain such information would bring about a most serious situation.

Chairman Khrushchev should also understand that Castro’s belligerent attitude toward the other states of Latin America creates a most difficult situation for the President. Castro’s threats toward such forward-looking and progressive leaders as Betancourt, in Venezuela (as well as others), followed by terrorist attacks, sabotage and bombing by terrorists within Venezuela who are publicly supported by Castro, make it difficult to believe that Castro desires to live in peace with his neighbors. The President hopes that Chairman Khrushchev continues to share the President’s desire to reduce tensions in the Caribbean area and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Ball, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk and Johnson.
1. See footnote 3, Document 292.
2. Documents 95 and 102.
3. In telegram 1950 to Moscow, March 14, the Secretary told Kohler that the last paragraph of this telegram was not intended to imply that the President “has any intention of invading Cuba under present circumstance, or otherwise modify the statement of policy set forth in the first three paragraphs.”Rusk noted that Kohler would understand that the President “cannot make to Soviets any open-ended commitment which would amend or detract from our treaty obligations in this Hemisphere.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR)