292. Summary Record of the 509th National Security Council Meeting0
SUBJECT
- Latin American Policy1
PRESENT
- President, Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon,
- Attorney General, General Taylor, Director McCone, Secretary Vance, Under
- Secretary Ball, Ambassador Stevenson, Administrator Bell, Deputy Secretary
- Gilpatric, Director Murrow, Director McDermott, U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant
- Secretary Martin, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Paul Nitze, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr.
- Sorensen, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Kaysen, General Clifton, Mr. Bromley Smith
The President opened the meeting by asking Director McCone for a summary of current intelligence on Cuba, as well as a summary of his recent experience on the Hill with Congressional Committees.
Mr. McCone reported that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Cuba; that between 1700 and 2000 had already left, more were probably leaving, but we had no knowledge of how many thousands would actually depart. Because there appears to be no movement of major items of military equipment, we do not know whether the Soviet troop withdrawal to date has actually affected the Soviet military capability in Cuba.
With respect to U.S. prisoners in Cuba, Mr. McCone reported that Mr. Donovan would be in Havana this week where he expects to arrange for the release of all U.S. prisoners without more conditions. Mr. McCone said we have held off flying low-level reconnaissance missions until the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba. He hoped we could fly low-level missions just as soon as the prisoners were out.
Director McCone reported that the Stennis Congressional Committee will make a favorable report.2 All members appear to be satisfied [Page 716] with the performance of the Intelligence Community and their public report will cite no intelligence gap to be criticized. Mr. McCone said the Congressional group pressed very hard with respect to future policy toward Cuba and Latin America. He said he told the group policy was beyond his competence, but on being pressed he told them there was a Cuba problem and a separate Latin American problem. He said he favored taking positive steps to prevent any other country from falling to Communism. As regards Cuba, he said first we must get the Soviets out and, after that, the Castro government can be broken up by a military coup favorable to the U.S. Mr. McCone said he favored a military uprising rather than a civil uprising. He concluded by predicting that the investigation of past actions in Cuba was about finished on the Hill.
The President indicated the Soviets may be pulling away from a Cuba withdrawal and apparently are not taking out the four armored groups now there. Secretary Rusk said that if the armored groups do not come out, we can go back to the Russians and remind them that these groups, which were used to protect the missiles, should come out as part of the commitment to remove missile-associated forces.
The President referred to a State cable which reported that Khrushchev is saying that we are moving away from our no-invasion pledge.3 This may explain why Khrushchev is hesitant to pull out his troops. He asked that we raise this subject with Khrushchev within the week.4
The President asked whether we are doing all we can to isolate Cuba. He cited (a) free world trade with Cuba, (b) embargo of allied shipping, and (c) the movement of students and subversives into and out of Cuba.
Secretary Rusk indicated that we are keeping the pressure on, but acknowledged that unless the British take immediate action, we would have to raise with them the question of U.K. ships in Cuba trade. Assist-ant Secretary Martin called attention to the pressure which he had put on the NATO members during a recent trip to Paris.
The President asked for a report on current shipping restrictions and on what actions we would take as soon as the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba.
Secretary Rusk commented that he did not believe it would be useful to demand the withdrawal of all Latin American missions from Havana. He said we had been working bilaterally on the Bolivians and the Uruguayans with a view to prompting them to break relations. Afterwards, we would suggest that Chile might break relations. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
[Page 717]The President, referring to his forthcoming trip to Costa Rica,5 wanted to be certain that we avoided the impression that we want to go further on Cuba than we actually do. He was concerned that the Nicaraguans and the Guatemalans would want to take more forceful action than we are now prepared to take. He asked that we make certain that the other countries were aware of this problem prior to the opening of the Costa Rica meeting.
Secretary Rusk commented that he believed that there was a real falloff in Congressional demands for the invasion of Cuba. He felt that in the last ten days the demands for military action had been decreasing substantially.
The President commented on the problem of persons going to and from Cuba. He said we have little hard evidence on who was moving and he referred to the use by Time magazine of the word “flood” to describe persons going to Cuba.
Mr. McCone indicated that he had told Mr. Luce that the use by Time of the word “flood,” to describe the number of persons going to Cuba, was wrong. The President said he had also told Mr. Luce that the use of the word “flood” by Time’s staff was an excellent illustration of how Time overstated situations. There resulted a humorous exchange to the effect that the President was delighted that Mr. McCone supported him in telling Mr. Luce that the word “flood” was wrong and leading the President to suggest that we should have meetings more often to be sure we were taking the same line.
Mr. Martin said that on the basis of the evidence we had, the number of trainees in Cuba has dropped off since last October.
In this connection, the President asked how we could sort out the students who come back from Cuba. Some become obviously activists in the Communist movement, but not all. He asked for further information on this subject.
[Here follows discussion of Haiti, economic development in Latin America, and independence for British Guiana.]
Mr. Murrow reported that we are getting our message through to the Cubans by radio even though some of our programs are being jammed. He said the missing ingredient in our message to the Cubans is hope. He believes we must present long-range plans on the future Cuba after Communism. Now, he said that we are unable to talk about the promise of the future.
In response to the President’s question as to whether or not we had a speech on what we hope for the future of Cuba, Mr. Martin referred to the [Page 718] comments made to the Brigade in Miami.6 The President thought something should be put in the communique at Costa Rica, but he was doubtful that we could develop an agreed future program because of splits among the Cuban exiles.
Secretary Rusk wanted to be certain that we do not create false hopes. Mr. Murrow felt we are entitled to issue some promissory notes.
The President said he doubted that we could do better than to try to get a statement from the Cubans of what they want.
Mr. Murrow said what was required was a U.S. government statement. Secretary Rusk said we did not want to do anything which would get in the way of the movement of Soviet troops out of Cuba. Mr. Bundy expressed his doubts as to whether actions we take now affect the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Under Secretary Ball thought we should involve the OAS in the work of developing plans for Cuba of the future. Mr. Martin agreed and said he would discuss it with the OAS members.
The President commented on the continuing pressure which he thought we would get from the Hill when it became clear that not all the Soviet troops were leaving Cuba. He said we should protect ourselves as best we can with the shipping policy, the trade matters, and the movement of persons, with the overall purpose of increasing the isolation of Cuba.
The President suggested that the group meet every week. He postponed discussion of the European policy until his return from Costa Rica. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509. Top Secret.↩
- On March 11 McGeorge Bundy sent the members of the National Security Council a memorandum explaining that the President was calling the meeting to have a “broader exchange of views” on Latin American and European policy. Bundy also submitted talking points used by Secretary Rusk in a recent talk to the Cabinet, dated February 28, which noted that while it was not a formal State paper, it was a “responsible statement of the main lines of our present courses.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement.↩
- The Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, Chairman, released a sanitized version of its report to Congress on May 9. The report concluded that while the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations made mistakes in some areas, U.S. intelligence “performed creditably” in other areas. The report discounted the idea of an “intelligence gap” between September 5 and October 14, 1962, but expressed concern that all Soviet strategic bombers and missiles might not have been removed and that there was a minimum of 17,500 Soviet troops remaining in Cuba. (Congressional Quaterly Almanac, Vol. XIX, 1963, p. 316)↩
- Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR) See the Supplement.↩
- See Document 293.↩
- Reference is to the President’s trip for meetings with the Presidents of Central America, March 18-20.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 260.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩