Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

288. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, February 25, 1963.

In a follow-up to our discussion of last week,¹ I am circulating herewith certain documents which I think may be helpful to all who are called upon to discuss the problem of Cuba either in Executive Session or in public. These documents are:

First, a compendium of the President’s own principal comments on Cuban affairs.² The President’s statements obviously represent the position and policy of the Executive Branch, and witnesses undertaking to explain the position of the Executive Branch on policy matters should be guided by these statements.

The second major document enclosed is a report prepared under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to intelligence on Cuba before and during the October crisis.³ This account represents a coordinated report, and witnesses undertaking to discuss the matter will wish to be familiar with it. Since the subject is highly classified, it is assumed that witnesses without appropriate clearance will be cautious in commenting on it, and that witnesses who are more fully informed will take appropriate precautions as to the character of hearings in which they discuss it. Discussion of any possible modifications in our intelligence procedures growing out of this experience should be avoided by any witnesses not having direct responsibility.

Finally, I am circulating copies of a public statement presented by Assistant Secretary Martin on February 18.⁴ This statement is an unusually clear and comprehensive account of the problem of subversion, and witnesses called to testify on this subject will wish to be familiar with the official position presented by the Department of State.

McGeorge Bundy⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Secret. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In an attached personal memorandum to the same three men, Bundy stated that in light of their comments, he had decided not to attempt a resume of guidelines for Congressional testimony as it would be subject to misunderstanding.
1. Document 284.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Apparent reference to a memorandum dated and distributed on February 27. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis—Miscellaneous) See the Supplement.
4. Printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1962, pp. 347-356 and March 18, 1963, pp. 404-412.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.