Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

287. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 25, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Aide-memoire of February 25, 1963¹

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR
• Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

The Soviet Ambassador telephoned me about 10:00 this morning to say that he could not transmit to Moscow the attached memorandum which was handed to the Soviet Counselor by Mr. Guthrie on February twenty-third. He pointed out that the memorandum implied an agreement which did not exist. I inquired if it would be satisfactory if we left out any reference to the conversation I had had with the Ambassador.² He replied that, speaking personally, he thought this would be considered in Moscow as a kind of ultimatum since the Soviet Government would have to either accept our proposed procedures or protest them. He said if we wished to propose an agreement with the Soviet Government on this subject, he would, of course, transmit our proposal, but he could not transmit the memorandum.

After discussion with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bundy, who discussed the matter with Secretary McNamara by telephone, and after clearance with the President, at 1:00 p.m. today I handed the Soviet Ambassador the aide-memoire of February twenty-fifth on this subject.

After reading the aide-memoire, the Ambassador inquired what kind of information we were seeking. I replied that it would be helpful to know the names and times of departure of the ships involved, and added that if the Soviet Government could do so, I thought it would be most helpful to be informed of the numbers and types of troops involved. The Ambassador inquired whether it was intended that this information be made public. I replied that I did not think we would need to make public the fact that we might be informed of the names and departures of the ships, but that if they could give us the numbers of troops, it would be to our mutual interest that we be allowed to make this information public. I pointed out that our whole thought in this operation was that it was in our mutual interest that the public be convinced that the useful action being taken by the Soviet Government be convincingly confirmed.

Attachment

Washington, February 23, 1963.

With reference to Ambassador Thompson’s discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, February 21, the United States Government wishes to inform the Soviet Government that the United States will photograph outbound special interest passenger ships from Cuba during daylight and that aircraft and/or ships approaching for photographic coverage will:

a. Approach from the stern on a parallel course.

b. Take station well clear on either beam.

c. Fixed wing aircraft will dip wings: ships sound four or more blasts on the whistle, helos no special signal required.

This information is being provided in order that it will be understood by both the U.S. ship/aircraft and Soviet passenger ships involved as

a. An intention to approach closer without hostile intent.

b. An intent to overfly or close for photographic purposes.

c. Provision of opportunity for the Soviet ship to have its embarked troops on topside, and

c [d]. An understanding that both are to come up on 500 kcs for radio communication should such be required.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret.
1. The aide-memoire stated that the United States would appreciate further information concerning arrangements for withdrawal of troops from Cuba, and expressed the view that comprehensive information on this matter was in the interests of both sides. (Ibid.)

2. Apparent reference to a February 21 Dobrynin-Thompson conversation; the memorandum of the conversation by Thompson reads:

   “At the White House reception last night, I had just started talking to the Soviet Ambassador when the President walked up. In the course of the conversation, I said I had just been on the point of suggesting to the Ambassador that it would be in our mutual interest for them to arrange a boat drill on the vessel taking Soviet troops out of Cuba in order that we could get some good pictures.

   “The Ambassador replied that he did not think we would have any difficulty whatever getting good pictures by the same methods we had used when the missiles were removed.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb-April 1963)