Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

281. Message From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, February 13, 1963.

1. I am growing increasingly concerned over Soviet intentions in Cuba. The agent report of deep verticle wells, three to four meters in diameter in Pinar del Rio is not satisfactorily answered by negative surface indications or the absence of spoils as quantities of earth involved could be trucked away and hidden from view and other signs of workings could be easily camouflaged. I therefore feel we cannot dismiss this possibility on the basis of negative photographic interpretation and analysis.

2. Several recent events contribute to my growing concern over the possibility of reintroduction of an offensive capability in Cuba and I wish the entire Intelligence Community to intensify efforts to satisfactorily answer this question. In addition to reports mentioned, the receipt of two shiploads of unexplained military cargo and the precipitous discharging of the cargos by military personnel, together with news of a possible third cargo, is to me an ominous sign. In addition Khrushchev’s false and absolutely misleading statement that his technicians were in Cuba to train Cubans is inconsistent with the facts as were his and Dobrynin’s statements prior to the October crisis.

3. Furthermore, the disarmament proposals by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday were so obviously unacceptable to the West (as they have been on numerous occasions during the past ten years) that I believe they were stated as a justification for a Soviet offensive weapons base in Cuba than for any other purpose. Certainly they were not advanced for the purpose of serious negotiation.

4. In view of all of the above, I am inclined to the view that it is highly dangerous for the Intelligence Community or spokesmen for the Government to take a categoric position concerning the possible exist-ence or future clandestine development of an offensive threat and am inclined to place greater emphasis on my statement that this can only be proven by penetrating and continuing on-site inspection.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret. According to an attached covering letter from Carter to Rusk, February 13, McCone (who was in Europe) sent this message to Acting Director Marshall S. Carter, asking that he give a copy to Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the members of the USIB. Carter assured the addressees that the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and the Office of National Estimates were at work evaluating the matters raised by McCone.