Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

280. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 9, 1963, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
• John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

The Secretary told the Ambassador that Cuba is still a troublesome problem. In his talk with Ambassador Dobrynin at lunch on February 8, Ambassador Kohler had referred to Cuba as something that was poisoning our relations.¹ This was an accurate statement. President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev understand that the United States has no desire or intention to invade Cuba. It was not possible, however, to make a wholly unqualified commitment concerning the future, as this depends on the attitude of the Cuban Government. If Cuba wishes to live in peace then there will be peace in the Caribbean. However, we were not encouraged by the way in which Castro has attempted since January to whip up violence in Latin America. Subversive activities in Venezuela and elsewhere make the future very uncertain. As for the Soviet presence in Cuba, the United States is concerned over the fact that the movement of Soviet forces out of Cuba has stopped while additional military equipment continues to enter the island. We had supposed that the troops connected with the operation and protection of the missiles which had been emplaced in Cuba would be removed. Evidently some Soviet troops had been sent there initially to protect these weapons but these troops were still there although the weapons had been removed. Training was clearly not the mission of these troops as there are few Cubans to be found where the Soviet forces are. The presence of these troops contributes to the heightened tensions in our relationship. Therefore, we hope that the Soviet Government will find it possible to reduce tensions by making it clear there is no Soviet military build-up in Cuba and that there is an intent to further reduce the number of Soviet forces there, as Khrushchev had indicated would be the case. The Secretary had noted a press report of a conversation which Khrushchev had had with a Canadian businessman in which Khrushchev had stated all the Soviet troops in Cuba were on a training mission. Clearly, the Secretary said, not all of them are there for this purpose.

The Secretary went on to say that the President has a serious problem over Cuba. Last August and September he had tried to calm down the American people on this issue. However, the events of September and October were not only serious in themselves but had reduced the President’s credibility in the eyes of his own people. Now, it was not so easy for the President to reassure the country over Cuba. The American people remember what Senator Keating had said last August and what the President had said and Keating’s speculation had turned out to be correct. This situation makes it very difficult for the President to calm the atmosphere in the United States. We hope, therefore, that steps will be taken in Cuba to make it clear that Cuba is not being prepared as a base for adventure in the rest of the hemisphere. We do not agree that a Soviet military presence in this hemisphere is a normal situation. The Cuban question is clearly poisoning United States-Soviet relations and we strongly urge the Soviet Government to do what it can to reduce this complication.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he assumed the Secretary’s reference to Castro’s activities since January referred to Castro’s speech of January 2. It should be remembered that many things were being said in the United States. Castro’s speech was a point by point reply to statements made by the President. The President had just told the Bay of Pigs prisoners that their banner would again fly in Cuba. The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider how Castro regards threats from the United States. He also noted that the Cuban Government was very unhappy with the result of the United States-Soviet negotiations on Cuba. The Ambassador said that he could not believe the United States fears Cuba and that the Cubans have a rather natural resentment against the large country only 90 miles from their shores. While he personally believed the President’s pledge not to invade Cuba, the Cubans did not believe it. The Secretary replied that we do not of course fear Cuba but that we do link Castro’s speeches with subversive activities in other countries. He told the Ambassador he would give him more precise information subsequently about Cuban subversive activities.

The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary was seeking some clarification regarding the status of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and reiterated that we were looking for some outward movement of Soviet forces now there. The Ambassador promised to report this conversation to his government.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Gutherie and approved in S on February 18. The meeting took place in Rusk’s office and lasted approximately 45 minutes. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
1. No other record found.
2. On February 18 Dobrynin handed Rusk an aide-memoire stating that the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw from Cuba “Soviet personnel connected with the protection of the types of weapons withdrawn from Cuba and likewise some of the military specialists involved in training Cuban troops. It is intended to recall from Cuba in the nearest future—before the middle of March—several thousand men.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63-3/63) See the Supplement.