Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

374. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)⁰

Washington, August 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, the Operational Representatives have worked out the attached outline of an Alternative Course B, for your consideration. More detailed planning can be undertaken when guidelines are firmed for future activities.

Attachment

ALTERNATE COURSE B

I. Objectives

National objectives for the purpose of this planning are assumed to be:

a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Take steps to inspire splits in Cuban leadership or split in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

f. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

II. Mission

The mission will be to accomplish the above objectives as rapidly as feasible through a balanced program of overt and covert activities. Accomplishment probably will raise the noise level above that in Phase I of Operation Mongoose. It should be recognized that the activities described in this outline are not in themselves designed to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime.

III. Activities

A. Intelligence

Tasks

Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

2. Activities of Cuban G-2.

3. Soviet activities in Cuba.

4. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

5. Military and militia order of battle and morale.

6. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the “power centers” in the Cuban government.

7. Economic.

8. Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Implementation

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized.

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence coverage particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets.

B. Political

Tasks

1. Continue and intensify active OAS and Latin American country support for the containment and undermining of Castro/Communist regime.

2. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Support the CRC and such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the “power centers” of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

5. Investigate the possibility of enlisting assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.

Implementation

1. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republicʼs initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.

2. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.

3. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.

4. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro/Communist elements.

5. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-Communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.

6. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

C. Economic

Tasks

1. Encourage minor acts of sabotage throughout Cuba.

2. To the extent practicable, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

3. Conduct selected sabotage principally of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such.

4. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.

5. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Implementation

1. Use covert psychological media to induce mass Cuban undertakings in minor sabotage (nails in road, sugar in gas tanks).

2. Commando/Sabotage Teams: A pool of 20 to 50 most carefully selected men highly trained in commando-sabotage tactics should be maintained. From this group, especially constituted sabotage teams will be selected for specific sabotage assignments per para. III.C.3 above. Except for occasional specialized training (such as possibly parachute), all spotting, recruiting and training can be done by CIA facilities.

D. Psychological

Tasks

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

Implementation

Operations on these objectives will be divided first into two general categories—overt, i.e., those activities which are attributed or attributable to the U.S. Government and which are the primary responsibility of the U.S. Information Agency; and covert, those activities which cannot or should not be attributed to the U.S. Government and which would thus be under the primary control of the Central Intelligence Agency. These two categories must be subdivided according to whether the operations are primarily directed at target groups within Cuba or at groups outside Cuba, either in the hemisphere or elsewhere.

Concerning operations in all these categories care should be exercised to avoid overplaying purely psychological or informational operations. Information programs can be effective only so long as they accompany and support political and/or material action. They should never be allowed to become substitutes for action and they should not anticipate or prejudice policy.

It is also important to avoid over-emphasis on the purely anti-Castro or anti-Communist aspect of the program. Wholly negative programs of any sort do not wear well with any audience. The Alliance for Progress as the real promise of fulfillment of the aspirations of the common people of the Americas must remain as the keystone of our general Latin American information policy. And a positive approach must also be included in a substantial portion of our materials pointed directly at the Cuban people. This should include material which will provide a basis for reassurance and hope for a new Cuba after the fall of Castro, a Cuba which will truly provide for a realization of the reforms and a fulfillment of the aspirations which motivated the Cuban revolution.

Note: USIA concurs with CIAʼs conclusion that the expense of establishing and operating a medium-wave broadcasting facility is not justified under the present plan. As previously pointed out, the facility would cost approximately 8 million dollars and take 15 months to build and there are very serious obstacles (notably an extensive Cuban jamming capability) to its success. State and USIA recommend that CIA continue the Swan Island operation at its present level.

Overt—To Cuba:

Short wave radio must continue as our principal medium of communication with the Cuban people. Nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish with three hours specifically beamed at the Cuban audience will continue to be the basis of this. In December USIAʼs new Greenville facility will be operational with a resulting substantial increase in signal strength. Programs will continue to be built around hard news and commentary, dramatic, historical, sports, and agricultural features and Cuban local happenings, particularly items not carried in the Castro/Communist media. All of these programs carry in some form or other material supporting our objectives.

Particular attention is recommended to a project to plan a well spaced series of moderate statements by U.S. officials and other U.S. non-official spokesmen which would support policy objectives of developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba without leading to over-optimism or too inflated hopes.

At the same time carefully documented programs on the failures of the Castro/Communist system must be stepped up to help maintain a firm and material subjective basis for disaffection among the Cuban people.

Strong emphasis will also be given to programming which points up negative reactions to, or repudiation of the Castro/Communist regime in other parts of the hemisphere.

Once the “gusano libre” theme has been established through Cuban or other non-U.S. assets, USIA programming could give it special and continuing play, maintaining, of course, strong emphasis on its Cuban origin.

Overt—To the hemisphere and other free world targets:

All media can and will be utilized in support of Operation Mongoose, although USIA has very difficult budgetary problems. Monetary support from other USG sources might well be necessary for full implementation of some of these projects.

Specific program adjustments made in support of Mongoose include:

1) Radio

There will be increased production and distribution of packaged programs particularly soap operas and commentaries stressing anti-Castro themes.

2) Cartoon Books

USIAʼs six book series (5 million copies) has been widely distributed and accepted. More could be projected with special stress on Mongoose themes with a minimum delay. Funds here also might be a limiting factor. The new ones would not necessarily be factual but rather the “thriller-killer” type with a Cuban background.

3) Photo-novels

This is unique to Latin America. It is a book utilizing specially-posed photographs with captions to tell a fictional story. A medium of particular importance in reaching the adult, blue-collar worker and housewife neo-and semi-literate groups, this is a field which we have not yet entered. Development of a USIA potential in this field is under consideration and anti-Castro materials would have a priority in any production.

4) Motion Pictures

An animated film on the failures of Cuban land reform has been produced and distributed and two more films on children and labor are now in the pipeline. Contingent on the availability of funds, further productions of this nature could be arranged. More emphasis can be given to providing film clips on Mongoose themes to indigenous newsreels.

5) TV

A medium of rapidly growing importance in Latin Americaʼs urban areas which we have not utilized too widely yet in support of Mongoose objectives.USIA has access to some excellent producers of commercial puppet shows (such as the producer of the Wilkins Coffee commercials) and satirical anti-Castro materials could be easily developed for area use. Further exploitation of the Cuban refugee talent available in the Miami area could also be arranged.

6) Books

Larger scale editions of books already used and of other similar materials might be arranged in order to provide rebuttals to the pro-Castro volumes already circulating widely in the area. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development of books by non-U.S. authors.

7) Exhibits

This is one field we have not developed well in support of our Cuban exhibits. USIA could develop and produce quantity paper exhibits of a two-dimensional nature which could be widely distributed in Latin America.

Covert

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized:

1) Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution.

2) Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and performance of the Castro regime.

3) Expose the encroachment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism.

4) Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers.

5) Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.

The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan:

1) Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for communicating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas.

2) Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers.

3) Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. (CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA)

4) Continue and expand the “Voice of Free Cuba” submarine deception broadcasts in collaboration with the Navy.

E. Paramilitary

Tasks

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance in the general population.

2. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

Implementation

The program will aim primarily for the development of controlled intelligence sources and small resistance cells for use in the event of any significant uprising. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining individuals or “black teams” in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method been devised by which infiltrees can become “legalized.” Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original infiltrees. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent material, and the Cuban populationʼs willingness to support infiltrees. To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support are considered essential:

1. Urban Cells: Two-to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small “legal” compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or its continued presence jeopardizes the “legal” residents. Primarily, these cells will be intelligence producers. A second mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.

2. Rural Cells: Three-to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small “legal” compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.

3. Commando/Sabotage Teams: (Described in the Economic section above.)

F. Military

1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks.

2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capability as required.

IV. Policy Implications

The policy implications of the activities outlined above include:

A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and USIA questioned).

B. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews.

D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

E. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing or planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantan-amo.) State and Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal.

F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.