Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

375. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)⁰

Washington, August 15, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Observations on Operational Potential with respect to Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize my impressions gained from discussions in the Operations Group of what we can reasonably expect might be accomplished covertly in Cuba under Course B or any other course which is conditioned upon a comparatively low noise level.

Propaganda Media

Radio to date has proved of limited value. Short-wave does not reach many people because of shortage of receivers. Medium-wave broadcasting from Swan Island has a small audience, due in part to the low power of the facility.CIA recommends that these broadcasts cease. USIA and we prefer that they continue. None feel that the investment entailed in a more powerful facility would be justified. Enlargement of the Swan Island facility or establishment of a new powerful facility elsewhere would, of course, attract a great deal of attention. The submarine radio will probably improve somewhat, although its approximate 25 mile range is a basic limitation.

Dissemination of propaganda to Cuba through the open mails is underway and will probably improve, unless the Cuban Governmentʼs censorship tightens.

Infiltration of Cubans with some propaganda materiel is accomplished, although the maritime operations appear to be increasingly difficult. I have inquired about the possibility of infiltrating small portable presses for underground publications—CIA says that they are looking into this possibility.

Other means of communication, i.e., dropping propaganda from balloons or aircraft would probably be attributed to the U.S. rather noisily.

Conclusion

Our means of communicating with the Cuban people are limited and will probably remain so.

Sabotage

The limited state of communications directly affects the success of sabotage operations. Reports indicate that some, apparently very limited, nuisance sabotage (sugar in gas tanks, etc.) does occur. Our ability to persuade the Cuban people to engage in more widespread activities of this nature is handicapped by our limited ability to communicate and the difficulty in landing and distributing sabotage materiel, such as plastic explosives, incendiary fountain pens and similar devices. The Agencyʼs reaction to turning such materiel over to exile groups that are known to have organized resistance groups in Cuba (as stated in the NIE)¹ is: whenever a reasonable plan is presented by an exile group, the Agency has provided such assistance and is prepared to continue to do so. A complicating factor appears to be that unless such materiel remains under Agency control until the last minute, its existence in the hands of exiles becomes known to the FBI which then, apparently, becomes unhappy. Further, the Agency is fearful that supplying materiel to selected exile groups in blanket fashion and not based on exile plans which the Agency approves, may result in the sabotage of major installations, thereby raising the noise level considerably above that which the Agency understands to be desirable, since the U.S. would be charged by the Cuban and Bloc Governments with complicity and responsibility.

Conclusion:

A significant amount of sabotage in Cuba during the next year appears unlikely, unless approval is given for the destruction of major installations by carefully selected and trained Cuban teams infiltrated for such purpose and for the noise level to be raised substantially.

Air and Sea Support of Infiltrated Teams

While maritime means, including the use of submarines if necessary, would continue to be the primary means of infiltration/exfiltration/re-supply, occasions may arise where re-supply can only be accomplished effectively by air and with U.S. citizen crews. Teams that have moved inland may find that only with considerable danger can they reach the coast again for re-supply. Agency experience with Cuban pilots on air re-supply missions has not been good (they are not accurate) and U.S. citizen personnel may have to be used.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Martin passed this memorandum to Johnson on August 15, under cover of a note in which he stated that it might prove useful background information for the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) scheduled for August 16. (Ibid.)
1. Document 363.