Office of the Historian

373. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)0

Washington, August 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Alternate Course B

REFERENCE

  • Your memorandum—August 13, 19621

I—Statement of Objectives:

A.
The ultimate objective of the United States with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro Government and its replacement by one which shares the objectives of the free world.
B.
As steps toward the ultimate objective, the following intermediate objectives have been established for Phase II (which should be attained as rapidly as feasibility, prudence and a comparatively low noise level dictate):
(1)
Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
(2)
Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
(3)
Maintain maximum [moderate]2 economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. [Conduct limited, secure, viable covert resistance and action operations.]
(4)
Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
(5)

Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban/Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

[Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuba leadership, or split in Cuban-Bloc relationships.]

(6)
Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade.
[Page 927]

II—Comments and Courses of Action:

A.
“Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.”
(1)
State would carry out those actions described in the Departmentʼs contribution to General Lansdaleʼs August 8, 1962 memorandum.3
(2)
As an additional means of isolation, covert attempts to intefere with important Cubans who travel in the Hemisphere might be undertaken. Specific policy approval in each instance would be required.
B.
“Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.”
(1)
Emphasis should be placed upon discreditation in the Hemisphere as part of the isolation process. The more we succeed in discrediting the Castro Government in the Hemisphere, the less likely are we to experience adverse reaction in the Hemisphere to the regimeʼs disappearance. Inside Cuba, the people will support or oppose the regime, primarily depending upon actual conditions, not upon United States or exile propaganda. To the extent we can covertly effect deterioration of conditions and/or stimulate overt acts of opposition, however, such actions would serve to discredit the regime both in Cuba and abroad.
C.
“Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuban economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.”
(1)
The two main Cuban exports to the USSR are sugar and nickel. Disruption of the sugar industry (for internal reasons as well) and the Nicaro nickel plant should, therefore, be among the high priority targets. Policy approval would be required for each sabotage operation.
(2)
Sabotage materiel should be made available to any Cuban exile group (except Batistianos) that has assets inside Cuba and desires such materiel. Although the CRC should be given priority, it should not be given a monopoly. General policy approval would be required.
D.

“Maintain maximum coverage of intelligence requirements with respect to Cuba.”

No comment.

E.
“Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.”
(1)
A thorough study of the backgrounds of the ORI Directorate members who were formerly with the 26th of July should be undertaken [Page 928] to determine who among them have the most influence on Castro. Through the MRP leaders (who probably retain some influence among the 26th of July leaders) we should seek to influence selected ORI Directorate members toward splitting Cuba from the Bloc.
(2)
We would investigate the possibility of enlisting the assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.
F.

“Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade.”

State would initiate a plan for this contingency.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret.↩
  2. Document 372.↩
  3. Bracketed portions contain original Agency language. Unbracketed language (except for item 6) reflect the Agencyʼs interpretation of the sense of the policy meeting. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]↩
  4. Document 367.↩