Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

367. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)⁰

Washington, August 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Stepped Up Course B

You requested a paper on “a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action.”

Course B was described in our 25 July team review of Operation Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. policy. It read: “b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military.” The major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines,¹ which kept our actions “short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area.”

As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from participating departments and agencies.

The papers from each representative are attached. The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are essentially reflective of companion roles to CIAʼs covert activities. USIA has added a “think piece” on anticipated world-wide psychological reaction to a stepped up Course B.

Considerations

In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regimeʼs security forces attempt to crush the revolt. The CIA operational people, who would implement a stepped up Course B as Phase II of Operation Mongoose, do not believe this course of action by itself would bring the overthrow of the regime in Cuba; they believe that the use of U.S. military force in the final stage must be anticipated, for success.

At the close of the attached CIA section on “covert activities,” there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions (including propaganda balloons and establishing a medium-wave Radio Free Cuba), training Cubans on U.S. bases, some operational use of Guantanamo, and more flexibility in the composition of paramilitary groups (selection of Cubans in U.S. forces and strengthening with non-Cubans).

In the “covert activities” section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.

My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

Attachment²

Washington, August 7, 1962.

COVERT ACTIVITIES

William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

I. Situation:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action “b” in General Lansdaleʼs memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.³

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62.⁴

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a “time table” basis.

II. Mission:

“Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment”

III. Tasks:

A. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the “power centers” of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage.

B. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics.

3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor acts of sabotage.

C. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population.

2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.

5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc.

7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere.

E. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

b. Activities of Cuban G-2.

c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

e. Militia morale.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the “power centers” in the Cuban government.

IV. Implementation:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FI):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in “high noise level” types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required.

2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.

3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.

4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.

5. Continuation and expansion of the “Voice of Cuba” submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.

7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining “black teams” in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated “black teams” can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide “the spark of hope.” Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams—Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four-months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.

2. Urban Resistance Cells—Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small “legal” compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the “legal” residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting, casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any major uprising.) A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.

3. Rural Resistance Cells—Three to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small “legal” compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.

4. Guerrilla—Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) “hit and run” guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces—The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a “Cuban Freedom Fight” under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the “Cuban Freedom Fighter” groups. Additional policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration—The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:

a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.

b. Submarines and other naval craft.

c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

V. Support Required From Other Agencies:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.

a. Site A—commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B—Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

c. Site C—Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts—“Voice of Free Cuba”.

c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. Policy Approvals Required:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeting against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.

H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of “Cuban Freedom Fighters.”

K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. Estimated Cost to CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

• Fiscal Year 1963—$40,000,000
• Fiscal Year 1964—$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis)

Attachment⁵

Washington, August 7, 1962.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may be in this unstable situation provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however, we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly in operations, the success of which may be doubtful.

The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the exercise of all feasible political, economic and psychological pressures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to make the Castro Governmentʼs survival more difficult and to isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.

Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall of the Castro Government whenever it reasonably appeared that the benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for the free world.

A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)⁶

It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, however, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans in Cuba who are not under U.S. control; supply of sabotage materiel and instructions as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control; and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life. Terroristic acts of sabotage should be ruled out.

A second area of covert activities which might contribute to the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.

There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B, with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:

Political

A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republicʼs initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.

• Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the “Hemisphere versus Cuba” impression.
• Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could place on public display sharp division among the OAS member states and could serve to weaken the inter-American system.

B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.

• Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where successful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Government.
• Disadvantage: If overdone, such a campaign could result in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S.

C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.

• Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.
• Disadvantage: Most Latin American nations do not have legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with respect to travel to Cuba could create serious local political problems.

D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro-communist elements.

E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.

F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.

• Advantage: This action, where successful, would exacerbate Cubaʼs already precarious foreign exchange position and further reduce its ability to purchase vital equipment in the free world.
• Disadvantage: In some instances, Cuban exports are less expensive than are similar products from alternate sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation for which funds are not currently available.

H. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Added note on sabotage

Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment: for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts should not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result. Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.

Attachment⁷

Washington, August 7, 1962.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.

2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to “isolate” Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIAʼs new view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castroʼs capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

b. Balloon deliveries. This capability under CIA direction has been discussed at a meeting of the Special Group and not acted upon. If activated, USIA would participate in the preparation of the propaganda material.

c. Aircraft deliveries. Also a CIA project.USIA would participate in the preparation of propaganda material.

d. Smuggling of printed materials. As the U.S. capability within Cuba increases, there is an improving possibility of making propaganda material available to the population. The desirability of this would have to be first determined on the basis of security to the personnel involved. An increase of printed material exposing weaknesses of the Castro regime would be desirable, and USIA would participate in the preparation of that material.

e. The greatest possible circulation to the “worm” (gusano libre) theme within Cuba should be implemented. This is a CIA project. However if it gains momentum, USIA will be able to pick it up for VOA exploitation into Cuba and the rest of Latin America.

f. We would continue to attempt to find a suitable musical theme that might stir the resistance forces in Cuba.

2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America.

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year ʼ62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year ʼ63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:

1) Radio. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.

2) Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up.

3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.

4) Television. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America. The Agency has done one TV “Special” on Castro, and has acquired others from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could do a puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos.

5) Books. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America. Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme.

6) Refugees. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on). We could more fully exploit the Negro defectors.

Following are some possibilities for new programming:

1. Contract for anti-Castro supplements to be printed and placed regularly in Latin American newspapers.

2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees. Program content can be worked into the performance, or there could be a statement on the Cuban plight at intermission.

3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on one theme—perhaps the executions—to be sent around Latin America.

4. Develop a speakersʼ bureau throughout Latin America to send lecturers before all types of groups. Provide these lecturers with anti-Castro giveaway materials and film slides.

5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro themes, and get them displayed in key locations all over Latin America.

It is USIAʼs view that the most effective information program in Latin America must have a position theme. That is why the majority of our output is still devoted to support of the Alliance for Progress. Our anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated to a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support material for the Alliance for Progress.

Advantages of Stepped-Up Course B:

a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways.

b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro factions.

c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin America to the Castro/Communist regime.

Disadvantages:

a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious of “intervention.”

b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of exposure of the program.

Anticipated Reaction to Stepped-Up Course B

World reaction to a heightened propaganda-political action campaign against Castro would be significantly influenced by (a) the pace of the intensification, (b) the degree of overt identification with the U.S., and (c) the intensity of the Soviet propaganda response.

Assuming such a campaign were skillfully handled, however, we believe public reaction abroad would not be damaging to U.S. interests in any significant degree.

Latin America

There has been increasing disenchantment with Castro throughout Latin America since early 1961. There would not be widespread negative reaction if our campaign were closely identified with a Cuban liberation movement and directed solely at Cuba, not throughout the area generally.

An overt, clearly U.S.-inspired campaign would bring varied reactions. Mexico, with its legalistic, moralistic approach to Castro, might react strongly to any implied violation of Cuban sovereignty. The press, however, would be less critical than the government. Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and possibly Ecuador, would deplore our action. Again, however, the press and public would be less critical than their governments.

Argentina is less predictable; probably the present regime would be less critical than Frondizi would be.

Governmental and public opinion of the smaller countries in and near the Caribbean would be with us. They feel the heat from Castro most, and are most eager to see him out of the way. In this category are Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and to a lesser degree Panama, Nicaragua and Salvador. Colombia would be sympathetic to us. The Betancourt regime in Venezuela is, of course, openly anti-Castro; there would be hostility on the far left, however.

Western Europe

Assuming no sudden or dramatic moves which might alarm a war-wary public opinion, European reaction would be mostly sympathetic. The U.K., Germany, the Benelux, and center and right-wing elements in France and Italy would be particularly sympathetic. Enthusiasm would be restrained by the fact that European nations have benefited economically by the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. They would dislike losing the market, which would be inevitable to some degree if Castro fell.

Spain and Portugal, which feel a Latin affinity with Cuba no matter who is in power there, would be critical despite their lack of ideological sympathy with Castro. Public opinion in Sweden and Austria might be moderately critical on moral grounds. The anti-Communist Finnish public would be favorable, though the government would straddle.

Communists and fellow-travelers would be sharply critical. It is unlikely, however, that they would stage demonstrations or make much noise except perhaps in Italy.

Canada

Canada, which has profited economically by U.S.-Cuban estrangement, would be critical, pegging its criticism on lofty moral grounds.

Eastern Europe-Communist China

The Communist Bloc and Yugoslavia would, of course, be sharply critical. There might be mass meetings; possibly some “demonstrations” outside American embassies. There would be an intensification of pro-Castro, anti-U.S. propaganda, and probably new assurances of Soviet support to Castro in the event of hostilities.

Near East and South Asia

The most serious repercussions in this area would be in India where Krishna Menon and his ilk would publicly condemn the U.S. and exploit the situation as further justification for their general anti-American line and the MIG purchases.

The extent of Indian reaction would depend in large measure on the intensity of the Soviet reaction. If the latter were sufficiently severe, U.S.-Indian relations could be damaged.

Reaction in Ceylon and Iraq would be similar to that of India.

There would be criticism by the pro-Nasser press in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, but the UAR Government—pleased with its improved relations with the U.S.—probably would remain silent. The Pakistani press, unhappy about our aid to India, might use Cuban developments as a peg for attacks on the U.S. despite their lack of ideological sympathy for Castro.

What little reaction might develop in Greece, Turkey and Iran would be mostly favorable.

Africa

Africa, like India, is particularly sensitive to any heating up of the Cold War. If Moscowʼs response is particularly vigorous, African political and opinion leaders are likely to become more skittish with a resulting slowdown in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Africa.

The hostile neutrals (Casablanca Powers) would lead the negative reaction. It is unlikely we would suffer much except in Guinea (where Sekou Toureʼs disillusionment with the Communists might be slowed) and Ghana. Even in these countries, however, it is not probable that U.S. interests would be seriously damaged.

The independent and pro-Western nations (Monrovia Powers) would be neutral or quietly sympathetic except in the case of Nigeria where we might expect some hostility.

Far East

Except for the Philippines, Far Eastern nations have little interest in Cuba. The Philippines, with their historic and cultural ties with Cuba, would take note of events but not unsympathetically; they donʼt like Castro. Little notice would be taken in neutral Cambodia and Burma. The Sukarno regime might criticize us, but the Indonesian public would be indifferent. Communists and fellow-travelers might stage demonstrations in Indonesia and Japan, but with little effect.

Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam would, of course, exploit the situation in their broadcasting, but the impact would be little different than that caused by their current anti-U.S. propaganda.

Attachment⁸

Washington, August 7, 1962.

MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.

2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use US military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.

a. With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne/amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.

b. A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this plan the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within 8 hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed 3 days later with a build up of the full scale effort to follow.

c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.

d. We are continuing our efforts to reduce reaction time through plans for the prepositioning of forces and materiel. In this connection, we have developed a Cover and Deception Plan which permits a certain amount of prepositioning under the guise of training exercises and places US forces involved in an advantageous position without endangering security to an unacceptable degree.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.
1. Document 314.
2. Top Secret; Sensitive.
3. Document 360.
4. Document 363.
5. Top Secret.
6. The note is at the end of Hurwitchʼs paper.
7. Top Secret.
8. Top Secret.