Office of the Historian

305. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0

Washington, February 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • The Cuba Project

Although I am not familiar with the context in which the paper dated 18 January 19621 has been discussed and developed, I think it may be useful for you to have a few observations on it from a bystanderʼs viewpoint.

1.
I believe that the Objective as stated is sound and desirable.
2.
With regard to the Concept of Operations, I have serious misgivings. The concept appears to depend in large measure on building up an internal political action organization in Cuba which would enjoy the support [Page 748] of the majority of the Cuban people. Presumably, it would be primarily CIAʼs job to build such an organization. I have seen no hard intelligence which would lead me to suppose that there exists, or that the Agency has assets for bringing into existence in the near future, an internal political action organization which would assure the support of the majority of the Cuban people against the Castro regime. On the contrary, the evidence we have points toward the present regimeʼs tightening its controls. This leads me to conclude, as others have, that unless a popular uprising in Cuba is promptly supported by overt U.S. military action, it would probably lead to another Hungary. Briefly, I do not believe we can unseat the present regime in Havana by anything short of outright military intervention.
3.
There exist, of course, contingency plans for taking Cuba over in a matter of days. What does not exist, to my knowledge, is any agreement (a) to carry out such an intervention, (b) on a means of provoking it, or (c) an analysis of the possible consequences of intervention. I think we should bite the bullet and address ourselves to these points. Unless we are at least willing seriously to consider such a course of action, I am afraid we may be heading for a fiasco that could be worse for us than the ill-fated operation of last year. In a word, on the basis of the information available to me on the Lansdale approach, which is fragmentary to say the least, I tend to agree with the position taken by John McCone in the Special Group as reflected in the minutes of the meeting of January 252 (copy attached).
  1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 31, February 21, 1962. Top Secret.↩
  2. Document 291.↩
  3. See Document 296.↩