Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

296. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, January 25, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962

PRESENT

• General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell
• Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Helms and General Lansdale were present for Item 1

1. Cuba

The Group considered General Lansdaleʼs paper “Cuba Project,” 19 January 1962;¹ his paper “Task 33,” 19 January 1962;² and the CIA paper “Cuba Project,” 24 January 1962.³ In addition General Lansdale circulated, but retained, copies of a paper on actions taken to gain popular support for the U.S. position in connection with the OAS meeting, and another outlining actions taken on the spot, in Punta del Este.⁴

After a lengthy discussion, all agencies currently involved (State, Defense, Joint Staff, CIA) agreed that they accept the tasks assigned to them. In the case of State, this is subject to concurrence by the Secretary upon his return. February 20th is recognized as a target date to take a searching look at progress up to that point and to recommend new lines of policy if appropriate.

General Lansdale commented that it appears that some clarification might be in order as to exactly what is intended in the planning papers. He emphasized that there is agreement that external support of internal operations should be provided for and that it is recognized there might be an internal revolt which could lead to a Cuban groupʼs requesting U.S. intervention. He also said he had met with the JCS and that the latter had responded strongly to the idea of preparing for external action. Additionally, he had met with the intelligence estimators and it had been noted there will be some delay in the NIE⁵ because of the need to acquire more intelligence and to digest a sizeable input from the State Department.

Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establishment of the Lansdale group, higher authority had directed State and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He said a great deal of work has been done along these lines and that this should now be directed into the channel of an integrated politico-military plan to cover any contingency.

Mr. McCone made several points: (a) The NIE of November 28,⁶ which was commented on in General Lansdaleʼs paper, was based on all available intelligence and dealt with certain operational aspects. The latter had been done at Mr. McConeʼs direction. (b) Clandestine operations are not susceptible to rigid scheduling and must be approached on a step-by-step basis. Therefore, schedules will have to be reexamined periodically. (c) Sabotage, sanctions and economic warfare can all be attributed to the United States. The Special Group should recognize this as a possible consequence. (d) A popular uprising within Cuba could be brutally suppressed in the manner of Hungary. In such an event, unless the U.S. is prepared to give overt assistance, future opportunities to unseat the Castro government would be lost.

In commenting on Mr. McConeʼs last point, General Taylor noted that the CIA paper of the 24th appears to question the feasibility of the basic objective of overthrowing the Castro regime without overt U.S. military intervention, and that it suggests the need to accept in advance of implementing the Project the definite possibility of having to use U.S. forces. He said that in his view more than contingency plans are required and that, so far as possible, authority should be obtained in advance to undertake major moves which might be required as circumstances develop. He conceded that it may be impossible to get such a firm determination very far in advance. The Group agreed, however, that every effort should be made to line up various situations that might arise, and to formulate recommended policy to capitalize on these situations at the proper time. It was agreed that no action should be taken before February 20th which could have possibilities of involving the U.S. in charges of overt aggression.

General Lemnitzer noted that military contingency plans now in being provide enough American strength to accomplish the job without internal help. He said that while these plans are up-to-date, it will be necessary to build up a number of them based on varying assumptions. He also warned that planning for operations of this kind should not involve a firm commitment to a time schedule, as was the case in the earlier unsuccessful operation.

Finally, General Lansdale noted that task number 33 (a) has been withdrawn. The others under 33 will not be put into execution until future examination and approval.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott⁷

0. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 28, February 1, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott.
1. For text of Lansdaleʼs program review, dated January 18, see Document 291.
2. Not found.
3. Document 295.
4. Neither paper has been found.
5. An apparent reference to NIE 85-62, Document 315.
6. See Document 271.
7. Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.