Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

295. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Special Group⁰

Washington, January 24, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The Cuba Project

I—Objective

In accordance with the objectives of the Cuba project program review presented to the President and the Special Group by Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale on 18 January 1962,¹CIA will collect and process intelligence and counterintelligence, conduct covert propaganda and political action operations, and develop a covert resistance movement to help the Cubans overthrow the Castroite-Communist regime.

II—Concept of Operation

Fully recognizing the urgency and necessity of achieving our objective in this grave undertaking, CIA will use all available assets to develop a resistance organization inside Cuba to assist in bringing about a revolt of the Cuban people. Because of the present severity of Communist and police controls inside Cuba, it is not likely that we can make the resist-ance groups self-sustaining as is envisaged in General Lansdaleʼs “Concept of Operation” section (p.1). External support will be essential to their survival. Except for the results of sabotage which will become known during the development of the movement and intended uprisings at the climactic moment, the movement will be primarily underground and clandestine. Since the movement will be clandestine, it will have to be highly compartmented and secure, thus limiting the size of the unit in each area where agents will be established. Open and significant political action by members of the movement would result in the destruction of these elements of the resistance. CIA will, however, create and expand a resistance movement which will help develop a political climate in which a large scale uprising may be possible. If the movement develops an impetus of its own, we shall not be able to control it from start to finish and at any time it may be sparked suddenly and prematurely into an uprising. It should be recognized that an uprising of this kind, which might result from our plan of action or from causes which we do not control, constitutes a serious danger. Because of this danger we must enlarge the “Concept of Operation” to include plans for this contingency in order that the United States Government will be ready with sufficient military assistance to guarantee the success of any uprising within the framework of our objective. If our efforts achieve the optimum result of generating an uprising of significant size, the U.S. Government will probably wish to support it by military action because the alternative would be to see the revolt fail. If a revolt does not develop of its own momentum, then consideration should be given to provoking an uprising and supporting it with military action. The consequences of a ruthlessly suppressed uprising encouraged even remotely by the United States could spell the end to any deniable efforts to unseat the Castro government and the end of Cuban faith in the United States and the practical end of resistance inside Cuba.

III—Estimate of the Situation

Although CIA will act on the basis of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 85-62 on Cuba, scheduled for completion in February 1962,² our operational plans and actions will require significantly additional basic intelligence. To acquire this information, we are now urgently expanding our intelligence collection facilities.

Our collection, covert action and resistance activities will have to overcome the repressive Cuban police controls of the population based on refinements introduced by experts from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The pervasive informant system, efficient propaganda machine, and military and civil suppression are supported by jet fighter, radar, patrol boats, and communications capabilities far beyond the level of April 1961.

Internal purges and escapes from Cuba have seriously diminished those groups from which leadership could be expected and the failure of the invasion has lessened our current recruitment capability inside and dampened the will to resist. Nevertheless, the deteriorating economic situation provides a climate in which opposition is more likely than in a rising economy. We believe, however, that the Soviet Bloc will seek to maintain its Cuban foothold in the Western Hemisphere, thus challenging the Monroe Doctrine, by extending economic aid to Cuba to help offset losses which will result from our actions. Our efforts must be concentrated within this period of economic difficulty to prevent improvement which might hinder the resistance movement from taking firm roots. We must recognize that our efforts to destroy the Cuban economy by sabotage, sanctions, and other measures of economic warfare will run a major risk of attribution to the U.S. and of Cuban propaganda exploitation. In addition, sabotage actions will inevitably result in a considerable attrition of resistance potential and assets.

IV—Initial Phase

In the initial period of three to four months this Agency will move toward the completion of assigned tasks. Although all CIA assets are now being directed to meet target deadlines, clandestine operations are ill-suited to rigid scheduling. The timetable for clandestine operations depends step by step upon the introduction of more and more concealed assets inside Cuba plus an increasing flow of information from Cuba. As our assets and knowledge grow, we shall move with greater speed. If we were to adhere to all the elements of the proposed Cuba Project timetable, we should be forced to act on the basis of extremely inadequate information. CIA will attempt, therefore, to adhere to or improve upon assigned deadlines but with full cognizance that the imposition of arbitrary scheduling upon clandestine operations can be used only to prod the participants but not to predetermine results.

Tab “A” of this paper discusses the tasks currently assigned to CIA, progress to date, and reporting deadlines.

Tab A

SUBJECT

• Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdaleʼs Program Review

A. Tasks

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdaleʼs program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdaleʼs paper.

1. Task 1, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.

2. Task 2, p. 5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February—the deadline date.

3. Task 3, p. 5. The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. [3 lines of source text not declassified] A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p. 5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. [10 lines of source text not declassified]

6. Task 6, p. 5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO officials have been conducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, [11 lines of source text not declassified]. It is suggested that consideration be given to assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR.

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph.

14. Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

16. Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

B. Additional Undertakings

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

19. Section F, p. 3. In support of Stateʼs efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

20. Section H, p. 4. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated.

21. Section K, p. 4. Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts [1 line of source text not declassified] will also be utilized.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5,DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only.
1. Document 291.
2. Document 315.