Office of the Historian

306. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet0

Norfolk, Virginia, February 24, 1962, 3:54 p.m.

241554Z. CINCLANTOPLANs 314/316-61.1

A. JCS 3385 DTG 220013 Feb 1962.2

1.
Ref A contains planning direction for development of quick reaction capabilities in connection with subject plans. The criteria set forth in ref A were discussed at a conference conducted at this Headquarters on 7 and 8 February. For your information, a summary of the conference is contained in paragraph 4.
2.
In accordance with the directive contained in ref A, it is desired that:
A.
Plans supporting CINCLANTOPLAN 314-61 be completed as expeditiously as possible.
B.
In view of the information contained in ref A, adees review the info contained in the appended report and submit additional information required to CINCLANT.
3.
As noted in Part II of the report contained in para 4 below, CINC-LANT believes that further development of plans supporting CINC-LANT OPLAN 316-61 may be unnecessary. In connection with submission of the information required by ref A, CINCLANT will re-open this question with the JCS. In the interim, OPLAN 314-61 takes precedence.
4.
There follows a report in two parts entitled, “Planning Considerations for Reduction in Reaction Times.”
  • “Part One—Fast Application of U.S. Airpower
    1.
    Concept.
    A.
    Naval and Air Force forces designated for CINCLANTOPLAN 314 will maintain a posture of readiness to conduct air strikes against Cuba within six, twelve or twenty-four hours from the time of receipt of an execution order.
    B.

    The following order of priority for the selection of targets will apply: [Page 750]

    • Priority I: Cuban airfields, aircraft, missile and radar installations.
    • Priority II: Selective disruption of communication and transportation facilities limited by avoiding unnecessary destruction of populated areas.
    • Priority III: Troops and armor concentrations.

    Air strikes will be concentrated on Priority I and II targets for the first twelve daylight hours.

    C.
    The primary purpose for the fast application of U.S. airpower will be to eliminate the capability of Cuban Air Force to conduct air warfare, and to reduce the capability of Cuban ground forces to wage war.
    D.
    Marine forces at Guantanamo will, in coordination with the execution of air strikes, break out and obtain surrounding high ground in order to assure permanent retention and use of this U.S. base and its airfields.
    E.
    Coordination between CINCLANT and CINCONAD will be effected by CINCLANT in order to assure the air defense of forces located in CONUS.
    2.
    Assumptions.
    A.
    Required prepositioning of Air Force and Naval forces will be authorized.
    B.
    The airborne/amphibious assaults against Cuba will not begin earlier than four days following the day initial air strikes commence. (This limitation does not apply if forces are prepositioned for a four or two day reaction time for CINCLANTOPLAN 314 as discussed in Part II.)
    C.
    Cuban forces will attack the U.S. naval base, Guantanamo, immediately after commencement of U.S. air strikes on Cuban soil. (Provided such an attack, prior to the utilization of U.S. air power, is not the cause for initiation of hostilities.)
    3.
    Requirements.
    A.
    Army forces: Assume increased readiness posture at home bases.
    B.
    Naval forces: Consideration for the defense of Guantanamo is essential and must be included in prepositioning requirements for the fast application of U.S. air power as set forth below:
    (1)
    One CVA for general participation in air strikes in eastern Cuba.
    (2)
    One Marine Air Group (MAG) located in Mayaguana to provide air cover and close air support for Marine forces at Guantanamo. If unable to obtain base rights for use of the Mayaguana airfield and associated facilities or equally suitable airfield, a second CVA will be necessary.
    (3)
    One MAG located at Key West, available for support of Air Force forces with air attacks on western Cuba and to augment CONAD forces in southern Florida.
    (4)
    Class V (A) ammunition available to support this concept is extremely limited. Air strikes in support of the fast application of air power will have to be curtailed to insure that sufficient stocks remain for execution of CINCLANTOPLAN 314.
    (5)
    One Marine RLT headquarters and two reinforced battalions at Guantanamo in addition to present base defense forces. The Caribbean ready battalion and one air lifted battalion plus sea tail could be prepositioned on short notice. This would release amphibious vessels of the ready group, creating a relief in Naval assault shipping.
    (6)
    Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo.
    (7)
    It is imperative that the reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents be undertaken prior to the initiation of air strikes.
    C.
    Air Force forces:
    (1)
    Prepositioning requirement for tactical units are:
    (a)
    8 tactical fighter squadrons at Homestead AFB, Florida.
    (b)
    One tactical fighter squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron at Opalocka Airfield, Florida.
    (c)
    One tactical fighter squadron at NAS Key West, Florida.
    (d)
    One air refueling squadron at MacDill AFB, Florida.
    (2)
    Prepositioning requirements for control and support forces are:
    (a)
    Activation of AFTF 126 and subordinate headquarters.
    (b)
    Activation of Opalocka Airfield with a group and facilities sufficient for initial prepositioning of tactical squadrons and additional squadrons arriving after order to execute strikes is given.
    (c)
    Establishment of necessary communications and control facilities.
    (d)
    Distribution of POL and ordnance required for prepositioned units.
    (3)
    Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.
    (a)
    Reduces availability of air refueling aircraft for other operations.
    (b)
    Reduces reaction capability for other contingencies.
    (c)
    Limits forces available for exercises.
    (d)
    Reduces operational and training activities at bases providing support items and personnel to operating bases.
    (4)
    This posture can be maintained for an indefinite period of time.
  • Part Two—Reduction of Reaction Times of CINCLANTOPLANs 314 and 316 to Four and Two Days Respectively
    1.

    Concept.

    Execute those portions of CINCLANTOPLAN 314 which will produce a readiness posture in all forces equivalent to that necessary for D-2 [Page 752] or D-4 and suspend action at either one of these points. This will require execution of selected portions of Phases I, II, and III. Due to the continual growth and the estimated current strength of the Cuban armed forces the concept of operations set forth in CINCLANTOPLAN 316 may no longer be adequate to cope with the threat. Any major operations contemplated should be based upon CINCLANTOPLAN 314. Coordination between CINCLANT and CINCONAD will be effected by CINCLANT in order to assure the air defense of forces located in CONUS.

    2.
    Army Forces.
    A.
    Requirements.
    (1)
    Entire air echelon of TF 125 to be prepositioned at staging base in Florida.
    (2)
    Initial surface echelon of TF 125 to be embarked.
    (3)
    Air and surface echelons to be placed in DEFCON 2.
    (4)
    Up-to-date vertical photography of drop zones and other critical areas is necessary, placing a requirement for the removal of overflight restrictions. Current vertical photographic intelligence is urgently required for all other forces as well as for Army forces.
    (5)
    Prestockage at home installations of operational maps will be required for surface movement units. This is now being done for airborne echelon only.
    (6)
    There is a requirement for one aircraft carrier for lift and operation of army helicopters and light aircraft. Provision from presently assigned CINCLANTFLT forces will dangerously reduce ASW effort. CINCLANT is developing a more satisfactory solution which will be forwarded separately to the JCS.
    B.
    Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.
    (1)
    If troops are placed in full ready to launch status, combat effectiveness will begin to decrease after two weeks. After sixty days the combat effectiveness of all units will become very questionable.
    (2)
    These forces are earmarked for use in other contingency plans in support of CINCNELM, CINCPAC and other CINCLANT plans. While in the advance readiness conditions they would be geographically oriented for rapid deployment to Middle East, Europe or Africa.
    (3)
    Numerous programmed training exercises would have to be canceled.
    (4)

    The following is an initial U.S. CONARC cost estimate for prepositioning only, of certain combat units in the air and surface echelon. It does not represent the total cost that would be involved: [Page 753]

    Unit Move To
    1 ABN DIV (Ft. Campbell, Ky.) Florida
    1 ABN DIV (Ft. Bragg, N.C.) Florida
    INF BDE (Ft. Benning, Ga.) Ft. Jackson, S.C.
    Tank Bn (Ft. Benning, Ga.) Ft. Stewart, Ga.
    Armd Cav Regt capability (Ft. Hood, Tex.) Ft. Stewart, Ga.
    3 FA bns (Ft. Sill, Okla.) (surface echelon) Ft. Polk, La.
    1 FA bn (Ft. Sill. Okla.) (air echelon) Florida
    1 FA bn (Ft. Knox, Ky.) (surface echelon) Ft. Stewart, Ga.
    1 FA bn (Ft. Campbell, Ky.) (air echelon) Florida

    Other miscellaneous support units (5,000 personnel) at various installations. The following includes movement of units, opening costs at Ft. Stewart and Ft. Polk, and packing and crating etc.

    Costs w/o Per Diem
    1. Movement
    A. Equipment $2,697,540
    B. Personnel (one-way, surface elements to surface staging area) 210,000
    C. Fill personnel and equipment shortages 1,497,000
    2. Per diem 58,000
    3. Opening cost 365,240
    4. Installation support costs 95,500 per day
    5. Packing and crating 1,767,500
    6. Cost of continued operations at prepositioning staging areas, not computed.
    7. No MATS reinbursement is computed.
    Total $6,537,280 153,500 per day

    3.
    Naval forces.
    A.
    Requirements.
    (1)
    The entire Naval Task Force, as set forth in 314, will have to be almost wholly loaded and ready for sea in order to meet the four day [Page 754] reaction time. Forces to be employed in western Cuba could be in south eastern coast ports and those earmarked for eastern Cuba could be in Caribbean ports. This applies to MSTS shipping also.
    (2)
    To meet the two day reaction time, the Naval Task Force must be at sea, or in port within required steaming time.
    (3)
    The LANTCOM Marine division (-) to be earmarked.
    (4)
    PACOM forces to be earmarked and deployed to the Caribbean, could be in port in Vieques or Panama depending upon the required reaction time.
    (5)
    One MAG to be prepositioned at Mayaguana. Base rights for use of the airfield, unloading site, ammunition and POL facilities must be obtained. It is estimated that the MAG would be operational thereon in about 16 days, utilizing short airfield for tactical support (SATS) equipment while construction forces pave present graded runway for jet operations. The MAG would provide close air support and air defense for defense of Guantanamo and for the eastern attack group in the Santiago/Guantanamo area. If base rights are unobtainable for Mayaguana or suitable alternate Caribbean airfield cannot be obtained, a CVA can be used to provide this support.
    (6)
    One Marine air group to be prepositioned at Key West to provide air support to western Marine assault forces. This unit will be available in support of Air Force Task Force and CONAD prior to asst landings.
    (7)
    A Marine RLT headquarters and two reinforced battalions to be prepositioned in Guantanamo in addition to present defense forces.
    (8)
    Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo.
    (9)
    The four preceding requirements, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above, are considered essential for both concepts set forth herein and should be implemented without delay.
    B.
    Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.
    (1)
    It is estimated that a four or two day readiness posture can be attained in fourteen and sixteen days respectively.
    (2)
    This posture could be maintained for a maximum of 60 days. If the requirement for reaction time is changed to five days, which would permit minor exercises to be conducted ashore and allow more leeway in sailing distance, a longer period could be held. Troop readiness could be maintained at a higher level.
    (3)
    The readiness condition of most Naval surface and air units will be improved by deployment and by the opportunity for minor training while in an advanced state of readiness.
    (4)
    Naval and Marine forces, less MAGs and Guantanamo reinforcements could be easily shifted in the event they are required in execution of other CINCLANT contingency plans for general war, until committed.
    (5)
    The strike fleet general war posture will be degraded by units thereof being well south of planned positions. This will be emphasized particularly if a third CVA is required in place of a MAG at Mayaguana.
    (6)
    Project Mercury support will be considerably reduced although some flexibility will exist depending upon the time prepositioning commences and the readiness time imposed.
    (7)
    Use of the 5th MEB will have the following impact on PACOM plans:
    (a)
    Withdrawal of PACOMLSD and LPH support for planned atomic tests by JTF-8 will be required.
    (b)
    A reduction in earmarked forces for defense of SE Asia will be necessary.
    (c)
    Capability to react to PACOM contingencies will be reduced.
    (d)
    Relief of deployed amphibious forces will be hampered.
    (e)
    Curtailment of certain amphibious exercises including support of army training requirements will be necessary.
    (8)
    A comprehensive dollar cost has not been computed, however, some major considerations for costs, chargeable solely to attaining an increased readiness posture, are set forth below:
    (a)
    Pre-loaded MSTS shipping for Marine forces (6 TAP, 20 TAK, 2 TAO), 4 million dollars per month.
    (b)
    Deferred upkeep of ships will result in expensive breakdowns.
    (c)
    There will be a considerable increase in expenditure of POL.
    (d)
    Increased stevedoring and shipping costs will be incurred.
    (e)
    A large increase in TAD funds will be necessary.
    (f)
    Construction costs at Mayaguana Airfield must be funded. An alternative to paving the runway would be to use SATS airfield matting at an estimated cost of 1.8 million dollars.
    (g)
    The cost of prepositioning MAG in Key West with resultant displacement of normal Key West units must be considered.
    4.
    Air Force forces.
    A.
    Prepositioning and alerting requirements for four day reaction:
    (1)
    Prepositioning requirements for tactical units are:
    (a)
    2 TFS at Homestead AFB.
    (b)
    1 TFS at Opalocka Airfield.
    (c)
    2 TFS at Palm Beach International Airfield.
    (d)
    1 TFS at Key West NAS.
    (e)
    1-1/3 TRS at Opalocka.
    (f)
    1 ARS at MacDill AFB.
    (g)
    1 AEW&C Det at McCoy AFB, Florida.
    (h)
    1 Air Search and Rescue Detachment, Key West.
    (2)
    Alerting of units at home base requirements: [Page 756]
    (a) 4 TFS 6 hours
    (b) 7 TFS 12 hours
    (c) 1 TRS 24 hours
    (d) 3 TCS C-130 12 hours
    (e) 2 TCS C-130 24 hours
    (f) 5 TCS C-123 24 hours
    (g) 14 TCS C-119 recall to active duty within 24 hours.
    (h) 6 ATS MATS 12 hours
    (i) 6 ATS MATS 24 hours
    (j) 1 Search and Rescue Detachment at MacDill 24 hours
    (3)
    Prepositioning of control and support forces required is as contained in paragraph 3C(2) in Part I plus activation of Palm Beach International Airport for use by tactical air forces.
    (4)
    Prepositioning of required tactical air forces at Homestead AFB will necessitate the evacuation of certain SAC forces from that base.
    (5)
    Prepositioning of Army forces at MacDill AFB, McCoy AFB and Patrick AFB will require priority for use of ground handling equipment and airfield space facilities necessary to the troop carrier airlift operation.
    B.
    Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.
    (1)
    Same as paragraph 3C(3) in Part I plus increased impact on bases providing logistical support.
    (2)
    SAC will be denied the use of Homestead AFB for air operations and operations from McCoy AFB and MacDill AFB will be limited.
    (3)
    Air research and development command air operations from Patrick AFB will be limited.
    C.
    Requirements for two day reaction:
    (1)
    Prepositioning of all tactical and support forces at operating bases in Florida will be required.
    (2)
    Other requirements as listed in para 4A(4) and (5).
    D.
    Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations.
    (1)
    Practically all other TAC operations will have to be deferred.
    (2)
    Others as in para 4B(2) and (3).
    E.
    The Air Force forces can maintain either the four or two day posture for an indefinite period of time with costs and impacts as stated.
    5.
    Joint Task Force 122 Headquarters.
    A.
    It will be necessary to activate and fully staff the Headquarters of JTF 122 as a pre-requisite to prepositioning of forces for any increased capability of contingency forces.
    B.
    For a two day reaction time the JTF 122 Joint Staff must be embarked and the flagship in port or offshore south of latitude 31 degrees N. For a four day reaction time the Joint Staff can be ashore in the Norfolk area ready to embark and sail in the flagship.”
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 2/4/62-7/10/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to CG USCONARC, COMTAC, CGUSARLANT, CG USAFLANT, CJTF 122, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCSTRIKE. Repeated to JCS. The White House copy of this telegram indicates that it was seen by McGeorge Bundy and General Taylor.↩
  2. Neither of these operations plans has been found.↩
  3. Not found.↩