Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

174. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Second Meeting of the Green Study Group

TIME AND PLACE

1020-1700 hours, 24 April 1961, CIA Administration Building

PARTICIPANTS

• Study Group Members
  • General Maxwell D. Taylor
  • Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
  • Admiral Arleigh Burke
  • Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles
• Department of Defense
  • General David W. Gray
  • Commander Mitchell
  • Colonel Stanley W. Beerli
  • Colonel Ingelido
• Central Intelligence Agency
  • General C.P. Cabell
  • Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
  • Colonel J.C. King
  • Mr. C. Tracy Barnes
  • Mr. Jacob D. Esterline
  • Colonel Jack Hawkins

[Here follows discussion of record-keeping procedures.]

7. Mr. Bissell then commenced the discussion by resuming the chronological account of the development of the Project. He said on Saturday, 22 April, a review had been made of November and December, 1960, developments. By early January, the original concept of a 300-man force broken up into small teams for infiltration—after possible training in the United States—became shifted to the concept of a much stronger strike force. To Gen. Taylorʼs query as to whether this shift was covered by a formal paper, Mr. Bissell replied that there was no formal recording of the shift. The expansion of the forces in Guatemala was accelerated and on 12 January 1961, we received 38 officers from the Special Forces Group. Following the arrival of these officers at the camp, the character of the training changed.

8. At the end of January, 28 January to be precise, the President was briefed on our Agency plan. At this time, little more was involved than a presentation, largely oral, of the status and a decision was obtained to continue with the activities but there was no implication that military action would be undertaken. Gen. Taylor asked if this was the first time the plan had been presented to the President and Mr. Bissell said yes, but added that the President did not offer an opinion concerning it. Mr. Bissell said we were seeking authority to continue all our activities—overflights, etc. and to call attention to the fact that we were recruiting and moving men and accumulating material and expending money against mere contingencies, and that we were anxious to present our plan to Gen. Lemnitzer. (Gen. Gray was asked to provide a copy of this plan from his file. He remarked that this was the plan which the JCS had approved on 3 February 1961.)¹

9. Mr. Bissell stated that on or about 17 February 1961, another meeting, including the President, was held.² By this time the JCS had evaluated the military plan which had been developed by Col. Hawkins. Gen. Taylor asked if this plan was considerably different from the final plan adopted and was answered affirmatively. At this February meeting, we felt a sense of urgency as the military plan called for a D-Day of 5 March. At the 17 February meeting, it became clear that there would be no immediate decision and that the plan would have to “slip” by one month. It was recalled that the President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, Gen. Gray, Col. Hawkins, Mr. Mann and Mr. Berle and possibly others, were present. Gen. Taylor asked if the outcome of that meeting was to decide to let D-Day slip and Mr. Bissell answered affirmatively adding that certain questions had been raised with respect to military implications.

10. Mr. Bissell then read from a paper he had prepared on 11 March³ which was a statement of the status of preparations, actions, timing and possible alternate courses of actions. This was presented at a meeting attended by much the same persons who attended the 17 February meeting.⁴ At this juncture, Mr. Dulles called to the attention of the committee a copy of Mr. Bundyʼs record of action of the 28 January meeting (of the NSC?).⁵ He stated he had no authority to disseminate copies but he would read it, which he did. The paper reported that the Director of Central Intelligence had reported on the situation in Cuba, that Cuba was rapidly becoming a communist state and that the United States had undertaken a program of covert action, propaganda, sabotage and assistance to exiles. The paper reported that the present estimate of the Department of Defense was that no program existed at this time which had capability of correcting the situation. The President, according to the document, authorized the continued activities of the Agency, including overflights. The Department of State was instructed to propose actions which could be taken in concert with other countries of the hemisphere, such as Brazil and Colombia. Mr. Dulles read the paper in full and stated it was available at any time to members of the committee.

11. Mr. Bissell read from a memorandum of the 11 March meeting concerning the status of immediate alternative courses of action:

A. Use of force in such a way as to minimize appearance of an invasion, including amphibious infiltrations by night.

B. Commit the PM force to a surprise attack, accompanied by use of tactical air force.

C. Employ two successive landings—one a diversionary force to be followed by landing of the main force 24 hours later.

D. Send the force into an inaccessible area where it could hold the beachhead for considerable time.

“A” and “D” were included because at the 17 February meeting, the President and the Secretary had urged an examination of all possible alternatives. No affirmative decision came out of the 11 March meeting.

12. Mr. Dulles then proceeded to read the statement of action of the meeting of 8 February.⁶ (A discussion of the two February dates ensued—8 February and 17 February—with Mr. Bissell conceding that there was no meeting on 17 February, but that the paper had been prepared for a meeting which had been cancelled or postponed.)⁷ Mr. Dulles stated that the President was not present at the 8 February meeting⁸ but the discussion resulted in a decision by the President to authorize the encouragement of the establishment of an exile Junta and Revolutionary Council and discussion with exile leaders looking toward such a development. No other action pending further word from the President, was authorized.

13. Mr. Dulles then read from a paper covering the 11 March meeting, noting the President had decided on the following courses of action:

(1) Every effort should be made to assist the Cubans to form a political organization. This is to include publicity for the leading political figures.

(2) The United States Government should prepare a “White Paper” on Cuba and assist the Cubans to do the same.

(3) The Department of State would explore possibilities of a de-marche in the United Nations (?).⁹

(4) President expects to offer United Statesʼ support for Cubans to return to their homeland. However, best plan for achieving this has not yet been presented. New proposals for action should be submitted.

Gen. Taylor commented that it would appear the President was favorable to the concept but was not satisfied with the proposals to date.

14. Mr. Bissell then read an account of a 15 March meeting.¹⁰ According to this paper the plan for the Cuban operation submitted on 7 March 1961¹¹ was unacceptable as it was not a program of infiltration but a World War II type of assault. That in order for a plan to be politically acceptable it must:

A. Be an unspectacular landing at night in an area where there was a minimum likelihood of opposition.

B. If ultimate success would require tactical air support, it should appear to come from a Cuban air base. Therefore, territory seized should contain a suitable airfield.

The paper contained a brief outline of a second military plan prepared by Col. Hawkins which was approximately the plan later adopted.

15. Mr. Bissell next read from notes on a meeting held on 16 March,¹² at which time two operations were proposed:

A. Trinidad—Probably an opposed landing in daylight with air support required.

B. Zapata—Unopposed landing with no tactical air until opposed.

Consequently, as of 16 March, there were two plans still under consideration as indicated above. Between the 16th of March and the end of March another postponement was called due to the visit of Prime Minister Macmillan. The target date for action was postponed to 10 April, later to 15 April and finally to 17 April.

16. Mr. Bissell then read from a paper covering a meeting held on 12 April.¹³ By this time, the plan had crystallized and this covered the concept of the operation:

1. Modification of air plans to provide for air operations limited basis on D-2, and again on D-Day. Shortly after the first strike on D-2, Cuban pilots would land at Miami. Other details not discussed.

2. Diversion or cancellation. Not feasible to halt embarkation but if necessary, ships could be diverted.

Gen. Taylor asked why it was not feasible to halt the embarkation and Mr. Bissell replied that the staging and loading of the troops was already underway. Mr. Bissell said that approval was given on continuing stages but that on April 12, D minus 5, the President still had the power to stop it. Staging started D minus 7 and 2/3s had already been moved from camps and first vessel sailed on D minus 6 and the last on D minus 4. Mr. Kennedy commented that the plan appears to have been approved but the “GO” signal not given. He asked with whom the plan had been coordinated. Mr. Dulles stated that an Internal Departmental Task Force had been set up early in March 1961 and various tasks were assigned to the separate departments. The IDTF was composed of representatives from State, Defense and CIA, specifically, Mr. Braddock, former Charge at Habana representing State, Gen. Gray representing Defense, and Mr. Barnes representing CIA. At the end of the 16 March meeting agreement was reached to set up the IDTF. Mr. Bissell said it was the sense of the 16 March meeting that the Zapata plan was preferable. Admiral Burke commented that the JCS did not agree at that time. Mr. Bissell stated there was a review of the plan by the JCS and that Gen. Gray would later elaborate on that.

17. Mr. Bissell stated that by 12 April the plan had crystallized but we still had no “go ahead” signal, whereupon Mr. Kennedy asked how we came to that conclusion and how was it actually worked out. He asked if anyone formally presented a plan for approval. When actually did the President and others examine the plan and give it their approval? Gen. Gray stated that 16 March was the date. Gen. Taylor asked if it was approved on that date and Mr. Bissell stated it was approved as the plan to be implemented but that no “go ahead” signal was given. Gen. Taylor inquired as to what the JCS had done with respect to the plan and Adm. Burke replied that on 15 March 1961, the JCS was briefed on the alternate plan and that the evaluation concluded that the alternate Zapata plan was considered the most feasible. He then started to discuss the three alternatives when Gen. Gray interrupted with the suggestion that the discussion was getting out of step; that the Trinidad plan should be discussed first and then the three alternative plans.

18. Col. Hawkinsʼ Presentation—Before going into the details of the Trinidad plan, Col. Hawkins said he would like to provide background information showing what factors were available and factors not available in connection with planning of that Project. He stated that when one is confronted with the requirement for non-attributability you introduce tremendous difficulties for a covert plan. For example, in a regular military operation, you know what forces you have, bases, state of training, etc., but in a PM covert plan you donʼt know much of anything. He said that last September when he joined the Project, the question of bases for the strike force and for supplying guerrillas in the mountains was not resolved. The only bases available were two bases in Guatemala. These were training bases, a shelf on the side of a volcano with room for 200 men at most (we ended up with 1400). These were the training facilities—which were very poor.

19. The air base in Guatemala was 750 miles from Central Cuba—too far for supply operations. C-46ʼs could not reach Eastern Cuba with satisfactory loads. C-54ʼs could. The distance was too great for tactical air operations using B-26 or smaller planes. All sorts of studies were made to locate a satisfactory base. The United States was ruled out but Col. Hawkins did not agree with the reasoning therefor. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Consequently, we had no base from which to conduct satisfactory operations. However, we later learned that President Somoza of Nicaragua would cooperate and we selected Puerto Cabezas as the site since it had an airfield, dock facilities, and other advantages. We were still 500 miles from Central Cuba, still far but feasible.

20. Late in the autumn of 1960 we feared we would lose Guatemala bases and recruiting stopped, and we looked around for other bases. We could never be sure how many troops we could get as the recruiting was often slowed down due to political infighting of exile leaders.

21. Training—We did not have facilities for PM training. Last fall we only had four CIA personnel. On 28 October, Col. Hawkins requested three Special Forces teams—a total of 38 people—for training the forces in Guatemala. Because of political considerations, it was two and a half months, 12 January 1961, before they got there. We were facing amphibious operations, the most difficult of all military operations, and we had no ships. The question was: should we buy ships, recruit crews, or should we charter ships? We finally bought two LCIʼs in Miami, not fitted for landing troops but we modified them, we recruited Cuban crews, it took months (until January 1961) to get the ships to sea. The crews were made up of former Cuban navy personnel. We also recruited American contract personnel for these ships, the two LCIʼs. These two ships could carry only 150 men so this did not answer our problem. We had to charter ships. We contacted a Cuban ship owner named Garcia who had six small freighters of the 1500-2000 ton variety. This man, Garcia, offered the most and asked the least of all the Cubans we were in touch with. He asked that we cover the operating expenses. At first we wanted two ships for our 750-man force. We armed the LCIʼs and kept them as command ships. We also used them for other operations such as the raid on the Santiago refinery.

22. Air Picture—This was a problem in the autumn of 1960. We had few trained crews. There was always the question of whether the Cubans would measure up. We didnʼt know whether the air force was adequate. The covert approach is extremely difficult. PM operations of any size at all cannot be covert. Col. Hawkins commented that we may have to adjust our thinking to the need for coming out in the open as our enemies are doing.

23. Policy Questions—Policy questions had a bearing on our plans. Some unanswered questions by early January were these:

• Will a strike be conducted?
• Will an air operation be permitted?
• Will American pilots be used?
• Will Nicaragua be used as a base?

Col. Hawkins then read from a paper dated 4 January 1961,¹⁴ which he had prepared. This paper outlined the current status of our operation and set forth policy questions which had to be resolved. (Col. Hawkins provided a copy of this paper for inclusion in the record. Consequently, no attempt is made to reproduce it in these minutes.)

24. From the above mentioned paper, Col. Hawkins outlined the concept of the strike operation:

1. Securing of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by 750-man force.

2. This to be preceded by tactical air strike which would destroy the air force, naval vessels.

3. Following this, other military targets would be attacked, such as tank parks, artillery parks, motor transport, etc.

4. Close air support for strike force on D-Day and thereafter.

5. The initial mission was to seize a small area preferably with an air field and access to the sea, with contingency plans for air drops if field and port not available.

6. Force should try to survive and not break out until time opportune or U.S. intervened.

7. Expected widespread popular support and general uprisings.

8. If this did not develop, there was the possibility that the fighting might bring on assistance from other Latin American countries and the U.S. with the resultant fall of Castro.

9. Plan called for continuation of regular PM operations: sabotage, guerrillas, etc.

10. If driven from the beachhead, the force would continue guerrilla operations.

25. Gen. Taylor stated that this concept raised fundamental questions. What was the magnitude of the air cover you expected and did you expect to stay on shore indefinitely, and if so what size force did you plan to employ? Col. Hawkins said that the force was to have been composed of 750 men and that they expected to have an air force of 15 B-26ʼs, whereupon Gen. Taylor questioned whether 15 B-26ʼs could have done all that was expected. Col. Hawkins explained that the plan was to eliminate the enemy air force. We anticipated that he had twelve operational planes, including six B-26ʼs, 4 T-33ʼs, and from two to four Sea Furies. This turned out to be a fairly accurate estimate. We felt that fifteen B-26ʼs could do the job.

26. Gen. Taylor asked on what intelligence did we base our belief that there would be popular uprisings. Col. Hawkins said that we had our own agents up and down the length of Cuba—some 60 to 70 agents including 25 radio operators—who gave us a picture of large members of people begging for arms in order to fight Castro. We had difficulty supplying the arms via the air drops. The Cuban pilots were not sufficiently qualified for this work. The flights were rarely opposed but the aircraft encountered difficulty in finding the drop zones. (Mr. Esterline commented that at no time were our surface craft interdicted by Cuban navy craft and surface deliveries were much more successful.)

27. Col. Hawkins then quoted other extracts from his paper of January 4, summarizing the size of our air force—ten B-26ʼs but only five pilots; seven C-54ʼs; a few C-46ʼs—with grossly inadequate transport crews. Five hundred Cubans training in Guatemala. FRD (Frente) recruitment not going satisfactorily. Special recruiting teams being sent from camps to Miami to assist. Expect to have 750 men in time but unless Special Forces training they could not be ready before late 1961. All this time, Col. Hawkins said, Castro was building up his military capability and in September we thought he still had 75% of the population behind him, although his popularity was then declining. Gen. Taylor asked in retrospect what would have been the best timing (for the strike to have occurred?) and Col. Hawkins replied early March.

28. Col. Hawkins said at the time of the preparation of his paper of 4 January we did not know whether the new administration would approve the project and this needed to be resolved immediately in order that the operation could be stopped and considerable expense saved. He therefore recommended that the Director of CIA attempt to get a decision from the President-Elect. Col. Hawkins felt that if the decision was made in mid-January the force could be ready to move by the end of February. We were then under pressure from the Guatemalan government. Time was not entirely in our favor. We anticipated that Castro would soon have a jet capability. Heavy equipment was being assembled throughout the country and the establishment of a police state was advancing rapidly. In his paper he recommended that the operation be carried out not later than 1 March 1961.

29. Col. Hawkins terminated reading his paper. Mr. Dulles asked what disposition was made of it and Col. Hawkins said it was directed to Chief of WH/4 (chief of the Cuban operation). Mr. Esterline, C/WH/4, said he directed it to higher authority. Gen. Taylor asked for the identity of the higher authority and was told it went to the Chief of the Division (Col. King), the Assistant Deputy for Plans (Mr. Barnes), and the Deputy for Plans (Mr. Bissell). Mr. Bissell stated that the paper did not go much further than his office, and added that we did eventually get the air crews, the B-26ʼs, etc. Avon Park was readied. American contract pilots were readied. He stated that with respect to the major policy decisions raised by Col. Hawkins, these issues will emerge when limitations on use of the tactical air force are discussed. Mr. Esterline commented that we battled with State for months and we only got watered down more and more for our efforts.

30. Mr. Kennedy asked why, if Col. Hawkinsʼ presumptions and conclusions were correct, and if State and others felt it wasnʼt feasible or desirable, wasnʼt the project called off? Mr. Bissell explained that what actually happened was that Col. Hawkinsʼ position was stated and first there was agreement on air strikes on D minus 2, D minus 1, and D-Day; and then later an absolute minimum calling for strikes on D minus 1 and D-Day. And what finally was called for was a maximum effort on D-Day.

31. Mr. Kennedy asked Col. Hawkins if he would have approved the operation as it ultimately came to occur—that is, would he have or did he approve of the watered down plan? Col. Hawkins replied that he did not approve but must say this with qualifications. He said he always maintained that we must get rid of the opposing air force. He insisted the three major airfields must be attacked. He was not in favor of limiting the number of aircraft (he eventually got the number raised)—he was not satisfied with the limited application of air power and he thought we would have had a satisfactory sweep on D-Day of all the Cuban airfields. Gen. Taylor asked how many planes we had on D-Day and Col. Hawkins stated fifteen. Admiral Burke asked if all the factors raised by Col. Hawkins were ever listed in check off form—and were they checked off as achieved? The reply was that we had no formalized check list but we knew where we stood as we went along. Col. Hawkins said we had the capability on the morning of D-Day with the 15 B-26ʼs but we werenʼt given an opportunity to do the job.

32. Col. Beerli stated that prior to D-Day we had an accurate count of the enemy air force and knew where every craft was kept. He had a total of 36. Col. Beerli described them by category. We estimated 50% of these planes were in flying condition. On the D minus 2 strike we destroyed over 70% of their air power. We had 15 planes left to employ to knock out the remainder. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] showed the enemy planes were concentrated at San Antonio. On D-Day one Sea Fury was knocked out and another fell into the ocean. They were down to three T-33ʼs. Gen. Taylor asked then why did the strike fail? Col. Beerli replied that we had strikes planned for San Antonio, Libertad, and 11 other targets, but were not permitted to carry them out. Gen. Taylor commented that we had done well with our air force and Col. Beerli replied that we had them pinned down and we based this belief on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and photography. He added that every aircraft we lost was due to the T-33ʼs. Mr. Kennedy asked how many aircraft did Castro have on D-Day. Col. Beerli said he had 2 Sea Furies, B-26ʼs and 3 T-33ʼs. Col. Hawkins repeated that we had planned a fifteen plane raid at dawn on D-Day but were not permitted to carry it out. Mr. Dulles asked if subsequent events bore out the correctness of our air O/B and Col. Hawkins replied in the affirmative.

33. Mr. Kennedy asked for information on the report that MIGʼs were in the air. Col. King said that MIGʼs did not appear until the final date. They may have been in crates and quickly assembled. Mr. Dulles commented that aerial photography never picked up any MIGʼs. Mr. Bissell said we had no reports from agents of MIG air flights. Gen. Taylor asked concerning the characteristics of the T-33ʼs and was told they are jet trainers armed with two 50 cal. machine guns. Gen. Gray said that on D plus 1 a request was made of our destroyers to attempt to locate the field. Col. King said the report of MIGʼs in crates indicated San Julian air base. Col. Beerli terminated his remarks by saying that as of D-Day the air picture was in our favor.

34. Trinidad Plan. Col. Hawkins then proceeded to discuss the Trinidad Plan. He utilized charts showing the composition of the strike force and maps of the areas discussed. First he described the composition and organization of the assault force and how it was trained. He said at first there was no one to train the troops so he sent Col. Egan and Capt. Monk with directives to conduct individual training, small unit training, etc., and an 8 week course was provided. With large influx of recruits, concurrent recruit, small unit and combined training had to be conducted. Gen. Taylor asked where they found room in view of Col. Hawkinsʼ previous statement of the small shelf on the volcano side, and Col. Hawkins explained that we finally got permission to use a finca belonging to Mr. Alejos of Guatemala for training purposes. However, firing practice was done in the mountains.

35. Noting that tanks appeared on the chart, Mr. Kennedy asked if tanks did get ashore and if they were camouflaged or disguised. Col. Hawkins said that tanks were put ashore and Gen. Gray added that these were the same type of tanks given to other countries. Col. Hawkins stated that we trained the tank crews at Ft. Knox and we had no trouble whatsoever. The Cubans knew where they were being trained and Col. Hawkins said that was a good example of how our own soil is better suited for training from security and other standpoints.

36. In arriving at the Trinidad plan, Col. Hawkins said that he studied the entire island carefully. He then decided that the Trinidad area with the nearby Escambray mountains was the place. Gen. Taylor asked if he had the benefit of photography in reaching his decision and Col. Hawkins said he had no photography until one flight was flown in November with not too satisfactory results. He then proceeded to describe the Trinidad area—the town of some 18,000 population, the nearby port to the south, named Casilda—with its docks—many good beaches for our purposes—good guerrilla country nearby with hills of 2,500-4,000 feet in which from 600-1,000 guerrillas were reported to be active who had been able to maintain themselves for six months, but were eventually eliminated. Although these were small groups with little equipment and poor supplies, it nevertheless took Castro six months to eliminate them. Therefore in considering the Trinidad plan it was felt that the force could if necessary move to the mountains and could exist in such terrain indefinitely. There were no approaches from the North that Castro could use, only other main road was from Santa Clara—this had a bridge over a river and a railroad bridge—and we were planning to knock out these two bridges. Other approach was from Cienfuegos—with bridges. The area was suitable for isolation. Also there was reason to believe that the Trinidad population was friendly. They had been supporting the guerrillas in the hills. We expected to pick up recruits from the Trinidad civilian population and we planned to bring in arms packs for 4,000 men and rapidly expand our forces. Another advantage if the force succeeded in maintaining itself and eventually breaking out was the possibility that we could have severed Cuba in the middle, creating great problems for Castro.

37. Gen. Taylor inquired as to the date of the plan. Col. Hawkins said it was written in January and the JCS was briefed on the plan on 31 January. He remarked that the JCS, in an independent study, had also selected the Trinidad site as the most suitable for this type of operation. Gen. Taylor asked how did the JCS get into this matter and Gen. Gray replied that the JCS had already been asked to come up with a likely spot and that they had in mind a small invasion force.

38. Col. Hawkins then reviewed the strike plan as follows:

• D-Day—landing
• Prior D-Day—destruction air force
• D-minus 1—attack aircraft on ground—also tank parks, artillery, etc.
• H minus 6—feinting operation off the West Coast of Pinar del Rio—destroy bridges
• H Hour—Assault force lands on beaches—seizes high ground—another company moves inland and establishes self on forward slopes—another company on a separate beach—clear Casilda—airborne troops drop in heights over Trinidad.

39. Gen. Taylor inquired as to the known presence of Castro forces in the area. Col. Hawkins said we could never pin down the exact location of his forces. There were some 40,000 militia in the general area—with about 5,000 militia encircling the Escambray mountains. These were not making an aggressive effort to join battle with the guerrillas but would catch them as they came out for food. We evaluated the militia fighting qualities on what they did in the Escambrays and this was very low. He then went on describing the plan by saying that after seizure of the objectives we would enlist and arm civilians, we would use the hospital and other buildings for the force—we would coordinate with local civilian leaders and make contact with local guerrillas. We would use the local airport for resupply—but the airport could not take a B-26. In the event Trinidad could not be held, the plan was for the force to withdraw to the Escambrays where they would be supplied by air drops. This, Col. Hawkins said, was the beauty of the Trinidad Plan—it provided an alternative and safe area to move into if the original phase failed to achieve its objectives. Gen. Cabell commented that the concept called for a dawn landing. Col. Hawkins said the air strike called for attack on three air fields and the Managua military base, which had tanks and equipment which would have easily been destroyed by use of napalm but we were not authorized to use napalm in the operation. Gen. Taylor asked who said napalm could not be employed and Col. Hawkins replied that it was a decision of the National Government. Col. Hawkins listed in detail all the targets which we had selected for air attack—which included in addition to obvious military targets—the Havana power plant, microwave stations, refineries, etc.—and said all these things we wanted to do. Gen. Taylor asked if the air requirement varied with the change of plans and Col. Hawkins replied no.

40. Gen. Taylor asked aside from terrain what else was favorable and Col. Hawkins repeated his references to friendly population, nearby guerrillas, beaches as good as those of Zapata. He said the presence of enemy forces was a disadvantage of this plan as compared with the Zapata Plan. We did not think there was anyone at Zapata. Gen. Gray said that as far as could be determined there was only a police battalion at Trinidad. Admiral Burke commented that the size of the air field at Trinidad was another disadvantage—the field at Zapata being larger. Col. Hawkins reiterated that the principal advantage was being able to fall back into the mountains. At Zapata we presupposed an uprising but the beachhead did not last long enough. At Trinidad we might have had favorable civilian reaction—one agent told us he had 2,500 men wanting arms.

41. Mr. Kennedy asked if we had any communication from the island after D-Day indicating a desire on the part of the people to rise, and Col. Hawkins said yes there were requests for arms but air drops without the use of American pilots had never been successful. Gen. Taylor asked if there was an annex to the plan for supplying arms to anyone who did rise. Mr. Bissell stated that we had airplanes and supplies and were ready to respond to agent calls. We could have responded—there were 19 requests—most of them before D-Day. Mr. Kennedy asked if there were any after D-Day and Col. Hawkins said yes, but we couldnʼt service them since our aircraft were committed to try to deliver supplies to the strike force which had lost its supply ship.

42. Gen. Gray recalled that the Agency had prepared a summary of agent radio communications received—and messages from the beaches—on D plus 2 and asked that a copy of that summary,¹⁵ which he found quite impressive, be furnished for the record.

43. Mr. Bissell said that we had anticipated domination of the air and therefore could have made daylight deliveries of arms in response to the many calls we had received. As it turned out we did not have the means with which to respond.

44. Mr. Esterline then informed the group that we had on hand one of the American pilots who survived the morning raid, and since he was planning to leave the city tonight, asked if the committee would like to hear his story this afternoon. Gen. Taylor said he would like to hear him after we finish the actual scenario and this should be sometime after lunch. The hour of 4 p.m. was set.

45. Gen. Taylor asked what happened to the Trinidad Plan. Col. Hawkins replied that it was always opposed by the State Department—also the President wanted something that was less like an invasion. Mr. Bissell read from the record of the 15 March meeting which reported that Trinidad was not acceptable since it appeared like a WWII assault operation. Gen. Taylor asked if the plan was rejected on 15 March and Mr. Bissell replied no, on 11 March. Admiral Burke commented that on 3 February the JCS had generally this same plan. Mr. Bissell said that the JCS first evaluated this plan early in February and Admiral Burke said that the JCS had made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the plan.

46. Mr. Bissell stated that we considered a variety of alternatives—one suggestion was that we seize a remote area and build an airfield from which to operate. Col. Hawkins then described the ground rules which had been established for the next plan:

1. It must call for a quiet, night landing operation—nothing that might be viewed as spectacular.

2. It must include seizure of an airfield that would accommodate up to B-26 planes in order that air strikes which were to commence at dawn could be attributed to that field.

Col. Hawkins said we looked all over for an airfield in Oriente province but could find none that could handle a B-26. We built up the concept for an operation at Preston but the field would not support B-26ʼs. We reconsidered the Isle of Pines—but rejected it because there were from 7,500-15,000 troops there and there were no suitable beaches for night landings. We thought of another plan for Trinidad involving landing troops who would go directly into the mountains—but there was no airfield. Finally, through photography, we found what we thought was a usable field—this was in the Zapata area—and this is what led us to this area. The plan was hastily put together. We got started about 15 March—after the 11 March meeting. An error in photographic interpretation had occurred. We believed there were 4,900 usable feet of runway in northern Zapata. One of the disadvantages was the 18 mile bay which meant we would have trouble getting people up there in daylight hours. We found a 4,100 foot field at Playa Giron. We would never have adopted the Zapata Plan if we had known that he had coordinated forces that would close in and fight as they did. The air field requirement was what led us into Zapata.

47. Col. Hawkins then described the moving of the troops from Guatemala to Nicaragua which was accomplished on three successive nights without incident. We were employing four merchant ships and two LCIʼs. They fanned out upon leaving Puerto Cabezas and later rendezvoused at approximately 40 miles off the coast. Col. Hawkins paid tribute to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for his performance in handling the fleet. The ships formed convoy and proceeded to a point 5,000 yards off the beach.

Afternoon Session—24 April 1961.

(Note: This account of the afternoon session is not complete inasmuch as the recording secretary was not present during the first portion of the session, having missed approximately 45 minutes of the meeting. However, the notes prepared by Col. Ingelido, who was present during the entire afternoon session, should cover this missing period.)¹⁶

48. (Gen. Gray was in the midst of discussing the JCS evaluation of the Trinidad Plan when note taking was resumed.) He said the scheme of maneuver was basically sound. There was a need for civil officer type people to coordinate with the population, etc., and this was done. The original idea was that the guerrillas would join up with the strike force. The JCS thought it best to maintain a corridor and establish a link—he pointed out that one road runs from Santa Clara to the area—and a secure route for moving up into the hills. Without interference from the air, we estimated the Cuban Army could move men and materiel to the scene by D plus 2. At time of assessment there was one regiment of Cuban Army near Santa Clara. We also were told the Cuban Army was not concentrated but spread out. We figured it would take them a day to concentrate and another day to move the 100 miles to the scene.

49. Gen. Gray indicated that the publicity which developed during the final weeks of the project, much of it centering around the Revolutionary Council and its alleged plans, gave Castro notice that something was in the wind and time to mobilize his forces. Mr. Esterline explained that we were given the requirement of establishing a broad based revolutionary council. He said Cubans cannot keep quiet and before you knew it we had a Roman Circus on our hands—leaks to press, etc., both in Miami and New York. Gen. Taylor asked if the Revolutionary Council was aware of the operation. Col. King stated that the first word they had that the operation was going was on the evening of Friday, 14 April. Col. King and Mr. Barnes had gone to New York City to brief Dr. Miro—had met with the group—had dinner—and at midnight Col. King told Dr. Miro that at dawn on the following day some action would take place. Col. King cautioned Dr. Miro that there always seems to be a leak and that in the interests of the sons of some of the members of the Council, including Miro, and other relatives—Col. King told Dr. Miro to keep this information very much to himself. Dr. Miro said he would not even tell Dr. Varona, another member of the Council, and added that he would keep all members of the Council together the entire night.

50. Gen. Taylor said that what was inferred was that all this hoopla made execution of the plan more difficult and Gen. Gray said yes—that this permitted Castro to prepare—but if the target had been the Trinidad area he would not have been ready until the afternoon of D-Day. Mr. Barnes said that there was a great deal in the press—Tad Szulc and others—guessing as to dates—and all this developed during the last week—and this could not have been anticipated. Mr. Esterline commented that one or two of Mr. Restonʼs articles in the New York Times two or three days before the date were not at all helpful. He said that despite this we were able to move people from Guatemala to Nicaragua and the first anyone knew about the invasion was when they hit the beaches.

51. Gen. Gray said that another miscalculation was that the Cuban Army was not coordinated and thus we expected the strike force would be able to resist attack. In this respect Trinidad would have been difficult terrain for launching of attacks. While the Cuban Army could eventually have reduced the beachhead, it was Gen. Grayʼs opinion that the beach could have been held for seven days. In considering the Trinidad Plan it was not considered that U.S. overt intervention would be necessary since the force could get to the hills. The ships were loaded with supplies on D minus 21, but it was always clearly understood that the President could always call off the plan. The ultimate success of the plan depended on political factors—uprisings, possible OAS action, etc.

52. Gen. Taylor asked what provisions, if any, had been made for follow up support. Gen. Gray said that CIA was training additional personnel. He said Mr. Berle had sounded out certain South American countries but got no promise of military support. The plan called for the arming of local volunteers who were expected to join up with the force. Mr. Esterline said we had approximately 300 additional untrained troops—about 167 in Guatemala and the balance in Miami. Gen. Cabell pointed out that the original concept called for a 750 man force but that we actually committed in advance all our 1400 men rather than hold out for follow up. Gen. Gray said the key to the plan was popular uprisings all over the Island—which would pin down the militia in other areas. The militia in this area had proved to be friendly to the guerrillas and for this reason Castro had to bring others in from elsewhere.

53. Gen. Taylor asked Gen. Gray concerning the 30-70 evaluation they had given to the plan. Gen. Gray said this referred to the Trinidad Plan—that the percentages were roughly 30-70 and never ran more than 40-60. He then said that about this time Mr. Berle was appointed coordinator of Latin American affairs and Ambassador Willauer faded out of the picture. He said he had had meetings with the Berle group. Gen. Taylor asked if Mr. Berle got into the military aspects of the plan and Gen. Gray said not to any important degree—that he was mostly concerned with the political aspects. Col. King said that Mr. Berle was given one briefing on the Trinidad Plan.

54. Gen. Gray then stated that on 23 February a JCS evaluation team went to Guatemala to assess the troops and summarized their conclusions as follows: Based on general review of the military portion of the project and evaluation of the combat efficiency of the forces, such forces could attain the initiative—but the ultimate success of the operation would depend on the extent the strike forces served as a catalyst. Gen. Taylor said this new evaluation of the plan expected them to get ashore all right but success depended on their serving as a catalyst to a general uprising. Gen. Gray answered affirmatively. Gen. Gray stated that Col. Tarwater thought the air force was very well prepared but made certain suggestions for improvement.

55. Evaluation of the Zapata Plan. Gen. Gray said that the JCS first saw the Zapata Plan on 15 March and gave it a favorable evaluation as an alternate plan. This, he said, was done hurriedly. The JCS was briefed on the plan on 13 March; prepared its evaluation on the 14th of March, pre-sented it on the 15th March and submitted it to the President on the 16th of March.

56. Mr. Bissell said three other alternatives were considered:

1. The Isle of Pines

2. The Preston Area

3. Alternative Trinidad Plan—(landing at night, into the hills and at daylight attack backwards to the beachhead).

With respect to No. 3, Col. Hawkins said the plan really was for the force to move into the hills—and not attack backwards—and was a modification of the original Trinidad Plan.

57. Gen. Gray said that of the alternatives mentioned it was considered that the Zapata Plan was the most feasible but not as feasible as the original Trinidad Plan. Zapata depended on control of the air and the ability to secure the exits to make difficult the movement of enemy forces into the area. The plan called for the mining of all approaches but this was not executed. The evaluations were the essential part of the JCS contribution—however, we attended most meetings. Gen. Taylor asked if the evaluation which Gen. Gray had summarized was approved by the JCS and Gen. Gray responded affirmatively. Of the three alternatives the Zapata Plan was the best.

58. Mr. Kennedy said wouldnʼt you say that the JCS had approved this plan? Admiral Burke responded by saying that the paper does not say so—but in effect the JCS approved this plan—felt it had a reasonable chance of success. Admiral Burke added that the original plan had the area they would have selected—Trinidad. Gen. Gray stated that at no time did the JCS say that the Zapata Plan should not be carried out. Mr. Bissell said that the 16 March meeting summed it up as follows:

Trinidad Plan would provide more decisive results at greater initial risk

Zapata Plan provides less decisive results—and slower results—with less initial risk

Mr. Bissell commented that we felt and hoped the Zapata Plan would be less risky but recognized its limitations—less chance of a build up from friendly population.

59. Gen. Taylor said there appeared to be two points: At no point did the JCS recommend doing it—it merely commented on three alternatives—but where we made our mistake—we should have said—but did not—that this plan was not feasible. We had an opportunity to do more and we were responsible for approving it. Mr. Dulles stated that all the plans were exposed at high level. Admiral Burke commented that one difficulty was that Gen. Lemnitzer was there by himself—then corrected himself to say that Gen. Gray was with Gen. Lemnitzer at the high level meetings.

60. Gen. Gray stated that as we became associated we became more interested in trying to make it go. Mr. Kennedy asked if this wasnʼt the key to the whole thing—this wanting it to go? Mr. Dulles said we had these alternatives—we could carry out the plan or we could demobilize the strike force. Gen. Gray said that if we had ever written a National Concept—we would have had to rewrite it continually. Admiral Burke said that there naturally was confusion during the change of administration. We should have formalized this thing much earlier and in greater detail. The trouble was that only a few people of the Admiralʼs staff knew about it.

61. Gen. Taylor asked if the possibility of uprisings was discussed among all of you and Mr. Dulles answered yes. Mr. Dulles said the first plan was the shock plan—and in this plan we hadnʼt counted on immediate uprisings—this was longer range. He said there were objections on the political side to the shock effects—and we couldnʼt count on it succeeding.

62. Mr. Kennedy asked what the objective was in landing 600-1000 men on the shore. Mr. Dulles said to obtain a beachhead which could be built up. Mr. Kennedy then asked how a beachhead could be held against 300,000 troops—or against even 30,000 or 25,000. Mr. Dulles said the enemy would not have been able to concentrate all his troops on one spot. Mr. Kennedy then said that he thought that uprisings were an essential part of the JCS evaluation. Gen. Gray said that it did not anticipate immediate uprisings—but uprisings on a slower basis. Mr. Kennedy then directed a question to Admiral Burke asking if it was the Admiralʼs understanding that 1400 men could land—and without benefit of uprisings—could maintain their position for several weeks. Admiral Burke said they thought they might be able to hold their position but if they could not, that they would then become guerrillas. Gen. Gray said that we thought the Cuban air force would be knocked out. He said the men demonstrated they could fight effectively at night. Mr. Bissell added that we expected a landing in Pinar del Rio on D plus 7. Col. Hawkins added that we had reports of men wanting to join but reiterated that the real key was control of the air.

63. Gen. Taylor then asked where is the concept? Gen. Gray said it is in the plan. The objective did not change. Here is the mission: To invade island of Cuba—with amphibious force—hold beachhead—provide castalyst for uprising—move in as guerrillas if beachhead not sustained. Gen. Taylor (checking language of mission) read: “—alternative 3 has all the prerequisites necessary and would be able to sustain itself for several weeks but inaccessibility of population would affect support of Cuban population …” Gen. Cabell remarked that we meant joining up forces and not necessarily civilian uprisings. Gen. Taylor stated it still becomes a choice between 3—but with Trinidad preferred.

64. Mr. Bissell stated that the language about sustaining for several weeks indicates a change of thinking—a slower development with less prospect of initial success. If the area could have been held for two weeks there was a good probability of ultimate success—for with no air opposition we could have knocked out his microwave and forced him to voice—we could have learned his plans—we could have reinforced the brigade with another 500 men—the logistic problem would not have been difficult—but we did not knock out his air. Gen. Cabell stated that maritime re-supply would have been a factor—with no air opposition—and would have had an effect on the outcome.

65. Gen. Gray stated that following the decision on 16 March that the Zapata Plan should be pursued, the Inter-Departmental Group on 22 March developed and finalized an agreed list of tasks.¹⁷ For example, the State Department would take care of recognition, etc. This paper served the useful purpose of coordinating our planning.

66. On 28 March the JCS approved letters of instructions to CINC-LANT and CONANT and we implemented the plan to improve the Miami defenses. We tested the plan and had planes, etc., to move in to protect the Miami area. Naval support was carried out by the carrier Essex and 7 destroyers. Destroyers escorted the invading ships—close at night but at a distance during the day. Gen. Taylor asked if they were authorized to engage. They were authorized to engage if attacked but under these circumstances the whole force was to have been diverted—since we were protecting shipping and not assisting an invasion. The rules of engagement changed several times as the operation proceeded. Our job was mostly one of support during two phases:

• Covert support—D-Day to D minus 3
• Logistic support—during build up phase

67. CIA was in a position to double and quadruple the force. We planned logistic supply as part of this build up. If things went well they might have built up in the Cienfuegos area in D plus 30. We provided arms packs for 30,000 men in addition to CIA planning for 5,000 packs. Packs for 15,000 men were actually loaded on ships and headed for the area. Also recoilless rifles, mortars, jeeps, trucks, etc. We were also providing for the overt phase under several conditions. For example, if the U.S. recognized this force (one of the Council members, Capt. Artime, went in with the brigade), State was planning on recognizing the government but no State or diplomatic representative would have been sent in until Havana was taken. We also considered possibility of supporting the force in the event a third country recognized them before we did. In addition we had one Marine hospital to move to Vieques.

68. Gen. Taylor asked about the evacuation plan and Gen. Taylor [Gray?] said it was planned to employ the LCIʼs and planes from the air strip. Gen. Gray said a separate war room was set up in the JCS—the regular war room was cut out. Only a limited number were cut in—this list included Adm. Dennison. Col. Mallard of the Agency was on the Essex. It was a cumbersome type of organization but it worked. There was good commo. There was good liaison. Decisions were implemented quickly.

69. Admiral Burke stated that the trouble was the delays—commo from there to Washington and back was fairly good—but there were always delays—sometimes of several hours—what was needed was a commander on the spot to make decisions. Another thing—although the commo was good from CEF (?) to Washington—there was not enough between the Naval forces and the ships—took a couple of days to find out that two ships were one and the same—that different names were being used for the same ship.

70. Gen. Gray said that there should have been an Inter-Departmental group working on the concept and keeping the President informed in writing. This would have eliminated the fact that up to the last date there was not a meeting of minds. It was not clear whether there was going to be an air strike or not. Mr. Barnes said it could not have been achieved the way it went along—after the Trinidad Plan was scrapped we were forced to come up with new concepts and new approaches to meet objections which were being raised.

71. Admiral Burke said that politically it could not have been done. We made our mistake in not drawing up what we thought the concept was and presenting it to the State Department and CIA. We did not grab it hard enough—partly because we were holding it so tight—therefore Gen. Grayʼs group couldnʼt get advice from the people who could have given it—because they werenʼt cut in. If he had been working under an agreed concept it could have been done better.

72. Mr. Bissell said that what he had read from the April 12 paper came near to this. Many of the suggested acts that came up involved political policy decisions of great import and these had been made in advance. Example, question whether Navy jets in the air would give protection to B-26ʼs giving close ground support. Decision was made that support should be given—this required high level policy and was a reversal of policy re engagement of U.S. forces. We could have had a concept of use of U.S. forces. Gen. Taylor said: You talk of concepts but the concepts didnʼt change. Admiral Burke stated we would have task for example to cover by Naval air—this came very late so that by the time we were supposed to execute this we were at some distance from the area. Gen. Gray said that if we had had an agreed national plan we would have had to face up to the decisions which we got piecemeal—re rules of engagement. It should have been in an overall plan.

73. Gen. Taylor asked how can we do better—about the political restraints—how can we do this. Gen. Gray replied: by putting the political factors into the plan at the beginning. Admiral Burke commented that the President must have been confused by the many different people who were advising him. Gen. Gray said that once we got State in on agreed plans, Mr. Braddock came up with the answers. We should get State into the plan at the outset.

74. Gen. Taylor remarked that after the rejection of the Trinidad Plan we were racing against the clock. Gen. Gray said that he had wanted to war game the plan and that that is what should have been done. Gen. Taylor then asked what were the factors that necessitated speed. Gen. Gray said the rainy season was approaching and this would affect not only ground fighting but flying conditions. There was the problem of the jets which Castro was supposed to be receiving soon. Info that some jet trainees had returned from Czechoslovakia. Col. Hawkins said there were other factors: We were holding 1400 men in impossible conditions. The President of Guatemala was pushing us. Also American newsmen were after the story and some of the troops and airmen were threatening to desert.

75. Interrogation of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. At this juncture [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], a member of the Alabama National Air Guard and a contract flyer who participated in the project, was received by the committee. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that he had drawn up a small resume and that if the committee was agreeable he would half-read and half-comment on that resume. (Presumably the resume will become a part of the record.) Consequently only the questioning will be recorded here.

76. Col. Hawkins asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] what happened to the original plan for D-Day. He replied that he was exposed to the targets. He thought the people were familiar with the original plan. It changed 180 degrees. We were to use maximum effort against air fields, microwave stations, (forcing use of radio voice)—we hoped this chaos—plus propaganda would do the job. Col. Hawkins asked what were the orders. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that they were ordered to use two aircraft on each target except that only one would be used on air base near Guantanamo. Request was granted late for use of other aircraft. We were pushed for briefing of crews—we didnʼt have time for target study—the whole situation was cramped. After D-Day it was obvious that not all enemy aircraft were destroyed—we thought we knew how many he had but he was turning them around quickly—our turn around time was 7 hours round trip with 30 minutes over the target.

77. Mr. Kennedy asked if these pilots were Americans or Cubans and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied they were both Americans and Cubans. They got along well together and both were motivated by patriotic reasons.

78. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that the first attack (D minus 2) only served to make Castro mad and gave him time to re-group his forces. Some of the flyers saw Navy protection—others did not. At Puerto Cabezas there was uncertainty as to whether they were enemy or friendly. Admiral Burke stated that on D-1 and D plus 1 the Navy fliers were over and that on D plus 2 authority was given for one hour of coverage. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was asked if MIGs were involved. He said that as much as he would like to he canʼt say that MIGs were involved. He said he did not believe they were. He said he debriefed B-26 and other pilots and they saw none. The reports of Navy intervention may have helped in air battles but as far as Cuban personnel were concerned they took it for granted that they had Navy cover.

79. Mr. Kennedy asked if the pilots expected they would have help or assistance. Were they ever told they would not have assistance? [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that they were not told that they would not have assistance and he did not think they expected military assistance. Mr. Bissell said that on D plus 2 they were briefed to expect Navy cover and protection and beginning at that time they may have expected assistance. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the news was a great morale booster to people in the Puerto Cabezas area and when it did not materialize morale was affected adversely. Cuban crews aborted and without this assurance of assistance American pilots would not have participated.

80. Gen. Taylor asked what targets they found on the beach. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that on D plus 1 they caught a large column of trucks. An American pilot “bounced” those trucks and from 15 to 20 Rusians tanks—three B-26ʼs made passes at the trucks and hurt them badly. This was Tuesday afternoon about 1800 hours local time. Col. Hawkins remarked that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated they suffered 1800 casualties. Mr. Kennedy asked if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was able to tell where the fighting was taking place. He was unable to give a conclusive answer but thought the forces had moved up from Blue and Red Beaches but never very far out. He remarked that the enemy had lots of anti-aircraft fire. Mr. Kennedy asked if they had this on D-Day. Col. Hawkins said that they did not but that they moved it in very fast. Gen. Taylor asked where were they reporting flack and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied: from all over—and with excellent marksmanship. Gen. Taylor asked how the air-ground commo worked and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the commo gear went down with the ship that was sunk and that there was no commo.

81. Mr. Kennedy asked if the Cuban pilots did well. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said they constantly found excuses for not flying. Gen. Taylor asked what percentage failed and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that only 35% were “ready to go” and you could count the number of “tigers” on one hand. Col. Beerli took exception to this saying that on D minus 2 we had eight aircraft up and that these made more than one pass over the target. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] observed that at that time the sight of victory was present—but when they got thinking that they were losing it was different. He said that on the morning of D minus [plus?] 2 he had to beg them to go. He observed that they were good until things started going wrong.

82. Mr. Kennedy asked where was the fighting going on at D plus 1 and D plus 2. Admiral Burke said that on D plus 2 Navy recon could find no infantry—they were all apparently in the bush. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said he had no information as to where the fighting was.

83. Mr. Kennedy asked if the Castro forces had come down the road on D plus 1 and Gen. Taylor remarked that he did not see how they could have gotten down there that fast even if they knew where the landing was coming. Col Hawkins said there were tanks in the Red Beach area on D-Day. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] expressed the personal opinion that there was not much fighting done. Gen. Taylor asked if there was any prearranged plan for use of smoke to identify our own people on the ground and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that the air force was concerned exclusively with taking care of the “heavy stuff” and not attacking troops. Mr. Kennedy asked how long the party lasted on Red Beach and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] thought it wasnʼt more than a matter of hours.

84. Mr. Dulles raised the question of the confusion in orders of going after the airfields on D plus 1. Mr. Bissell said that at some point on D-Day we received permission to strike the airfields that night—and then there was some talk of a strike at dusk—but ultimately it was authorized for that night but bad visibility and other factors prevented them carrying it out. Col. Beerli asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if there was a lack of aircraft and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that they were limited to the number of shells on any given target—we were limited to number of aircraft we could use. When we called it off we thought we were losing the war intentionally. This thought was based on the restrictions which had been placed on us.

85. The meeting terminated at approximately 1700 hours.

[name not declassified]

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Memoranda of Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by [text not declassified].
1. JCSM-57-61; for text, see Document 35.
2. See Document 48.
3. Document 58.
4. See Documents 59 and 60.
5. See Documents 30 and 31. The January 28 meeting was not an NSC meeting.
6. See Document 40.
7. The meeting scheduled for February 17 was postponed until February 18; see Document 48.
8. President Kennedy was present at the February 8 meeting.
9. The question mark in the source text indicates some question as to the accuracy of the statement. According to the available record of the March 11 meeting, the statement is accurate as written.
10. See Document 65.
11. An apparent reference to the CIA paper of March 11; see Document 58.
12. See Document 66.
13. See Document 92.
14. Document 9.
15. Not found.
16. Colonel Michael J. Ingelido, Deputy Secretary, JCS, also functioned during the deliberations of the Cuba Study Group as General Taylorʼs assistant. Colonel Ingelido was present at the afternoon session of the Study Groupʼs deliberations on April 24, which he noted began at 1:50 p.m. Ingelidoʼs notes on the meeting are more extensive than those prepared by [text not declassified] printed here. According to Ingelidoʼs notes, at the outset of the afternoon session CIA officials gave a resume of the landing operations planned for the Red, Blue, and Green Beaches during the Zapata operation. They also discussed the critical element of the air support planned for the operation, including the possible use of napalm to neutralize enemy forces in the area. General Gray outlined DOD and JCS participation in the planning, which led to a general discussion of the information provided to the President, and the actions approved by the President. (Memorandum for the record by Ingelido; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Cuba, Taylor Report)
17. See Document 71.