Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

173. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Factors which Hampered Preparations for and Conduct of Effective Paramilitary Operations (Cuba)¹

1. The following factors tended to limit the effectiveness of paramilitary operations:

a. Lack of clear-cut, detailed policy directives, in writing, from proper governmental authority. (The March 17 directive² was general in nature. Additional written directives should have been issued from time to time setting forth in detail concept, missions, objectives and authorized procedures. Verbal instructions do not suffice in matters of great import.)

b. Slowness of governmental machinery in resolving policy questions once presented. (For example, two and a half months were requested to obtain the services of Special Forces training teams after original request by the Paramilitary Staff. Results of Special Group meetings were often inconclusive. Proceedings were verbal and minutes were recorded by individual departments. This led to misunderstanding. The Group itself did not have authority to resolve major questions, and there were no written policy directives forthcoming after meetings were conducted.)

c. Over Centralization of Control. (Examples: The Special Group had to be consulted before launching each over-flight mission. Tactical headquarters were in Washington, whereas it has long been recognized that tactical operations must be controlled by a tactical headquarters in the field or at sea. It would have been better to place paramilitary operations under control of a special task force within the Unified Command. This task force should have included representatives from Army, Navy, Air Forces, Marine Corps and C.I.A.—all under a naval commander, since the target country was an island.)

d. Lack of adequate organization, procedures, equipment, facilities and staff within C.I.A. for management of paramilitary operations. (The organization and procedures of C.I.A. are not suitable for control of paramilitary operations and its paramilitary staff is very small. C.I.A. must call upon the Defense Department for equipment, supplies and personnel to establish training bases, conduct training and prepare plans. It would be better to assign paramilitary responsibilities to the Defense Department which has vast resources, both human and materiel, for such purposes.)

e. Failure to approve use of U.S. bases for training. (The paramilitary training base in Guatemala was entirely unsatisfactory. Troops had to live in prison-camp conditions and there were no adequate training areas or facilities available. Location of the base in Guatemala also introduced political complications and created tremendous logistical problems which were very difficult for C.I.A. to handle.)

f. Failure to use U.S. bases for air logistical and tactical operations. (The air base in Guatemala was at too great a distance for satisfactory supply flights for support of agents and guerrilla organizations. The air base in Nicaragua was too distant for satisfactory B-26 operations. Two sorties per day were the maximum that could be programmed, and pilot fatigue made this impossible for a period longer than one or two days. Location of the air bases in third countries complicated security and political problems and increased the likelihood that use of the bases would be denied soon after commencement of operations. Location of bases in third countries also multiplied logistical problems.)

g. Denial of the request to use American contract pilots for aerial supply of agents and guerrillas. (Cuban pilots demonstrated at an early date their inability to fly successful missions. Of twenty-seven attempted only four were successful. American pilots, on the other hand, have demonstrated their ability in this field in many areas of the world, working with a variety of indigenous guerrilla forces. The failure to supply guerrilla organizations was a critical failure in the over-all operation.)

h. Denial of the request to use American contract pilots for B-26 strikes. (The paramilitary staff expressed in writing on January 4, 1961³ its doubts regarding the ability of the Cuban pilots to conduct satisfactory tactical air operations. Request for use of American pilots had been previously made to the Special Group which authorized their hiring but not their employment.)

i. Long delay in obtaining Special Forces personnel for infantry training. (This request was submitted by the paramilitary staff on October 28, 1960. Personnel were not made available until January 12, 1961.)

j. Rejection of the preferred invasion plan (Trinidad). (This plan was recommended by the paramilitary staff as the best possible plan and was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the plan most likely to succeed.)

k. Restrictions imposed upon the conduct of effective tactical air operations. (The State Department from the outset opposed any tactical air operations. The paramilitary staff, on the other hand, consistently informed all authorities concerned that the operation could not be conducted unless the opposing air force was knocked out before the landing, and unless the landing force was continually supported by effective tactical air operations as long as it was in a combat situation.

The preferred plan presented by the paramilitary staff called for full scale air attacks on all airfields, using all available aircraft, commencing at dawn of D-1 and involving another full scale sortie in the afternoon and continuation of full scale operations on D-Day and thereafter.

Political decisions led eventually to a half strength attack on D-2 on only three airfields. After this strike, photographic interpretations and pilot debriefing indicated that the opposition still retained a number of offensive aircraft in operational condition.

This disadvantage could still have been overcome if full scale attacks on all airfields at dawn on D-Day had been permitted as planned.

Cancellation at the last moment, while the troops were already off the beaches preparing to land, of the air attacks planned for D-Day doomed the operation to failure. The paramilitary staff predicted loss of all shipping when informed of this decision at about 2230 on the night of the landing.

If this decision had been communicated to the paramilitary staff a few hours earlier, the operation would have been halted and the ships withdrawn with troops on board.

Restrictions on the use of napalm also contributed to failure. Use of this weapon against concentrated aircraft, tanks and trucks clearly visible in available photographs could have been a decisive factor. For example, photographs showed one concentrated tank park with 36 tanks and a truck park with 150 trucks.

Political considerations regarding use of air led to the selection of the Zapata area as an alternative of the preferred plan. A political requirement was established to seize an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations. A study of all Cuba showed that there was no airfield that the Cuban force could hope to seize and hold except in Zapata.

The curtailment of tactical air must be regarded as the one factor which insured failure of the operation.)

l. Failure to include all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at high level meetings in which military matters were to be discussed. (The practice of including only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at such meetings is, in the opinion of the writer, dangerous. It cannot be expected that any single military officer can advise on all the technical aspects of air, sea and ground warfare. The Cuban operation was essentially a seaborne invasion. Such operations are a specialty of the Navy and Marine Corps. Therefore, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations, if present at all meetings, would have been able to contribute invaluable advice at the proper time.

It is the hope of this writer that serious consideration will be given to the question posed above as military matters of greater significance are dealt with in the future.)

J. Hawkins⁴
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief, WH/4/PM

0. Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Secret. Prepared by Colonel Hawkins.
1. On May 5 Hawkins drafted a 48-page memorandum for the record that detailed the background and development of the Bay of Pigs operation. A copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba.
2. An apparent reference to the program of covert action against Cuba approved by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960.
3. See Document 9.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.