Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IX, Foreign Economic Policy

95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, March 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

• New Proposals for the Foreign Aid Program

In anticipation of our Monday meeting to discuss the report on Reorganization of Foreign Assistance, and its accompanying proposals,¹ I want to take this opportunity to restate my own deep concern and strong convictions on the historic situation in which we now find ourselves.

I feel certain that this concern and these convictions are widely shared by all those who have worked to produce these new proposals. The scale, shape, and direction of the new proposals are themselves based on an awareness of the increasing seriousness of the world situation. But we are also aware that both public opinion and political sentiment on Capitol Hill require the highest level Presidential leadership if our proposals are to attract the necessary support.

Unquestionably, the need for the intelligent use of foreign assistance continues and is likely to increase. In three underdeveloped continents we have reached a watershed where the holding operations of the past are clearly inadequate and where new initiative of a dramatic and positive kind are essential. Even if the Soviet threat did not exist, these requirements would be present and should impel us and other economically developed countries to adopt new policies. But the Soviet threat itself is taking on new forms, specifically including the availability of massive sums for trade and aid to be expended as Soviet political aims dictate.

Here at home the political and public climate for the aid program has been allowed to deteriorate just at the time when a more sophisticate understanding and a stronger long-term commitment is needed.

Part of this is the result of years of fraudulent justifications of the program as a short-term, anti-communist, quick-results proposition. Part of it is the understandable effect of boredom with the old symbols, maladministration and waste, neo-isolationism, and the protectionism produced by the economic distress inside our own economy.

I believe that most of us who have worked on this program feel that we have come to an important crossroads. In all likelihood, a fresh, positive aid program, scaled to the requirements, and presented with persist-ence and boldness, has a much better chance of Congressional approval and popular acclaim than another round of the old Mutual Security bill with the now standard figures on military assistance, “defense support”, “special assistance”, and all the rest.

We are facing a period much like 1940, when Lend Lease would never have been thought politically possible by ordinary politicians, but when farsighted leadership and Presidential initiative achieved a breakthrough. This is also a time like 1947, when neither the Congress nor the country was supposed to be ready for the Marshall Plan, but when a similar energy and influence provided the national momentum we needed.

The accompanying proposals have been drafted under the assumption that the top leadership in the new Administration throughout the White House, Cabinet, and sub-Cabinet levels, can and will be mobilized to undertake the important assignments in public education which will be an essential prerequisite to the program’s enactment. In practical terms, this will require a major public effort in the months of April and May between the presentation of your aid message and the presentation of the detailed program on Capitol Hill.

These considerations are uppermost in my mind at the moment, and I am sure that my colleagues share them. I think it is essential that they be appreciated and understood at the outset, for without them the program itself will be in trouble and indeed would not have been devised.

Dean Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5-MSP/3-1061. No classification marking. A March 6 draft, attached to the source text, is identical to the text printed here, except for the first paragraph that makes no mention of the upcoming Monday meeting. In the margins of the March 6 draft are the following handwritten comments: “Hand carried to Pres. by Sec 3/6/61” and “Revised & sent 3/10 to W[hite] H[ouse]”.
1. Neither the report nor its accompanying proposals nor a record of the meeting on Monday, March 13, has been found. A March 8 memorandum from Battle to S/S-RO indicates that this White House meeting with the President would concern foreign aid. (Ibid., 800.0000/3-861) Participants at the 10:05-10:50 a.m. meeting on March 13 were the President, Secretary Rusk, Bowles, Ball, David Bell, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, and Rostow. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Books)