309. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the National
Security Council0
Washington,
July 10,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Review of Export Control Policy
The Department of State and Commerce have had recurring differences
during the past year over the licensing of exports to the European
Communist bloc. There are now pending and we are in disagreement with
regard to a number of applications for licenses to ship commodities and
equipment to the USSR and to other
Eastern European countries.
Neither these applications as a group nor our total trade with the bloc
are quantitatively important. The dollar value of the goods represented
by the applications is approximately $2,400,000. Our total sales to the
European Soviet bloc in 1961 came to $133,000,000, of which sales to the
USSR amounted to $42,600,000.
Nevertheless, trade is an instrument of our over-all policy toward the
bloc and export licensing should be consistent with that policy.
I believe that the pending license applications should be approved. The
articles and equipment covered by the applications qualify for approval
under our policy and the licensing criteria developed under that policy
(see Enclosures 1 and 2). That is, either they are non-strategic by our
own definitions or the items themselves and the know-how involved are
available to the Soviet bloc in the same or substantially the same form
from Western Europe or Japan. If we were to deny the applications, it
would have negligible consequences for the material strength of the
Soviet bloc.
There is another and I think a decisive point involved. Denial of these
applications would work at cross purposes with our attempt to establish
sober communications with the USSR and
the Eastern European bloc. The underlying premise for our export control
policy has been, of course, that trade is one of the few means for
influencing the
[Page 679]
peoples of the
Soviet Union toward a national attitude that will tend to make the
USSR a more responsible and
peaceful member of the international community. I developed this premise
at some length before Representative Kitchin’s Subcommittee last
October. I think that it remains the soundest basis for export control
policy.
This is all the more so because the Russians appear to attach a
psychological importance to our export control procedures that is quite
disproportionate to the small amounts at issue. There is a tendency,
unfounded as it may seem to us, for the Soviets to view our operations
in the field of trade as indicators of our over-all attitudes. At a time
when we are engaged in a series of diplomatic discussions with the
Soviets about Berlin and other matters, nothing is to be gained by
giving the Russians a misleading impression of our point of view about
the kind of relationship we hope ultimately to have with them. On the
contrary, so long as the Soviets are in a mood for rational
conversation, it is important that we avoid actions in trade control
policy or elsewhere which seem to the Soviets to belie our expressed
readiness to maintain normal contacts of all kinds with the USSR as long as these are possible.
Ambassador Thompson during his recent visit expressed the opinion that
Soviet policy may now be at a crossroads, that it can move either toward
detente or toward increased pressure against the West, and that our
export control policy may well have a bearing upon the Soviet choice.
The Ambassador recognized that we cannot attempt to affect Soviet
decisions at the expense of our vital interests. We may not be able to
affect the outcome at all. But he feels, and I agree, that we should not
risk tipping the balance by actions in matters that are not otherwise of
genuine strategic significance.
Our friends and allies are entirely opposed to an increase in the
severity of existing trade controls at this time. As a practical matter,
domestic political forces in Western Europe and Japan leave the
governments there with little ability to strengthen the control
mechanism. The United States should therefore have no illusions that
restrictions by us would be effective in preventing such trade between
the Soviet bloc and the rest of the free world.
I believe that the recent Congressional discussion in the course of
extending the Export Control Act was on the whole more helpful than
otherwise. The amendments that were adopted do not require that we give
up any of the flexibility we have had in operating our export control
policy (Enclosure 3 analyzes the several amendments in the light of the
Congressional discussion).1
Congressman Kitchin’s amendment, which would have created a presumption
of denial of export license applications,
[Page 680]
was revised and in practical effect reversed in
conference. This was at the specific request of the Executive Branch
which objected strongly to the change of policy that the amendment would
have required.
In order to clarify our export control procedures for the future, and in
line with the request of the National Security Council Standing Group
Meeting of January 26, 1962, I have had reviewed our economic defense
policy as set forth in NSC 5704/3. I believe that this policy continues
to be consistent with and applicable to our objectives. I have taken the
opportunity of this review, however, to propose simpler language and so
far as possible to bring policy up to date with the current situation.
The resulting redraft is shown as Enclosure 1. I have also attached as
Enclosure 2 the Statement of “Criteria and Licensing Policy” which has
been the agreed basis for day to day decisions at the staff level in the
Departments of State, Commerce and Defense.
I recommend that the statement of economic defense policy, and the
licensing criteria and policy that apply to it, be affirmed. At the same
time, I recommend that the license applications which, under existing
criteria and policy, have been recommended for approval at the staff
level now be granted.
Enclosure 12
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY
General Policy
U.S. Economic Defense Policy must be viewed as an instrument of our
overall policy toward the bloc and of our total national strategy.
Furthermore, it should incorporate the major governing elements of
security trade control policy as it has been defined by the present
Administration. These governing elements are as follows:
- 1.
- The security of the United States and the Free World
countries continues to be threatened by the Sino-Soviet
bloc. We thus should apply against the bloc such economic
defense measures as will retard the growth of the bloc’s
war-making potential and reduce its unity. There
[Page 681]
can be flexibility
in determining the degree of severity of the controls, but
it is important to retain controls in such form that they
can be available for use as an instrument of policy during a
crisis situation, and provide a means of putting pressure on
Soviet bloc leaders when their demands become intolerable
and of forcing them, short of a resort to arms, to realize
our determination and the need to reconsider their own
course of action.
- 2.
- While it is necessary to maintain a system of economic
defense measures, it is equally necessary to maintain or
expand such contacts with the USSR and countries of the bloc as will
influence them over the long-run to become more responsible
and peaceful members of the community of nations. Trade
relations are an important channel of communication with
bloc countries. The courses we take should be based on the
assumption that the maintenance of commercial contacts and
trade between the Free World and the European Soviet bloc
may have positive advantages during this period of tension
and watchfulness, and that such trade should be encouraged
except where it would directly increase the military
strength of the bloc. The decision either to restrict or to
promote such trade should be coordinated with decisions in
other fields of our foreign relations so that foreign trade
policy may serve our overall foreign policy goal.
- 3.
- There are forces making for fragmentation within the bloc.
When an opportunity presents itself, as in the case of
Poland, trade and economic relations can become an active
instrument for the promotion of United States policy
interests in relation to bloc cohesion. Economic defense
measures should therefore be applied on a selective basis to
support United States policy with respect to encouraging and
assisting the bloc countries of Eastern Europe to achieve
increased self-determination and more active pursuit of
their own national interests.
- 4.
- To be of greatest effectiveness, the economic defense
system should represent the cooperative efforts of the
principal trading nations and should be coordinated with the
larger system of military and political alliances. In order
to be realistic and effective, the economic defense measures
which the United States should adopt should be coordinated
to the extent possible with those of Free World countries.
In the trade control field our allies are interested,
generally speaking, in limiting controls to commodities of
reasonably clear and direct military significance and
entertain a strong reluctance to enlarge the area of
restrictions. This fact rules out economic warfare except at
a time of high crisis.
- 5.
- The system of trade control should be selective and should
concentrate on the denial of commodities or technology which
would directly increase the net military strength of the
bloc, narrowly defined. The Soviet economy is at an advanced
stage of development with a virtually independent military
capability, and we cannot hope to erect an
[Page 682]
absolute barrier to Soviet
advances in military production. We can make it more
difficult or more time consuming for the Soviets to make
certain kinds of progress. From this standpoint, the trade
control operation is closely akin to the basic objective of
our national defense policies—namely, the preservation and
if possible the widening of our margin of military
advantage.
Based on the foregoing principles the courses of action to be
followed in the export control field are outlined below.
Courses of Action
- 6.
- Seek to maintain a multilateral security trade control
structure and control measures developed thereunder, making
appropriate and timely adjustments in those measures to reflect
changes in the military vulnerabilities within the Sino-Soviet
bloc as a whole and within its members, or to improve
cooperation and increase effectiveness; and continue our efforts
for better understanding and support of the multilateral control
objectives, criteria, and procedures essential to an effective
export control program.
- 7.
- Seek to maintain and, as necessary, extend the bilateral
arrangements with Free World countries (non-CG countries) to obtain support for
multilaterally agreed controls.
- 8.
- Maintain toward the European Soviet bloc United States export
controls over multilaterally agreed items and over such other
materials, equipment, technology and services as can be so
unilaterally controlled by the United States as to achieve a
worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European
Soviet bloc; and take all appropriate meas-ures as will
effectively enforce these controls and prevent their
frustration.
- 9.
- Approve, as a general rule, the shipment from the United
States to the European Soviet bloc of commodities not controlled
under the foregoing paragraph, and, where appropriate in support
of U.S. policy, remove the requirement of specific licenses for
such shipments to selected countries or to the entire European
Soviet bloc.
- 10.
- Make appropriate and timely unilateral adjustments and seek
appropriate multilateral adjustment in the scope and severity of
controls maintained toward the bloc countries of Eastern Europe
on a selective basis in line with the objectives of encouraging
and assisting these countries to achieve increased
self-determination and greater pursuit of their own national
interests.
- 11.
- Continue to seek the adoption of effective measures to enforce
the agreed scope and severity of the multilateral controls.
Increase the scope and effectiveness of multilateral exchanges
and cooperation in the enforcement field.
- 12.
- Seek a close association with NATO and other security alliances on export
controls, and where feasible, obtain their consideration and
advice on appropriate economic security problems toward the end
of promoting Western cohesiveness and building an instrument
that can be used in a crisis situation as evidence of Western
determination in the face of Communist pressure.
- 13.
- Maintain the current level of United States unilateral export,
import and financial controls applied against Communist China,
North Korea and North Vietnam and take all appropriate actions
effectively to enforce those controls toward Communist China,
North Korea and North Vietnam and to prevent their frustration.
At such time as it is judged to be in the United States interest
to do so, the controls toward Communist China should be
revised.
Enclosure 23
CRITERIA AND LICENSING POLICY
With particular reference to the Soviet bloc, the ACEP structure was used to establish
the criteria according to which items would be classified as
strategic. Under presently agreed criteria, an item is considered
eligible for strategic listing if it falls within one of the
following classes:
- (a)
- Materials, equipment, services and technical data which are
designed especially for or which, in the judgment of the U.S.,
are intended or expected to be used by the Sino-Soviet bloc
principally for the development, production or utilization of
arms, ammunition, implements of war (including BW and CW) and
atomic energy materials.
- (b)
- Technical data and materials and equipment which incorporate
advanced technology or unique technological know-how, the
acquisition of which may be reasonably expected to permit a
significant advance in Sino-Soviet bloc military-industrial
technology over the level of development already achieved or
expected to be achieved within the following two years;
or
- (c)
- Materials, equipment and services for which the Sino-Soviet
bloc has a deficiency which is critical in relation to its
present and future military-industrial capabilities and which it
is not expected to overcome within the following two years; and
technical data (incorporated or
[Page 684]
unincorporated) the acquisition of which
would be significant in remedying such deficiency.
Similarly, licensing policy applicable to individual commodities or
classes of commodities, including technology, has been determined
along detailed lines, but these can broadly be summarized as
follows:
- (a)
- Commodities, including technology, found to meet one or
more of the strategic criteria, and under international
embargo, have applied to them a licensing policy of
“presumption for denial”.
- (b)
- Commodities, including technology, found to meet one or
more of the strategic criteria and not under international
embargo but whose denial by the United States unilaterally
would or might impose a worthwhile adverse impact on the war
potential of the Sino-Soviet bloc likewise have applied to
them a licensing policy of “presumption for denial”.
- (c)
- Commodities, including technology, found to meet one or
more of the strategic criteria but whose denial by the
United States alone would not impose a worthwhile adverse
impact on the war potential of the Sino-Soviet bloc have
applied to them a licensing policy of “presumption for
approval”.
- (d)
- Commodities, including technology, found not to meet one
or more of the strategic criteria have applied to them a
licensing policy of “presumption for approval”.
In determining final action on an application, of course other
factors are taken into consideration which might lead to denial of a
license for a commodity under “presumption for approval”, or vice
versa.