Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IX, Foreign Economic Policy

158. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan)⁰

Washington, March 5, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Dave Bell on the Clay Committee¹

Dave seems to accept the fundamental premise of the Clay Committee: both military and economic aid ought to be concentrated in the countries which are able to use it effectively and in which visible good results will be achieved in a short span of time. All other countries should be removed from the list as fast as possible.

I think this is basically an incorrect view. I don’t quarrel with the proposition that the bulk of our aid ought so to be used. However, the needs of maintaining our position as a world power, and continuing to offer an effective alternative to communism all over the world, require that we maintain some active presence in a great many countries. Aid activity, military or economic or both, is usually the most effective way to do this. I recognize that in many of these countries the activities will produce little visible return, and in some of them it will be continuously difficult to justify because of the political behavior of the recipient governments, e.g., Cambodia or Algeria. Nonetheless, our continued presence is worthwhile. It gives us the only effective channel of influence to these governments. A judicious mixture of military and economic aid is a way of carrying on a continuing relation with two groups that are powerful and important in nearly every underdeveloped country: the would-be economic planners and the military. In every case it is much more difficult and costly to move in on a crisis if we have had no previous contacts than to expand our activity to meet a crisis, when in our judgment this is desirable or necessary.

The conclusion of this line of argument is that if we are both to concentrate on successful and well-performing clients and maintain some continuing aid relation with as many countries in the underdeveloped world as we can, especially the countries who are not our allies and who are tempted to swing strongly against us, we may need a somewhat bigger rather than a smaller total aid budget. This might mean $600 million rather than $250 million in the contingency fund. This may appear to vitiate the argument, since it is asking for the moon. On the contrary, I think it states the facts to which the Congress, however reluctantly, must ultimately be persuaded.

There is an alternative policy more consistent with the Clay Committee’s outlook, but politically much less palatable. This is the policy which accepts the proposition that many countries will, in fact, get strong military and economic assistance from the Soviets, or even some from the Chinese, that they will be loudly leftist and even more loudly anti-Western and that we can safely accept the situation. I think this alternative position is, in any long-term context, even less realistic politically, although perhaps fundamentally sounder.

C.K.²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Foreign Aid, Clay Report. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy.
1. Regarding the Clay Committee, see Document 161. Although not a member of the Clay Committee, Bell sat in on its sessions.
2. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.