93. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy0
Dear Mr. President, Although I was sorry we could not agree on a joint declaration about Nuclear Tests,1 I was grateful for your very helpful [Page 224] comments which Dean Rusk sent through David Gore2 and which I used in my statement in the House of Commons on October 31.3 No doubt you will have seen what I said about our position and the possibility of having to resume tests. I hope that you broadly agree with the position which I took.
Although there was a certain amount of hostility in the House of Commons this came only from the left-wing of the Labour Party, and the official opposition would not I believe dissent from what I said. In any case this is a perfectly defensible line here because it gives us a very strong moral position. I would not like you to think therefore that my idea for a joint declaration was prompted by domestic preoccupations. What I felt, and still feel, is that the present series of Soviet tests, particularly the large explosions set off in direct defiance of a United Nations resolution, has put the Russians in a very bad posture throughout the world. I know that the neutrals are always much readier to criticise us. All the same I have no doubt that they do resent the callous Soviet behaviour. I believe that this is a situation which we can use and that it is very important to set out our position clearly and firmly. Otherwise if it does seem essential later on for you to hold further atmospheric tests, the full weight of neutral opinion will turn against us or will at least succumb to the argument that there is nothing to choose between the Russians and the West. That was why I believed and still believe that some solemn joint declaration by the two Western nuclear powers would have real value. I think that our public statements this week mean that the time for such a declaration has passed for the moment. But if you do decide to resume atmospheric tests, my own feeling is that a solemn declaration broadly of the kind which I have suggested may still be desirable when that decision is announced.
Meanwhile, we have been giving some thought to our own needs for nuclear testing. We have strong technical reasons to test a device which the Atomic Energy Authority have developed [5 lines of source text not declassified] and it could be ready in a matter of weeks. The Atomic Energy Commission know about it and your people have expressed interest in it.
[Page 225]We should wish, however, to test underground and we have no underground facilities. No suitable site exists in these islands, and the search for and construction of a site overseas would not only be difficult in itself, but would take an unacceptably long time. I hope therefore that you may be able to fit a test of this device into the United States underground programme. I have no doubt that there are many claims upon your facilities, but I believe that such a test would not only be of mutual advantage technically, but would be an overt sign of our solidarity and collaboration at the present critical time.
If you were agreeable in principle to this proposal, the detailed arrangements and conditions for the test could, I suggest, be worked out between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Atomic Energy Authority. I would not of course make any announcement either about the request or about a possible test until all arrangements between us had been completed.
There are also plans for one or two other United Kingdom tests underground, but these are not urgent and the devices would not in any case be ready until next year.
Our Atomic Energy Authority is also interested in Project Gnome and will make proposals to the appropriate United States agency with a view to participating in the observation of this test.
I was very glad to have our telephone conversation on October 27. I certainly found it very helpful. If we cannot meet for the moment, and I quite agree about the difficulties of this, I feel it all the more important that we should be able from time to time to have these exchanges of ideas on the new telephone,4 which is certainly a great convenience.5
With warm regard,
Yours sincerely,
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Volume II. Top Secret; Atomic. Attached to a covering note from Ormsby Gore to the President.↩
- See Document 86.↩
- In a meeting with Ormsby Gore the afternoon of October 27, Rusk said that the President had the impression from his telephone conversation that morning with Macmillan that the Prime Minister “still desired to make a statement.” Despite reconsideration the United States could not “adopt a self-imposed moratorium for a period decent enough to meet the Prime Minister’s requirements.” The best solution was for Macmillan to say “unilaterally what he felt he must, taking into account our views.” Rusk also outlined potential points for a statement that would be acceptable to the United States. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/10-2761)↩
- For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 553-554.↩
- Reference is to the direct connection between the White House and 10 Downing Street.↩
- In his November 10 reply, Kennedy suggested U.S. use of Christmas Island for atmospheric tests, asking for “early assurance that you do not see obstacles to our use of this site.” He stated that the United States would not “emulate the Soviet demonstrative tests of big weapons.” No U.S. tests would be undertaken except for results of substantial military significance, which could not reasonably and effectively be obtained in any other way, nor without the most rigorous steps to avoid or reduce fallout. Kennedy concluded by noting the “agreement” between the U.K. October 31 and U.S. November 2 statements on testing. (Text in telegram 2599 to London, November 10; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan, 1960-1962)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩