Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

94. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Supervision of Atmospheric Testing Policy

You have ordered preparations for atmospheric testing, while reserving the actual decision on tests until later. Now preparations are beginning, and it is important that they go forward in such a way as to leave policy control in your hands. The following arrangements are recommended for this purpose:

1. You should establish an NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy, with the following membership: Seaborg, Chairman, State (Foster), Defense (probably Gilpatric), and White House (Wiesner and Bundy). This has the approval of all concerned.

2. You might instruct the Committee to review all preparations for atmospheric tests under the following criteria:

Tests will be conducted in the atmosphere only if

a. the test will provide information of substantial importance to the national defense

b. the information needed can be obtained in no other way, with reasonable time and effort

c. atmospheric fall-out is minimized in all practicable ways

d. the military need for the test outweighs the general desirability of avoiding all atmospheric fall-out.

3. You may wish to add that in your present judgment, any tests will be limited to those which relate to important questions of weapons development and weapons effects, and that you do not expect to approve of either proof tests or systems tests unless there is a convincing demonstration of unusual need in each case. (There is currently no limitation on the kinds of tests for which preparations may be made, and there is a good chance that individual services may make million-dollar preparations for tests that you are not at all likely to approve; it seems sensible to put up a warning flag here.)

4. Closely related to the problem of supervision is the budgetary problem. I attach a memo from Dave Bell on that.¹ We join in recommending (a) that no FY ‘63 proposals be made at this time, (b) that FY ‘62 expenditures should be financed by use of emergency funds and a later supplementary request as needed, and (c) that budgetary action should be subject to review by the NSC Committee recommended in paragraph 1. above, with advice from the Bureau of the Budget.

5. Finally, we think that division or disagreement in the NSC Committee should be promptly reported to you for decision—and of course any and all fall-out tests must require your personal approval.²

McG. B.³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61. Secret.
1. Not found.
2. At the end of the memorandum is the handwritten notation: “Approved. JFK”. NSAM No. 112, November 13, formally established the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy and designated Seaborg as Chairman. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 112)
3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.