Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, October 27, 1961, 9 p.m.

2294. Following is text of proposed draft declaration handed Secretary by Ormsby-Gore Oct 25.¹ President telephoned Macmillan Oct 27 informing him US could not join in declaration and suggesting that US and UK each adopt policy not to conduct particular test in atmosphere unless (a) atmospheric test is necessary as part of program the results of which contain possibility improvements of substantial military significance, and (b) result cannot reasonably and effectively be obtained in any other way.²

President also stated US unlikely conduct atmospheric test in immediate future and would advise UK prior to final decision being made.

Begin verbatim text

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, mindful of the dangers to the health of mankind, including children yet unborn, and conscious of their responsibilities for the security of free men everywhere, solemnly declare that:

1. They condemn the Government of the Soviet Union for breaking off the discussions in Geneva for a treaty to ban nuclear tests and for resuming atmospheric nuclear tests on a gigantic scale, which cannot even have any military purpose.

2. They undertake that any future tests of nuclear devices which their governments make will if possible be conducted underground in conditions where no danger to health can arise. They would feel themselves morally and politically free to conduct further atmospheric tests only if it was clearly proved and agreed by them that they had a duty to conduct such tests because they were essential to the preservation of freedom and the maintenance of the balance of deterrence. Neither the U.S. nor the U.K. sees any military reason to conduct atmospheric tests in the next six months and they will not undertake such tests during this period.

3. They propose to the Government of the Soviet Union that negotiations should immediately start again in Geneva or elsewhere in order rapidly to conclude a treaty for the controlled ending of nuclear tests within ______ months.

4. The President and the Prime Minister urge the Soviet Government to suspend all further nuclear tests, at least pending the consideration of the above proposals.

End verbatim text

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/10-2761. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Also sent to USUN.
1. Memorandum by Farley of conversation between Rusk and Ormsby Gore held October 25. (Ibid., 700.5611/10-1661) According to Ewell, Bundy stated at the White House staff meeting on October 26 that “Mr. Rusk’s first reaction is that this cuts across our announced policy, and he doesn’t like it.” Bundy also “observed that the hidden veto is probably unacceptable in any case.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily White House Staff Meetings, September-December 1961)
2. Kennedy’s remarks to Macmillan were along the lines of an October 26 memorandum from Foster to Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61) In an October 27 memorandum to the President, Bundy stated that “the agreed and unanimous position in the Government” was to reject Macmillan’s proposal, that Foster’s memorandum had “State, Defense and AEC” approval, and that “as the memorandum points out, the Prime Minister is trying to get you hooked to an agreement not to test without his consent. [text not declassified]” Bundy added that “our assessment is that the British Foreign Office and Ormsby-Gore both disagree with the Prime Minister’s proposal.” (Ibid.)