Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

81. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-713-61

Washington, October 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Test Firing of Weapon Systems (U)

1. In response to the memorandum by the Military Representative of the President, dated 29 September 1961,¹ on the desirability of firing an operational missile with a nuclear warhead, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are forwarded herewith.

2. Test firings of ballistic missile systems throughout the development phase and during operational training establish complete confidence in the basic design and proper operation of all components and subsystems. Such firings also give a valid assessment of the over-all reliability of the complete missile system as an operational entity. From a technical viewpoint, operational test firings to include full-scale detonations of the nuclear warhead have not been required in order to demonstrate proper operation of those complete systems which are now in the inventory. However, from a military viewpoint, full-scale firings would serve the useful purpose of providing realistic crew training and increasing crew confidence in the complete weapon systems. From a political and psychological point of view, such firings could have a significant beneficial impact.

3. So far as is known the USSR has not as yet detonated a nuclear warhead as part of a long-range ballistic missile demonstration. Such a demonstration with its adverse psychological impact on the West should be anticipated as a possible move in their continuing effort to intimidate the Free World. If the Soviets conduct such a firing, a subsequent similar demonstration by the United States would be of little value. A United States “first” in this regard, however, could serve many useful purposes including the strengthening of Free World resolve and increasing public confidence with regard to the operational reliability of US ballistic missile systems.

4. Successful firings of operational ballistic missile systems, complete with full-scale nuclear warheads, could and should be integrated into national cold-war planning so as to enhance our political posture in future negotiations. Of immediate importance, however, are demonstrations of the Atlas and Polaris as operational missiles. Such firings, if conducted on a timely basis, would serve as a powerful demonstration that the United States is negotiating from a position of readiness and strength. The firings could provide the initiative for a psychological offensive to counter the current Soviet series of nuclear weapons tests.

5. In light of the Berlin crisis, it is additionally desirable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the US and Allied tactical nuclear capability. An operational nuclear firing of the Honest John rocket could have significant psychological effect by confirming US and Allied troop confidence and in Soviet increased awareness of our capability to oppose major ground troop movements with this high density weapon. The Honest John rocket could be fired as a tactical demonstration on short notice and in conjunction with troop maneuvers.

6. With regard to safety aspects of the proposed firings, nuclear warheads are designed so as to give essentially no nuclear yield in event of accidental detonation of the high explosive by means other than the intended firing system. This provides safety for operations in the vicinity of the launch pad. In addition, numerous safety devices are incorporated into key elements of the arming, fuzing and firing systems to prevent detonation at other than the intended target area. It is considered that firing of operational missiles, including nuclear warheads, could be accomplished with adequate safety. World-wide fallout from such firings would be insignificant, and local fallout hazards could be controlled by proper selection of target areas and firing conditions, as set forth in JCSM-680-61.²

7. Since there is a possibility of failure of any one shot, sufficient firings should be planned so as to insure a successful demonstration. In this connection, firings should be sufficiently classified so as to preclude unauthorized publicity. As an additional cover, they should be interspersed with normal firings so that only successful shots are publicized.

8. To gain maximum impact it is considered mandatory that the full-scale firings be conducted prior to possible similar demonstrations by the USSR. Since timing is critical to attainment of the desired objectives, the proposed firings should be conducted as operational tests, thus avoiding the lengthy preparations normally associated with weapons effects or warhead testing.

9. In view of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that early approval be obtained for full-scale, nuclear shots of the Atlas and Polaris ballistic missile weapon systems and Honest John rocket so as to achieve a successful firing of each at the earliest possible time. Upon approval of the proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will propose a plan of execution for your consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112 Oct 61. Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation reads: “SecDef has seen.”
1. Taylor’s memorandum, addressed to McNamara, stated that the President’s “attention had been drawn” to the fact that the United States had never test-fired a missile with a nuclear warhead. “As there is always a possibility that the USSR may do some such thing, he would like your view as to the military desirability of checking out a missile system to this degree and, if your view is affirmative, whether such a firing should be considered for inclusion in our program for test firings.” (Ibid., OSD/AE Files: FRC 68 A 6453, 17 AWT WPNS Effects 1961)
2. Not further identified.