Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

82. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 10, 1961, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Committee of Principals on Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

• See Tab “A”¹

The Secretary opened the meeting by asking Mr. Foster what the first matter for consideration was. Mr. Foster said the first question for consideration was atmospheric nuclear testing—our own need for such tests and the relation to the UN debate. He asked for the views of Defense.

Mr. McNamara cited the Defense memorandum to the President of October 9,² a copy of which had gone to the State Department, which strongly urges making preparations for atmospheric testing. Mr. Seaborg indicated agreement with the Defense position, but not necessarily on the same grounds, noting that AEC does not share Defense’s view on the importance of proof testing.³

Mr. Bundy noted that proof testing in three weeks differs from developmental testing in six to nine months and that the Defense position had undergone a radical change. Secretary McNamara said that Defense wants approval to undertake preparations only. If the U.S. has to modify the warheads of the Polaris missile, preliminary work should start shortly.

Secretary Rusk noted that in September the U.S. proposed an atmospheric ban agreement. Since then, the Soviets had exploded almost two dozen nuclear devices. He asked if Defense believed the situation had changed militarily or politically by this series of tests.

Secretary McNamara replied that he would say both. He felt we should have asked for authority six or eight months ago to prepare for these tests. Mr. Bundy cited the September 20 Defense-AEC memorandum on test needs.⁴ Mr. Gilpatric agreed that Defense had accelerated its recommended program. We had not anticipated the rate of Soviet testing when the September 20 recommendations were made.

In response to a general request, Dr. Scoville summarized our information about the Soviet testing as follows: There have been twenty-four tests conducted over a broad range, including complete systems testing; four to six short-range missile launchings leading to a nuclear explosion, and an effects test at 100,000 to 200,000 feet which has not yet been announced. Our analysis of the debris is very tentative. Nothing so far has been done which is beyond the capabilities of the U.S. In summary, it shows a broad program including development, effects, and systems testing.

Mr. McNamara said the very breadth of the Soviet test program surprised us. However, he noted that Page 10 of the September 20 memorandum had asked for authority to prepare for atmospheric testing, so that the Defense position on this question was not really a basic change.

The Secretary asked about the political problem in the United Nations. Ambassador Dean replied that we have a joint US-UK resolution on the table and the Indians are planning to introduce a resolution.⁵ We are not sure what it will contain, but it will probably call for an uncontrolled indefinite moratorium on any further testing. The British and Swedes are very nervous about our position and the general estimate is that the Indian resolution will pass by a wide margin. However, the U.S. delegation feels that if it is clear that testing is essential, we can handle the political problem. He recommended that we clarify our position regarding further testing by the U.S. if we think it necessary, before the Indian resolution is passed rather than after. The British are pushing us very hard to renew the Kennedy-Macmillan offer. The U.S. delegation thinks our resolution calling for resumption of negotiations will pass by a very narrow margin with many abstentions. The Indian resolution will no doubt also pass, but by a wide margin.

Secretary McNamara noted that the Soviets may continue testing, or, alternatively, they may complete the test series and then accept an unpoliced moratorium. Chairman Seaborg noted that if we began testing preparations, they will become known and that will be tantamount to resuming testing. He felt we could not make additional preparations without their becoming known.

Secretary Rusk noted: (1) If the USSR says it is now ready to sign a test ban treaty, we would presumably agree. (2) We offered an atmospheric ban in September. (3) If we cannot maintain this policy, are we not forced to say either that the Soviets’ testing has changed the situation basically or that we were wrong six months ago?

Mr. Bundy stressed the difference between important developmental tests and proof tests, inquired as to the difference between the situation in September, when atmospheric proof tests had not been recommended, and October, when they were proposed for an early date. Mr. Nitze pointed out that the extent of Soviet tests had an effect on the political situation and that conducting proof tests would be a good idea if the Berlin talks failed and the international situation deteriorated. Mr. Bundy felt this was an essentially different problem. There was a difference between tests conducted for political effect and those conducted for significant military reasons.

Ambassador Dean thought that if we could postpone the tests and call for a moratorium for the duration of the General Assembly, it would help us politically. If we feel we have to test in the atmosphere from a military standpoint, let us decide the matter now so we can prepare for it politically. Mr. Foster agreed. Mr. Bundy asked if it made a difference if we “bang” now or “bang” later. Ambassador Dean thought it did not, but noted that Governor Stevenson thinks it does. Secretary Rusk said that the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency agree it is better to say so now if we decide it is necessary to test later. He wondered if there was any advantage in a short moratorium such as USUN had suggested in their telegram, 1123,⁶ and indicated he was not clear on the military and strategic implications.

Chairman Seaborg noted three factors for appraisal: (1) The extent of Soviet testing; (2) the fact of Soviet deception in preparing for tests while the Geneva talks were going on; (3) the Soviet rate of testing is so large compared to the rate of progress possible in underground testing. Mr. Bundy wondered whether there was a paper available on outer space versus atmospheric testing, since it is fall-out that creates the diplomatic problem. Secretary Rusk noted that the political climate was now shifting and that many countries were now against all tests, whether underground or not.

Secretary McNamara said we don’t know enough about the performance of our own weapons. Defense is increasingly concerned, especially about an anti-ICBM missile over the next four or five years.

Secretary Rusk said that we cannot have proposals outstanding which we are not ready to accept. While the test ban treaty is acceptable, we all agree that an uncontrolled moratorium is not. Ambassador Dean noted the Soviets might delay action on a moratorium resolution and then accept it at the end of the session when they were through testing. Ambassador Dean continued that if we could go back to Geneva, and agree not to test for say sixty days while we negotiated in good faith, we could knock the Indian resolution into a cocked hat. Secretary Rusk wondered what would be the effect of stating outright that we will sign a test ban treaty today but that we would not be a party to a moratorium hoax. We are prepared to negotiate but must reserve our right to test until the agreement is actually concluded. Under this procedure we would go ahead and prepare to test in the atmosphere. We were fully justified in taking a firm position on this matter in the light of the Soviet Union’s fantastic performance: many other governments would secretly be in favor of our position.

Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Dean and Mr. Cleveland if the testing issue would be a continuing problem at the UN. Mr. Cleveland replied that it would be an annual one. Ambassador Dean felt that the position suggested would be only mildly damaging. However, it was important to state clearly our intention to test before the vote is taken. Mr. Bundy thought we should enter a reservation and at the same time be ready to negotiate. It seemed to him that tests made for political reasons were not useful to the U.S. position.

Mr. Cleveland noted that we asked for the GA debate partly to educate other countries. We could enhance that position if it is possible to propose the atmospheric test ban again.

Secretary Rusk wondered whether the U.S. resolution would pass. Ambassador Dean said our liaison people thought it would pass. Mr. Cleveland was not sure that we would obtain a two-thirds majority, and Mr. Popper noted that amendments would be offered and efforts made to merge the U.S. and Indian resolutions. This would further confuse the issue. Ambassador Dean noted that Canadian Foreign Secretary Green’s efforts on radiation have already confused the situation. The Japanese, Canadians and the Swedes are very nervous. The newer nations would not support us. The British would not support us in an intention to resume atmospheric testing at this time.

Secretary Rusk noted the political burdens in the UN are heavy. He was not sure the U.S. could use up much political capital on this matter in the light of such issues as Chinese representation and Berlin. He asked Defense for a realistic specific assessment of the need for atmospheric testing. If we could repeat the Kennedy and Macmillan offer it would greatly facilitate our position at the UN.

Secretary McNamara thought (1) that if we renewed the offer and followed through with standby preparations, it would make us subject to criticism in the UN. We could not make preparations which would not become known. He was concerned about an open-ended moratorium. If the US knew the Soviets would test in the atmosphere, then he could agree; (2) if the international situation remains tense, Mr. McNamara thought we would have to assume the Soviets are continuing to prepare for more tests; (3) if this happens again in twelve to eighteen months, we will be in serious trouble.

Mr. Nitze assumed that if the Soviets agreed to a moratorium and then built on the 24 present tests, we would sustain a real set-back. If so, he would get away from a reliance on a nuclear deterrent, and change our Defense policy.

General Lemnitzer noted that if the Soviets said that they have developed an anti-ICBM missile, it could change the whole picture. Mr. Seaborg thought their ability to do so was unlikely.

Secretary Rusk said if the question is whether Defense can prepare for tests, can we say we will offer an atmospheric ban but at the same time tell the UN we are going to prepare to test, so that we will not be caught off base again? He saw two choices: 1) to reserve our freedom of action but be prepared to negotiate; or, 2) offer an atmospheric ban but also prepare to test. Mr. Cleveland thought we could do both.

Secretary Rusk asked about a procedural resolution directing the USSR, U.S., and UK to consult and report by the end of the Assembly as a means of delaying action on this question. Mr. Spiers thought the Soviets would oppose such a move and that it would thus not solve the basic problem. The Secretary felt it would at least put the vote off until the end of the session and help on things like Chinese representation. He asked Mr. Cleveland to frame the two alternatives for an early discussion with the President.

Mr. Cleveland summarized this directive as follows:

1) The U.S. favors a test ban treaty.

2) It reserves its right to prepare to test in the atmosphere.

3) It does not favor a moratorium.

Mr. Nitze felt the Soviets might increase its military capabilities by a factor of three to five over the U.S. He asked if the State Department was prepared to live with this politically. Messrs. Dulles and Scoville disagreed on technical grounds that the Soviets could accomplish this.

Secretary Rusk asked whether if atmospheric tests stop today, the advantage still rests with the U.S.? Secretary McNamara said that it did. Secretary Rusk thought that with preparations for testing publicly announced, we could renew the Kennedy-Macmillan offer. Mr. Bundy thought there was a weakness in making the offer again especially from the domestic political point of view. He thought this factor should be weighed.

Mr. Johnson noted that if we do not prepare for tests now we will continue to fall behind. Secretary McNamara asked what our attitude would be if the Soviets continue testing. He said there were three reasons in the Defense paper for testing: 1) long-range weapons development reasons; 2) a need for weapons proof tests; 3) system testing requirements. He urged that preparations be made for all three reasons. Secretary Rusk thought that the fact of making preparations would not be too difficult for us in the UN. He saw some advantage to adopting a simple, understandable position. He said he would like to discuss this further with his State Department colleagues after the meeting in preparation for further discussion with the Principals and the President. He summarized by saying the way to reach our objective is through a treaty; we cannot be a party to another moratorium hoax; we are ready to work hard for a treaty. In other words, we will stay with the treaty offer, but will not accept an uncontrolled moratorium.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by P.J. Halla of ACDA on October 12 and approved in S on October 25. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room.
1. Not printed. Rusk, Dean, Bundy, McNamara, Allen Dulles, Donald Wilson, Seaborg, Cleveland, Foster, Fisher, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Nitze, and Scoville were among the 31 present.
2. In his October 9 letter to the President, Gilpatric presented a detailed exposition of a testing program including many atmospheric and high altitude tests, with a request that the President “grant approval to prepare for a comprehensive test program.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, Oct 61)
3. Seaborg’s views on testing are set forth in a letter to the President, October 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, 9/27-10/11/61) See the Supplement.
4. Document 74.
5. See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 83.
6. Dated October 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/10-761) See the Supplement.