80. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle)0
In connection with the policy planning paper of September 131 on the subject of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability, I am not convinced that we should depart from our stated policy that we are opposed to the further extension of national nuclear weapons capability. For us to assist some other country, even for important political or psychological reasons, would start us down a jungle path from which I see no exit. Our problems with other countries and other continents on this matter could become quite unmanageable. Further, we must keep in mind that our policy rests upon the geometric progression of political difficulties as the number of atomic powers increases. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China. Top Secret. Drafted by Rusk.↩
- Reference is to McGhee’s September 13 memorandum to Rusk, which argued that to counter the security and propaganda impact of a Chinese nuclear explosion, estimated for as early as 1962, the United States should begin to explore the possibility of [text not declassified]. McGhee stated that Ambassador Galbraith [text not declassified] would at most agree to Wiesner, on a scheduled visit to India, asking Dr. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Authority, what effect a Chinese explosion would have on India’s atomic program. (Ibid., S/P Chron 1960-1961) See the Supplement.↩