Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

79. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, October 7, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: In his memorandum of September 22, 1961,¹ advising the Commission of your approval of our proposed program for resumption of testing of nuclear weapons, Mr. Bundy indicated that you wanted the schedule accelerated if possible.

This issue has been thoroughly investigated during my absence. In our consideration of all possible avenues for speeding up the test program we are studying the possibility of using a weapon device in connection with the Gnome shot of the Plowshare program scheduled for December. However, it is the conclusion of the Commission that we cannot accomplish any significant speed-up in the presently-planned program without resorting to atmospheric testing, although it is not the purpose of this letter to make a recommendation for atmospheric testing at this time.

Due to its very nature, underground testing requires a substantial amount of advance planning and preparation. For the next year, therefore, the scale of our test program is limited primarily by the capacity of the facilities at the Nevada Test Site. Our experience in the first event in the current series has also shown that unforeseen events can further limit the rate of progress. In this instance a venting of steam carrying radioactive materials contaminated one of our two major tunnel complexes at the Nevada site. We are working three shifts per day to clean up the tunnel, but it may be unusable for a month or more.

Therefore, if you should determine that our test program should be accelerated and increased in scope, atmospheric testing would be a necessary supplement to our current underground program. This is particularly true with regard to the detonation of devices of higher yields and those tests desired by the DOD for effects information and to prove weapons systems. Additional factors to be considered in evaluation of the pros and cons of resuming atmospheric tests are included in the joint AEC-DOD report submitted to you on September 20, 1961.²

In this connection, we have noted recent cables from Ambassador Stevenson to the State Department regarding the resolutions being introduced at the current U.N. General Assembly suggesting various types of moratoria, including a ban on atmospheric testing.³ I enclose a copy of a letter of even date which I have sent to Secretary Rusk outlining our views on these matters.⁴

Respectfully,

Glenn T. Seaborg

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 9/27-10/11/61. Secret; Restricted Data.
1. Not found.
2. Document 74.
3. These USUN cables deal with various permutations of possible U.N. resolutions regarding nuclear testing issues and are in Department of State, Central File 700.5611 for September and October 1961. Regarding the eventual U.S. position on these issues, see Document 83.
4. Not found attached. In this October 7 letter, Seaborg reviewed the history of the test ban moratorium, stated that the comprehensive nature of the Soviet test series had “given them an important relative advantage,” and concluded that in AEC’s opinion, “these factors clearly constitute strong reasons for retaining the President’s power to initiate atmospheric testing should he deem it necessary in the interest of national security.” (Seaborg, Journal, vol. 2, pp. 225-226) See the Supplement.