Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, September 5, 1961.

1178. Eyes only for Ambassador. Deliver urgently to Prime Minister Macmillan the following letter from President Kennedy dated September 5.

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to be sure that you understand fully my decision to resume underground testing.¹ This decision became inevitable as soon as the Soviets resumed testing, and as their tests continued one after another—the only answer to our proposal of Sunday²—it became clear to me that announcement of the decision could no longer be delayed. The world is being subjected to threats and terror. We have to show both our friends and our own people that we are ready to meet our own needs in the face of these new Soviet acts. And while of course we must keep our offer of Sunday open until September 9, I must say that the response in the first two days is not encouraging. As you know, we do not have in mind any early resumption of atmospheric testing unless unforeseen circumstances should require it. In my judgment, at this hour the gravest of our dangers is that we may seem less determined than Khrushchev.³

With warm personal regards. John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-561. Confidential; Niact. Approved by the President and Secretary Rusk. The time of transmission is not legible.
1. In a call to Bundy at 2:20 p.m. on September 5, Secretary Rusk asked if he should talk to the President about informing the British about the release of the testing statement. “Bundy said the thing had moved fast. Salinger was contacted by the President and the whole thing was on the way before he got control.” Rusk indicated he would call the President. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No record of Rusk’s call to the President has been found. At an unspecified time prior to release of the testing statement, Rusk gave Caccia a copy. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 711.5611/9-561)
2. September 3; see Document 63. Khrushchev gave a preliminary response to the U.S.-U.K. proposal during an interview on September 5 with Cyrus Sulzberger, published in The New York Times on September 8. Khrushchev replied to the President and the Prime Minister in a statement of September 9. Extracts from the interview and Khrushchev’s statement are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 355-360 and 384-391.
3. In Macmillan’s reply, received at the White House on September 7, he stated that he understood the reasons that led to the decision, thought press reaction “fairly good” at least in the United Kingdom, and was very glad “to have your assurance that you do not contemplate any early resumption of tests in the atmosphere. This is a much larger question on which we must surely go very carefully.” While only a small minority opposed testing because of opposition to nuclear weapons, many more felt a “legitimate anxiety” about testing’s dangers to health. “We must not gratuitously cause them alarm and I would trust that you will take no decision to resume tests in the atmosphere without full prior consultation with us.” (Text in telegram 1240 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-761)