Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, September 7, 1961, 9:22 p.m.

1241. Following message replies to Prime Minister’s letter delivered September 7 which being sent you in immediate following eyes only telegram.¹ Please deliver following, reporting time date delivery:

“September 7, 1961.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just received your message of today about atmospheric tests, and I am happy to assure you that we will consult carefully with you before any decision to resume atmospheric testing. I doubt if there will be any urgent need for such tests in the next few months. Over the long run, if the current Soviet position does not change, the situation may be quite different, and it may happen that we shall face again the same overriding need to test atmospherically that both our countries have experienced before. But the matter will be carefully weighed, and your opinion sought, before any such decision is made.

May I thank you also for your message of September fifth about nuclear tests. Obviously, it crossed our exchange about my decision to resume underground testing, but I am glad to have it as an expression of your thoughts.²

We have given a lot of thought to the possibility of taking the testing problem into the Security Council promptly, and we are still looking it over, but on balance it does not seem promising to us. In the Security Council we could probably get a fairly good resolution, but we would also get a Soviet veto and, as you say, they would certainly try to confuse the matter with an amendment on underground tests. The result would be indecisive, and it would involve a lot of unrelated and uncontrolled noise. So, on balance, we are inclined to think that it is better not to press the case in that forum. We have of course put down the whole problem of atomic testing for discussion in the General Assembly, and our two governments should keep in close touch on that as planning goes forward.

I agree with you that we should make a prompt statement in reply to any Soviet answer to our proposal of Sunday.³ It seems to me that whatever they say about underground tests or general and complete disarmament, our answer can be a straightforward one. We have now offered to make a treaty of control and inspection for the kinds of testing which require that assurance; we have offered an agreement to give up the kind of testing that can be detected without a special system. The Soviets have rejected both proposals and resumed fallout testing by unilateral decision; the responsibility for the consequences falls squarely on them.

Finally, let me also acknowledge your thoughtful letter of August 28th.⁴ Your statement of August 27th⁵ certainly hit exactly the right line, and I think we see eye to eye on the need for making it entirely clear that we are ready to enter into serious negotiations as soon as they can be useful. I am considering a more explicit statement on this point by the end of the week in view of the Belgrade efforts to show us the path of light and truth. I do not want Sukarno to come here with any illusion that he understands the need for negotiation better than I do. I expect to take up most of his time, in any event, by explaining the improvement in the world atmosphere that would result if he would promptly undertake fruitful negotiation with the Dutch on West New Guinea.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/9-761. Top Secret; Priority.
1. See footnote 3, Document 67.
2. In a covering note to the letter, Caccia indicated to Kennedy that the letter was drafted before Macmillan learned of Kennedy’s decision to announce resumption of testing. In the letter, Macmillan suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom, following the Soviet Union’s expected rejection of the September 3 atmospheric testing proposal, propose a U.N. resolution for an end to atmospheric testing by all nations, despite the risk of a Soviet amendment to include underground tests. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1960-1961) See the Supplement.
3. For text of a joint statement issued on September 9, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 403-404.
4. Not further identified.
5. Reference is presumably to a statement Macmillan made on August 26 regarding Berlin.