63. Editorial Note
According to a memorandum of a telephone call from Rusk to John J. McCloy in the late morning of September 2, 1961, “Sec. said he just had a talk with the Pres. and he, on his own initiative, started raising question of a proposal on the limitation of atmospheric tests.” (Department of state, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No Memorandum of Rusk’ telephone conversation with Kennedy has been found.
Rusk called a meeting to discuss this proposal. The account in Seaborg’s private journal, as subsequently edited by him, reads as follows:
[Page 159]“From 12:45 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. I attended a meeting with the Secretary of State in his Conference Room at the State Department. Also present were McCloy, Dean, Mac Bundy, Scoville, Gilpatric, Murrow, Cleveland, Harold Brown and General Wheeler.
“Rusk said that the President (who is in Hyannisport) had called him to suggest that the United States, together with Great Britain, probably should propose to the USSR an agreement that there might be no testing in the atmosphere.
“Gilpatric mentioned the need for testing in the atmosphere in connection with anti-ICBM tests, and Brown said this was our most important reason. Brown also mentioned the testing of the hardness of our missile launching sites and the effect of electromagnetic radiation on these sites.
“The effect of such a treaty on Plowshare was also mentioned, but it was agreed that the stakes were so high this might be relatively unimportant. It was agreed that the effect of such an agreement on weapons development would be quantitative rather than qualitative, at least up to some 10-megatons, and that the Russians would be impeded more than the U.S. if they must stay underground. On an effects test, it would be difficult to determine who would be impeded most. It was thought desirable to place a five-day limitation on the USSR answer to the proposal.
“McCloy was somewhat skeptical of the possible gain to this proposal from the standpoint of the neutrals; but he thought maybe from the standpoint of increasing our security, it was worthwhile. It was the general agreement that we should proceed to make such a proposal (copy attached).
“From 1:30 p.m. to 2 p.m. Secretary Rusk, Gilpatric, Bundy, McCloy and I discussed the procedure on the release pertaining to the above matter. It was decided that Rusk would clear it with the President later today; the members of the Joint Committee would be informed and the release probably would be made tomorrow.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 2, page 129) The “copy attached” refers to the proposed statement as issued, cited below.
In a telephone call to Foy Kohler at 5:05 p.m. on September 2, Rusk “said he was considering having President and Prime Minister Macmillan publicly propose to Mr. Khrushchev immediate cessation of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Does Mr. K. see any significant dangers involved? Mr. K. said no—he doesn’t think it would have a decisive effect one way or the other.” In a telephone conversation Rusk had with Bundy a few minutes later, Bundy stated that he had just discussed the proposed statement by phone with the President, who wanted the British to join in it and had suggested “we give them immediate notice.” A memorandum of a Rusk telephone conversation with Kohler later that evening indicates that consultations with the British were underway. [Page 160] (All three memoranda in Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
On the morning of September 3, Rusk called McCloy: “Sec. said on proposal we talked about yesterday re time duration of offer if we have difficulty with the British or perhaps anyhow wouldn’t it be wise to say this offer remains open pending further atmospheric shots so long as there are not additional atmospheric shots—it’s the logic of the proposal. McC. thinks that is all right.” In a telephone conversation with Murrow later that morning, Rusk reported learning that the British “wanted to shift from ‘atmospheric pollution’ to ‘further aggravation of international tension’. Mr. M. said the reaction in this country and abroad would be one of yielding. Sec. said there is a possibility of combining the two. Mr. M. said that would do it—atmospheric pollution is essential. Sec. thanked him.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; ibid.) The draft on which the British were commenting is apparently that in circular telegram 386, September 2, the opening sentence of which reads: “In order to protect mankind from the increasing dangers of atmospheric pollution, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom propose to Chairman Khrushchev that their three Governments agree, effective immediately, not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce atmospheric fallout.” (Ibid., Central Files, 700.5611/9-261)
In the early afternoon of September 3, Rusk received the following telegraphic message from Lord Home: “I am not happy about the last phrase of the new draft from ‘and regret’, which I think detracts from the positive tone of the rest. I do hope that the U.S. government can agree to omit it.” According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation with Lord Hood at 2:19 p.m., Rusk said he “doesn’t think we can turn around now. Pres. did not want to leave impression we were going into fruitless negotiations. LH understands and will pass this along.” (All three memoranda (Lord Home’s message is attached to the last of these) are ibid.) The draft on which Lord Home commented has not been found, nor has a record of Rusk’s telephone conversations with the President on this subject.
For text of the proposal by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan for a ban on atmospheric nuclear tests, issued jointly in Washington and London on September 3 at 3 p.m. EDT, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, page 351.