62. Memorandum From the President’s Special Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Governor Stevenson’s memorandum of August 31 re nuclear testing
I have been giving some thought to the possibility of immediate UN action along lines Governor Stevenson has proposed on the nuclear test issue. While I fully share the view that we should exploit to the utmost the propaganda advantage the Soviets have given us, I do not believe a US initiative for UN action at this time would on balance be advantageous.
I assume that the US will, in the light of the latest Soviet action, resume nuclear tests. The question is merely one of when. It seems to me inevitable that whatever the tactical skills employed in execution of a UN exercise at this stage, the outpouring of sentiment against all tests with or without a treaty, and with or without controls, would make a prompt US test resumption far more difficult and deprive us of the brief opportunity we now have to minimize the unfavorable consequences of our action by moving promptly in the wake of the Soviet resumption.
I believe, too, that any UN action is likely to eventuate in resolutions which in fact or in principle call for an uncontrolled test cessation or an uncontrolled moratorium. The US cannot propose or accept any resolution calling for an uncontrolled test cessation by either the Soviets or by both sides without departing from the most fundamental principle upon [Page 158] which any disarmament measure must be based—the principle of control. Since we cannot propose or accept a resolution calling for an uncontrolled moratorium, I doubt that we should choose as our field for propaganda exploitation an arena in which the overwhelming sentiment is likely to favor this course.
I think we should bear in mind, also, that action in the UN at this time could point up to a serious degree the differences between the French and ourselves on the testing issue. The French would be almost certain to veto a Security Council resolution against testing. I consider that this is a dangerous time to undertake unnecessary moves which would further split or reveal splits in allied solidarity.
On the purely tactical side I also question the wisdom of appearing to press too eagerly our propaganda advantage, by sponsoring condemnations of the Russians. The Soviet action has not gone unnoticed. Its effect might be diminished if we seek too obviously to capitalize upon it. In this situation perhaps we can let the neutrals take the initiative rather than turning this too obviously into a cold war issue where they will feel compelled to seek a middle ground.1
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. Confidential.↩
- In a handwritten postscript, McCloy added: “Arthur Dean strongly concurs.” A memorandum of a call from Rusk to Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, made the afternoon of September 1, indicates that IO wanted the testing issue to go to the United Nations, that Schlesinger had told Cleveland the President was also interested in this possibility, and that Schlesinger had asked Stevenson to draft a possible resolution. Rusk stated that “we may need the SC for Berlin.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.↩