Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

61. Editorial Note

On August 31, 1961, the President held several meetings to discuss Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. According to the account in Seaborg’s journal:

“At 10 a.m. I attended a meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room. Others present were: Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Harold Brown, Murrow, Rusk, Bohlen, Bundy, Schlesinger, Taylor, Wiesner, Scoville, Dulles and Sorensen. The meeting opened with the President’s calling on Dulles to begin with any pertinent comments that he might have. After a brief description of the receipt of the information that the Russians were going to resume testing prior to the actual announcement at 7 p.m. yesterday, Dulles described the method that had been used in announcing Soviet tests in the past.

“He said that the Soviets had not announced them themselves, but the United States had announced them either via the White House (and this was limited to the first few tests, or the most important tests) or, more generally, via the AEC. Dulles thinks, however, that the Soviets may now start to announce the tests as they occur. In the past we often made two announcements—a rather immediate one based on the acoustic and seismic data and then a later one based on the data obtained from atmosphere sampling. He estimated that the United States had announced some 50 to 60 Soviet tests.

“The President suggested that perhaps a method of procedure would be to have the AEC make an announcement that they are preparing for testing in order to be ready in case the decision is made to resume testing. This would have the advantage of avoiding a direct commitment so soon after the Russian announcement, which would negate some of our propaganda advantage, but at the same time it would reassure people in the United States and our Allies that we are not standing still.

“Murrow argued strongly for waiting a while—perhaps a few weeks—before making any statement that we had decided to resume testing in order to let the Soviet announcement take the maximum effect around the world.

“Rusk favored a statement now in order that the impression not be created that the President is indecisive on this matter.

“The Vice President tended to agree that there shouldn’t be any immediate announcement that we have decided to resume testing but also pointed out that it wouldn’t hold very long since Gore, Symington and Mansfield had made speeches this morning.

“In connection with the proposed discussion with Congressional leaders, McNamara recommended that he say we have a bomb in the stockpile which can be delivered by our current aircraft and that we see no requirement for bombs of 60-80-100 megatons. He wanted to report that we believe we could build a 50-megaton bomb within the delivery capability of currently available aircraft and based on currently known technology so that further testing would not be required. We could also build a 100-megaton bomb deliverable by the B-52, but it would have to be based on a new design which would require testing. A question was then raised as to whether or not we could say we are primarily interested in a new test series to be concentrated on tactical weapons; but Dr. Brown pointed out that some of the devices now proposed for early test have to do with Minuteman and Polaris warheads, which would certainly be for strategic purposes.

“McNamara then proposed a somewhat different response. He stated that our response should now stress the fact that we are strengthening our military preparations in connection with Berlin such as calling up an Army Division and other similar actions. He also stated that he had just reviewed the Nike-Zeus development program; he would be prepared at this time to recommend that a decision be made to produce the Nike-Zeus weapon system on a somewhat limited production base to provide for protection for some 9 to 10 cities at roughly $2.5 billion cost. He stated that he could meet the FY 1962 commitment to such a program out of his current budget and that the remaining funds would be spread over the next few years. The production program would not begin to provide actual protection until about four years from this time.

“The primary conclusion of the meeting was to hold back on any decision or announcement until the President had been able to discuss the subject with Congressional leaders, making an effort to assess, in the course of that discussion, how realistic it would be to expect those most vocal in urging the resumption of tests not to stir things up too badly over the next few days. It was proposed at one point that we announce that the decision is to be made at the next NSC meeting, presumably on Tuesday of next week; but his suggestion was rejected on the basis that it would focus too much attention on that meeting and result in a build-up of interest that would be detrimental to the position we would like to pre-sent to the world public.

“As the time was drawing near for the Congressional leaders to come in for the meeting which was immediately to follow, the President summarized by saying that he would present to the Congressional group the idea that the AEC was being directed to prepare to resume testing, but that no announcement would be made along these lines until at least after Labor Day weekend in order that we might have maximum propaganda value accruing to the United States as a result of the USSR action.

“The next meeting was held from 10:45 to 11:40 a.m. and was attended by the President, the Vice President, McNamara, Rusk, Lemnitzer, Bundy, Senators Mansfield, Jackson, Fulbright, Gore, Kuchel, Symington, Dirksen, Russell, Saltonstall, Pastore, Humphrey, Congressmen Holifield and Halleck and other Congressional leaders. McCloy came in about the middle of the meeting.

“The President opened the meeting by saying that he was directing the AEC to make preparations for the resumption of testing so that they could conduct tests, certainly before the end of September, but that he also wanted to explore with them the possibility of deriving the maximum propaganda benefit by the U.S. from the recent Russian announcement to resume testing, refraining from making an announcement so soon after the Russian announcement.

“Russell made the opening statement by saying that this was a God-given opportunity to exploit the maximum propaganda value, and he suggested that we should delay any announcements as to the resumption of testing in order to have maximum benefit.

“Gore inquired as to the reaction in Western Europe, and Murrow said that it generally had been one of revulsion to the Russian action and was favorable toward the U.S. He mentioned the possibility of bringing the question to the United Nations, particularly with respect to arguing against testing in the atmosphere. He seemed generally to be favoring waiting before the U.S. makes any announcement on the resumption of testing.

“Jackson asked whether the Soviet announcement at this time might not reflect some weakness in the Soviet Union, such as, Khrushchev’s having internal difficulties or difficulties with China. He also mentioned the possibility that the reason for their step was that they have a new spectacular device which they want to test and which has been developed as far as it can be by testing clandestinely.

“Dulles replied by saying he saw no sign of any rift in the government of the Soviet Union. Humphrey suggested that perhaps Khrushchev just gave in to the pleas and pressures of people in the Soviet Union who would be pressuring him to resume testing, pointing out this has been the situation in the United States also and that it has taken tremendous forbearance on the part of the President to resist these pressures.

“Dirksen said he thought the Soviet Union had taken this step in order to impress the maximum amount of fear on the world and, hence, to gain respect on this basis.

“Symington said that he wanted to reiterate what he had been saying all along and that was he believed they had been testing clandestinely.

“Gore said he thought their goal was world intimidation, that they wanted to break the will of the world to resist and, in particular, the will of the Western European Allies. He thought that the President should state that the U.S. has a superior stockpile of weapons and that there is no need for alarm because of the Soviet announcement.

“The President suggested that McNamara might hold a press conference in which he would state bluntly that the U.S. has a stockpile of nuclear weapons from three to seven times greater than that of the Soviet Union, and, in general allay the fears of our own people and Allies. He again raised the possibility of the AEC’s making an announcement that the President has directed the AEC to get ready for testing.

“Jackson reiterated that he thought we should go about this quietly for the next few days and that the AEC shouldn’t make any announcement now. Russell said it would be better to make an announcement denouncing the Soviet action, speaking of it as a crime against humanity, etc. Holifield then spoke on several points: that we had the capability of building a 50- or 100-megaton bomb; that we hadn’t seen fit to do so; that he was concerned about the effect on Great Britain of any long period of silence in which we wouldn’t indicate our intentions; that we should be careful to leave open the possibility of atmospheric testing, and that any public announcement concerning resumption of testing should be made within a few days.

“McCloy indicated that he was puzzled by the Russian action. Khrushchev had told him the Soviet Union wouldn’t test until after the U.S. had started to test. Something had changed his mind. Perhaps this was the desire to build up fear throughout the world with reference to the 100-megaton bomb. He thought the U.S. should defer announcement of the resumption of testing, but that in the announcement we should leave open the possibility of atmospheric testing eventually. He said that he thought we should give some time to trying to figure out just what was motivating the Russians in the direction they are taking. The Vice President indicated he thought the Soviet action might be a reaction to their failure to intimidate the U.S. in the Berlin situation. Symington indicated that he was in favor of McNamara’s having a press conference to indicate the greater nuclear capability of the U.S. as compared with the Soviet Union.

“I raised the question of whether the 100-megaton bomb might not have terrible consequences if exploded in the ocean near some of our populous centers by creating a tidal wave, etc. McNamara and Lemnitzer felt that this was not a serious matter, that this already could be done with some of the smaller weapons.

“The President thanked the Congressional leaders. The meeting broke up with the general consensus that the AEC would make preparations for the resumption of testing (and the President reiterated this) but that there wouldn’t be any announcement until after Labor Day weekend in order that we might have maximum propaganda benefit. There seemed to be agreement that everyone concerned would defer comment in response to questioning from newspapers as best he could.

“Another meeting took place from 11:45 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. Present were McCloy, Dulles, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Murrow, Bundy, Bohlen, Harold Brown, Scoville, Fisher, John Foster and I. The President came in at the end of this meeting. The time was spent in preparing a draft of a statement that the President might make at the end of this meeting. I made the point that the agreed upon program, wherein the AEC does undertake preparations for testing, has in it the inherent possibility of a leak; hence, it would become known that we are doing so, and, in any case, commits us to such a program; although we might get past the Labor Day weekend without a leak, serious preparations couldn’t go on very long before becoming known.

“I also made a plea for following the carefully prepared program which the DOD and the AEC had outlined rather than a crash program. However, it was decided not to make this decision today, and it was decided that we would direct our laboratories to prepare for the three types of tests that McNamara and I had discussed yesterday, namely, the proof testing of the Davy Crockett in about two weeks; the testing of the second device in about four weeks; and, the testing of the third device in about six weeks.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 2, pages 120, 126-128)

Everett Dirksen of Illinois was Senate Minority Leader. Representative Chet Holifield of California was Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee was a member of that Committee, as was Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Richard B. Russell of Georgia was Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senator Jackson and Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri were members.

For text of the White House statement issued following these meetings, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, page 350.