Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

60. Memorandum by the Ambassador to the United Nations (Stevenson)⁰

New York, August 31, 1961.

RE

• Nuclear testing

1. Allow a day or two for neutralist sentiment to express itself. In this connection see to it that Nehru is asked by the President whether India still subscribes to the statement in its memorandum of July 28th that “any state which resumes these tests would become primarily responsible for the deterioration of the entire position.”

2. Call on Saturday¹ for a prompt meeting of the Security Council to deal with the threat of peace and security posed by the Soviet decision anticipating that the meeting take place some time next week—possibly Thursday September 7th.

3. Introduce in the Security Council jointly with the United Kingdom a resolution calling on the USSR to change its position, and on all others to refrain from testing in connection with this appeal, and for early completion of a testing agreement with adequate inspection not subject to the veto or to any form of “self inspection”. Be prepared to proceed along these lines even if the French protest.

4. When the USSR vetoes this resolution promptly introduce a procedural resolution to Article 12 of the Charter taking note of the serious situation created by the Soviet Union’s position and the Soviet’s veto and asking the General Assembly to make urgent recommendation (this should come about September 12-13).

5. Cover the subject extensively in the President’s speech to the General Assembly.

6. Speak at an early period in the general debate and conclude with a resolution along the lines of the Security Council’s resolution, with “a view to a final vote by the middle of October.”

7. Immediately following the vote in the General Assembly the United States and the United Kingdom dispatch a final appeal to the Soviet Union calling for compliance by the USSR.

8. When the USSR rejects this appeal, or gives a dusty answer, President Kennedy announces that he has decided that the United States must resume testing in self protection, including appropriate statements about safeguards.

9. If it is necessary to make an immediate announcement on our intention in regard to testing (it would be preferable not to) the President should say that he has ordered preparation for the resumption of underground testing only in the interest of national security, but has not taken a final decision to resume testing pending a final effort by the nations of the world to get the Soviet Union to change its mind.

10. It must be understood that if the USSR agrees to a UN resolution to postpone testing we must be prepared to do so as well.²

Adlai E. Stevenson³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 8/31-9/5/61. No classification marking. There is no addressee, but the memorandum was apparently routed to Bundy.
1. September 2.
2. In a telephone conversation with Rusk that evening, Stevenson stated that he just heard that McCloy’s office was trying to persuade the President to “make a statement re the resumption of testing. He wanted personally to say this is a big mistake. This is not a blow; it is a bonanza.” Rusk replied that at the day’s meetings (see Document 61) “it was decided no” and added that “we don’t expect to say anything for a week or so in any event.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.